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Abstract 
This research thesis explores technical, legal and organisational challenges of 
digital evidence and the implications of their inter-relationships for responses 
to criminal, illegal and inappropriate on-line behaviours. From a forensic 
computing perspective the solutions to these challenges have tended to focus 
on discrete sets of technical, legal or organisational issues individually. Lack of 
understanding of the inter-relationships between these issues is inhibiting the 
development of integrated and coordinated solutions that can effectively 
balance requirements for the generation of legally admissible digital evidence, 
e-security and privacy. More significantly, this research highlights that the 
fragmented nature of these discrete approaches may be impairing the overall 
effectiveness of the responses developed. 
The methodological framework underpinning this exploratory research adopts 
a subjective ontology and employs an interpretative epistemology. The 
research strategy involves the examination of three cases on technical, legal 
and organisational challenges of digital evidence respectively. Each case is 
analysed independently and the interpretation and discussion adopts a forensic 
computing perspective to interpret and discuss the inter-relationships across 
these areas and to explore the implications for digital evidence and the 
underlying problematic on-line behaviours. Case A examines the validity of 
quantitative data collected by running a network intrusion detection system 
(NIDS) SNORT on University network. Case B examines an Australian 
Federal Court case illustrating legal arguments applied to digital evidence, its 
discovery and presentation. Case C examines the Cyber Tools On-line Search 
for Evidence (CTOSE) project highlighting the difficulties of developing and 
implementing organisational level processes for digital evidence handling. 
Analysis of Case A involves descriptive statistical analysis of network data and 
reveals significant problems with the validity and quality of the data. The 
results of the case analysis show that data collected by SNORT are not 
sufficient to track and trace the sources of the attacks. The analysis also 
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reveals that the data sets collected may be flawed, erroneous or already have 
been tampered with. Despite significant fine tuning, SNORT continued to 
generate numerous false positive alerts and/or wrongly identified sources of 
attacks. This case highlights that intrusion detection systems can play an 
important role in protecting information systems infrastructure, but to be 
effective they require the attention of highly trained security personnel/system 
administrators. These personnel also need to engage in regular monitoring and 
analysis of alerts and other log files, and to ensure regular updating of the rule 
sets used by these systems. 
Analysis of Case B reveals the impact of legal misconceptualisations about the 
nature of digital systems on court decisions and on the generation of legal 
precedents that have potentially broader social implications. The results of the 
analysis reveal serious flaws in understanding amongst all participants in the 
case over the nature of digital evidence and how it should best be collected, 
analysed and presented. More broadly, the judgement also appears to have 
worrying implications for individual privacy and data protection. 
Analysis of Case C highlights the practical challenges faced at the 
organisational level in the implementation of models and tools for digital 
evidence handling. The analysis highlights that models and tools that have been 
developed for handling digital evidence are by their very nature and 
complexity highly problematic to adopt and utilise in organisational settings. 
A key element that continues to inhibit their use is the lack of early and 
comprehensive end-user education. The results from this case highlight the 
critical need for organisations to have greater 'forensic readiness' for dealing 
with criminal, illegal or inappropriate on-line behaviours. 
Interpretation and discussion of the analyses from the three cases adopts a 
forensic computing perspective and focuses on the nature of the inter-
relationships between the issues identified in each case. From this perspective 
the discrete approaches adopted in each case limit an appreciation of the 
complex interplay between technical, legal and organisational factors, an 
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interplay that because of the nature of digital environments continues to have 
serious implications for each of these areas. More specifically, this 
interpretation and discussion reveals how and why this continued 
fragmentation of discrete approaches is impairing the overall effectiveness of 
the responses developed. A consequence of this is the lack of integrated and 
coordinated solutions that would effectively balance requirements for legally 
admissible digital evidence, effective e-security and data privacy. 
At the broadest level, this research reveals these complex inter-relationships 
and confirms that they are likely to continue into the future as a result of 
uncoordinated research and development. The underlying paradoxes prevalent 
within the forensic computing domain result from the different concerns, 
interests and expectations of stakeholders and the nature and foci of research 
and development in each domain. This in turn ultimately leads to developments 
that are beneficial for improved performance in one area and at the same 
moment creates new challenges and inhibitors in another area. These 
circumstances have the on-going potential to trigger 'chain reactions' that 
ultimately may lead to more significant challenges than the problems they 
solve. 
This research also reveals that the digital domain itself is also intimately related 
to the physical world where corroborative evidence and conventional 
investigative techniques have an equally important role to play. Ultimately, it is 
human behaviours that create these ongoing opportunities, challenges and 
risks. As a result, 'forensic readiness' also implies being able to grapple with 
moral, ethical and even political dimensions of these debates across the 'last 
mile' connection between digital behaviours and identifiable citizens. 
In this context, forensic computing emerges as an approach that does not 
advocate for stronger laws, stricter technical systems and/or organisational 
protocols per se, but rather for the beginning of dialogue amongst these 
different requirements. In responding to the complex inter-relationships 
identified in this research, it is clear that solutions developed need to be aware 
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of their specific aims and objectives as well as the broader context, if we are to 
avoid the on-going 'band-aid' approaches. 
This research thesis concludes that there is no easy solution to resolve the inter-
relationships and paradoxes inherent within forensic computing issues. 
However, by recognising that these paradoxes exist, how they work and what 
their impacts are, measures can be developed to reduce their negative effects. 
In this regard, coordinated academic research is contributing to the emergence 
of cohesive and holistic approaches to understanding, implementing and 
evaluating the paradoxes within forensic computing. 
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1 Introduction 
"Many criminal investigations will include computers at some point in 
the case. Murder and rape suspects may, through a search warrant, 
have their email and Internet activities analyzed to find evidence about 
their motives or hiding locations. Corporations investigate computers 
when an employee is suspected of unauthorized actions. Fraud 
investigations collect transaction history evidence from servers. It is 
_ 
therefore important that a process model for the digital investigation 
exists and that it easily interacts with the physical investigations that 
have long existed" (Carrier & Spafford, 2003). 
This research thesis explores technical, legal and organisational challenges of 
digital evidence and the implications of their inter-relationships for responses 
to criminal, illegal and inappropriate on-line behaviours. 
This research involves an investigation of three independent cases that focus on 
the technical, legal and organisational challenges of digital evidence 
respectively. Each case is analysed independently and the interpretation and 
discussion explores the inter-relationships between the cases and their 
implications for ongoing responses to problematic on-line behaviours and the 
discipline of forensic computing. 
This chapter provides a summary of the background to the thesis and identifies 
the primary research questions and research objectives. It also highlights the 
contribution that this research makes to the theory and practice of forensic 
computing and provides a summary of the other chapters in the thesis. 
More specifically, the first part of this chapter provides a background to the 
area of forensic computing and highlights the adoption of a forensic computing 
perspective and how this re-positions both the problems and solutions 
experienced in relation to digital evidence in each of the three areas (technical, 
legal and organisational). This research reveals a lack of coordination amongst 
the discrete approaches that have been developed in each of the three areas to 
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address problematic on-line behaviours. More significantly, the forensic 
computing perspective adopted highlights how the nature of digital evidence 
and these problematic behaviours create inter-relationships that challenge the 
very solutions developed in each discrete area. 
The second part of this chapter describes the research problem and presents the 
primary research questions and research objectives. In addition, this section 
also describes the scope of the research. 
The third part of this chapter presents the justification for this research and 
summarises the contributions made at the substantive, methodological and 
theoretical levels. 
The final part of this chapter provides a summary outline of the thesis structure 
and its chapters. 
1.1 Background 
In exploring the technical, legal and organisational challenges of digital 
evidence and the implications of their inter-relationships for responses to 
criminal, illegal and inappropriate on-line behaviours, this thesis adopts a 
forensic computing perspective. Forensic computing has become the focus of 
considerable academic and industry attention in the last ten years and has 
usefully been defined by Broucek and Turner (2006) as: 
"the processes or procedures involving monitoring, collection, analysis 
and presentation of digital evidence as part of `a priori' and/or 'post-
mortem' investigations of criminal, illegal or other inappropriate on-
line behaviours." 
By adopting a forensic computing perspective, this research has been able to 
illuminate the inter-relationships amongst discrete approaches to the challenges 
of problematic on-line behaviours. 
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Forensic computing perspective is primarily concerned with generating a true 
and accurate picture of activities, timelines and events that have occurred on 
hosts, networks and in applications, to be in a position to validate whether 
criminal, illegal or other inappropriate on-line behaviours have occurred. 
At one level, the forensic computing perspective is somewhat technical in its 
approach; however, it is this very perspective that enables the illumination of 
differences in approach, definitional ambiguities, and understandings amongst 
technical, legal and organisational experts. By highlighting the persistence of 
these differences amongst experts from different disciplines, it becomes 
possible to account for the continued lack of coherence in responses to the 
challenges faced. 
More broadly, forensic computing can be seen as being similar to forensic 
medicine, forensic psychology and other 'forensic' disciplines. However, of 
course, the nature of the subject matter that forensic computing deals with — 
digital data and corroborative information — makes it very different. For 
example, while the subject matter of a discipline like forensic medicine is 
physically tangible, i.e. a human body or part thereof, the subject matter of 
forensic computing tends to be more intangible in its nature. It is difficult to 
'touch' data travelling over the Internet or through wireless networks and 
although it is possible to touch a physical computer, it is again very difficult to 
inspect, observe or 'touch' the actual data stored on that computer. 
Additionally, the data in computers and other digital communication devices 
and networks are in the form of binary code rather than in human readable 
form. 
Forensic computing is also often incorrectly understood as computer forensics. 
However, computer forensics is primarily focused on the usage of computing 
technology to support conventional human forensic work. In this context, 
computers are used to help in other forensic disciplines — for matching DNA, 
fingerprints and many other time consuming tasks. Huge amounts of data are 
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stored in databases and retrieved by computers as part of forensic 
examinations. 
This thesis concentrates on forensic computing or as it is increasingly being 
referred to by the terms e-forensics and digital forensics. 
The next three subsections provide a very brief introduction to some of the 
challenges being faced and responses being developed to problematic on-line 
behaviours within technical, legal and organisational areas. 
1.1.1 Technical Area 
Criminal, illegal and inappropriate on-line behaviours are most often 
considered to be problems for computer security, military intelligence and 
cyber-policing experts. Problematic on-line behaviours that involve computer 
misuse (e.g. malware, hacking) and/or are assisted by computer (e.g. internet 
paedophilia, fraud) have led to an explosion of industry, government and 
academic research, development and commercial activity (Denning, 1999; 
Etter, 2000a, 2000b, 2000c). 
As a result, developments in the technical area of computer security, for 
example antivirus software, continue to occur rapidly both in the commercial 
and open source arenas. It is, however, important to recognise that the drivers 
for new developments vary between researchers and commercial operators. 
Indeed, it has been argued that despite numerous new products emerging on to 
the market, most commercial vendors are reactive to problems rather than 
proactive (Broucek & Turner, 2005b, 2006). 
Additionally, developments in these technical areas tend to focus exclusively 
on improving technical capabilities of the tools such that questions around 
digital evidence are marginalised or ignored. 
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1.1.2 Legal Area 
In contrast to the speed of development in the technical area, developments in 
the legal area remain relatively slow and tradition bound. While national and 
international frameworks do exist to address some of the challenges posed by 
digital technologies and the Internet, the practice of law within the court 
systems exhibit considerable variation. 
Aside from problems of applicable law or the technological neutrality of 
particular legal codes, problems exist with legal professionals understanding of 
digital technology when making analogies with pre-existing case law. The 
digital domain poses significant conceptual challenges to notions of chain of 
evidence, chain of custody, original versus copy and legal admissibility. 
Additionally, responses in these legal areas have often ignored how changes in 
one area of digital information law have direct or indirect consequences for the 
balance of rights in another area of information law. For example, it has been 
argued that strengthening digital intellectual property rights can have negative 
consequences for personal privacy and information access (Samuelson, 2002). 
1.1.3 Organisational Area 
With developments in electronic commerce, organisations have been quick to 
recognise the commercial opportunities provided by the Internet. However, 
most have become aware of the risks posed by criminal, illegal or inappropriate 
on-line behaviours by their employees, customers or criminals. In particular, 
organisations remain concerned about fraud, defamation and loss of reputation, 
financial loss and the loss of a competitive edge. 
In response to the above mentioned issues, organisations have developed 
policies and procedures to safeguard themselves. However, it can be seen that a 
lack of understanding of the nature of digital information and users' on-line 
behaviours often means these approaches compound the very problems that 
they are trying to solve (Broucek & Turner, 2003a). 
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Additionally, regardless of the effectiveness of organisational approaches, there 
remains a strong tendency to 'pull the plug' when problems are detected rather 
than to engage in a systematic investigation, collection and analysis of digital 
evidence of the on-line behaviours that have occurred (Leyden, 2000; Maher, 
2001; Microsoft, 2000; Microsoft UK website Hacked - VIGILANTe 
Statement," 2001; Mitnick, 2000; Rohde, 2000). 
1.2 The Research Problem 
As indicated above, digital technologies and the Internet open up potential risks 
from problematic on-line behaviours that have become the focus of interest for 
technical, legal and organisational researchers and practitioners. While each set 
of responses face difficult challenges to overcome, it is only by adopting a 
forensic computing perspective that the implications of a lack of coordination 
amongst these responses can be investigated. 
Forensic computing requires a multidisciplinary approach (Broucek & Turner, 
2001a, 2001b) and itself continues to be the subject of much debate concerning 
definitions, models and approaches. Broucek and Turner (2001b) presented an 
initial taxonomy of the field and this was later developed and extended 
(Hannan, Turner, & Broucek, 2003). Other models and definitions have been 
developed by other players, for example by First Digital Forensic Research 
Workshop (Palmer, 2001) and by EU funded project CTOSE (CTOSE, 2003; 
Urry & Mitchison, 2003). These models and definitions also reflect the 
ongoing debates inherent within the root disciplines that contribute to its multi-
disciplinary nature. 
Most significantly, a forensic computing perspective allows for an examination 
of each specific area and its response to problematic on-line behaviours as well 
as providing a conceptual framework within which to explore the implications 
of their inter-relationships. The lack of coordination and fragmentation that 
appears evident is caused by the fact that each area is grappling with its own 
problems, issues and challenges. The researchers and practitioners in each of 
the areas are attempting to address these challenges and ultimately make their 
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area 'better'. Unfortunately, by making improvements in one area, another area 
may be negatively affected and suffer significantly, thereby diminishing the 
overall effectiveness of the responses (Broucek & Turner, 2005a, 2005b). 
This research thesis aims to explore the problems and challenges in each area, 
the responses being developed in each area and the implications of the inter-
relationships across these areas for digital evidence and the underlying 
problematic on-line behaviours. 
1.2.1 The Research Questions 
To address the research problem identified above, two research questions were 
formulated: 
Research Question 1: What are the key technical, legal and organisational 
challenges of digital evidence? 
Research Question 2: What inter-relationships exist between technical, legal 
and organisational approaches and what implications do these have for the 
responses being developed? 
1.2.2 The Research Objectives 
A review of the research literature presented in Chapter 2 reveals that there has 
been limited academic research into technical, legal and organisational 
challenges of digital evidence and/or the implications of their inter-
relationships for responses to criminal, illegal and inappropriate on-line 
behaviours. There are large numbers of publications and ongoing research 
projects within each area (technical, legal, organisational); however, to date 
there appears to be limited research investigating questions of digital evidence 
or inter-relationships amongst the responses being developed. In answering the 
research questions above, this thesis has the following research objectives: 
• Identify the key technical, legal and organisational challenges of digital 
evidence; 
23 
• Determine the inter-relationships between the technical, legal and 
organisational approaches; 
• Understand the key tensions and contradictions within and between each 
area in relation to digital evidence and problematic on-line behaviours; 
• Explore the implications of these inter-relationships for emerging responses 
to criminal, illegal and inappropriate on-line behaviours; 
• Identify potential solutions balancing the interests of privacy of the 
individual, security for the network and the demands of the courts for 
legally admissible evidence. 
1.2.3 The Research Scope 
To answer the research questions and satisfy the research objectives detailed 
above, the scope of this research involves the conduct of three independent 
case studies, each analysing challenges of digital evidence within technical, 
legal and organisational areas respectively. Following independent analysis of 
each case this research adopts a forensic computing perspective to interpret and 
discuss their inter-relationships and to explore the implications for emerging 
responses to criminal, illegal and inappropriate on-line behaviours. 
In the technical area, Case A concentrates on an examination of data collected 
by the open source Intrusion Detection System (IDS) called SNORT. This IDS 
was at the time of conducting the experiment considered to be the best IDS 
available in the world. Case A focuses on an Intrusion Detection System partly 
because of the strong public disagreement between two leading experts 
(Sommer (1998b) and Stephenson (2000a, 2000b)) about the usability of IDS 
for collection of digital evidence (Broucek & Turner, 2003c). 
In the legal area, Case B concentrates on an examination of an Australian legal 
case - Sony Music Entertainment (Australia) Limited v University of Tasmania 
heard in the Federal Court of Australia. This case was selected mainly because 
it involved the University of Tasmania (the host institution of the researcher) 
making access to detailed information on the case more available (Broucek, 
Turner, & Frings, 2005). 
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In the organisational area, Case C concentrates on organisational experience of 
a European methodology developed for digital evidence acquisition (CTOSE). 
This case was selected because of an opportunity to participate as a 
collaborating researcher in the European project developing the methodology 
(Hannan, Turner, et al., 2003). 
1.3 Justification for the Research 
The information society is based on computers and networked communication 
technology. The Internet is increasingly accessible and is being adopted and 
utilised by all sectors of society. For example, in Australia, "the rate of access 
has quadrupled in recent years, from 16% of Australian households in 1998 to 
64% in 2006-07" (Australian Bureau of Statistics, 2008). 
This increased use of network technologies creates both greater opportunities 
and greater risks to individuals, organisations, governments and society as a 
whole. Unfortunately, some users engage in problematic on-line behaviours. 
These criminal, illegal or inappropriate on-line behaviours can be deliberate or 
accidental and have the potential to do more than simply challenge computer 
security. They also have implications for the privacy of individuals and for 
organisational and legal responses to them and the acquisition of evidence of 
these behaviours. 
At the substantive level, this thesis contributes three case studies specifically 
focused on the challenges of the digital evidence. By adopting a forensic 
computing perspective this research also illuminates the range of inter-
relationships that exist across the cases and the implications that these pose for 
the way in which potential future solutions may be developed that more 
effectively balance a range of requirements. 
At the methodological level, this thesis illustrates the utility of the forensic 
computing perspective for revealing complex inter-relationships across 
individual areas of knowledge that are not immediately evident to experts 
within those specific areas. 
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At the theoretical level, this thesis contributes to an improved understanding of 
complex nature of digital evidence and on-line behaviours as well as pointing a 
way forward through the inherent paradoxes that exist within the digital 
domain and its links with the 'real' world. 
Accordingly, this thesis aims to contribute to an enhanced understanding of the 
challenges faced and to the future development of more holistic responses that 
more effectively balance the interests of privacy of the individual, security for 
the network and the demands of the courts for legally admissible evidence. 
1.4 Summary of other Chapters 
Chapter 2 presents a review of existing literature relevant to the research. The 
chapter presents literature relating to: 
• Information society and risk of computer misuse; 
• Definitions and models of forensic computing; 
• Intrusion detection systems; 
• Information systems and technology issues; 
• Legal aspects and dimensions; and 
• Organisational challenges and issues. 
Finally, the chapter presents literature on emerging trends that has been 
published subsequent to the completion of case study analyses. 
The number of publications relevant to this research has significantly increased 
since 2001 when this research started. As a result, it is acknowledged that the 
literature review identifies only the key trends and directions across the three 
domains (technical, legal, organisational) with the aim of highlighting potential 
intersections that are then explored through the case studies. 
Chapter 3 presents the research method used to conduct this research. The 
methodological framework underpinning this exploratory research adopts a 
subjective ontology and employs an interpretative epistemology. The research 
strategy involves the examination of three cases on technical, legal and 
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organisational challenges of digital evidence respectively. Each case is 
analysed independently. The interpretation and discussion adopts a forensic 
computing perspective to interpret and discuss the inter-relationships across 
these areas and to explore the implications for digital evidence and the 
underlying problematic on-line behaviours. Case A examines the validity of 
quantitative data collected by running a network intrusion detection system 
(NIDS) SNORT on a university network. Case B examines an Australian 
Federal Court case illustrating legal arguments applied to digital evidence, its 
discovery and presentation. Case C examines the Cyber Tools On-line Search 
for Evidence (CTOSE) project highlighting the difficulties of developing and 
implementing organisational level processes for digital evidence handling. 
Chapter 4 provides analysis of Case A. The analysis involves descriptive 
statistical analysis of network data and reveals problems with the validity and 
quality of the data. The results of the analysis show that data collected by 
SNORT are not sufficient to track and trace the sources of the attacks. The 
analysis also reveals that the data sets collected may be flawed, erroneous or 
already have been tampered with. Despite significant fine tuning, SNORT 
continued to generate numerous false positive alerts and/or wrongly identified 
sources of attacks. This case highlights that intrusion detection systems can 
play an important role in protecting information systems infrastructure, but to 
be effective they require the attention of highly trained security 
personnel/system administrators. These personnel also need to engage in 
regular monitoring and analysis of alerts and other log files, and to ensure 
regular updating of the rule sets used by these systems. 
Chapter 5 provides analysis of Case B. The analysis of the case reveals the 
impact of legal misconceptualisations about the nature of digital systems on 
court decisions and on the generation of legal precedents that have potentially 
broader social implications. The results of the analysis reveal serious flaws in 
understanding amongst all participants in the case over the nature of digital 
evidence and how it should best be collected, analysed and presented. More 
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broadly, the judgement also appears to have worrying implications for 
individual privacy and data protection. 
Chapter 6 provides analysis of Case C. The analysis highlights the practical 
challenges faced at the organisational level in the implementation of models 
and tools for digital evidence handling. The analysis highlights that models and 
tools that have been developed for handling digital evidence are by their very 
nature and complexity highly problematic to adopt and utilise in organisational 
settings. A key element that continues to inhibit their use is the lack of early 
and comprehensive end-user education. The results from Case C highlight the 
critical need for organisations to have greater 'forensic readiness' for dealing 
with criminal, illegal or inappropriate on-line behaviours. 
Chapter 7 provides an interpretation and discussion of the complete data set. 
The interpretation of the data brings together analyses conducted in Chapters 
four to six. 
The interpretation and discussion of the analyses from the three cases adopts a 
forensic computing perspective and focuses on the nature of the inter-
relationships between the issues identified in each case. From this perspective 
the discrete approaches adopted in each case limit an appreciation of the 
complex interplay between technical, legal and organisational factors. This 
interplay continues to have serious implications for each of these areas because 
of the nature of digital environments. More specifically this interpretation and 
discussion reveals how and why this continued fragmentation of discrete 
approaches is impairing the overall effectiveness of the responses developed. A 
consequence of this is the lack of integrated and coordinated solutions that 
would effectively balance requirements for legally admissible digital evidence, 
effective e-security and data privacy. 
Chapter 8 provides the conclusions of this research. A synthesis of the main 
findings of the research is presented, along with a brief discussion of the 
limitations of the study, and an outline for future research work. 
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2 Literature Review 
"The persistence of data, however, is remarkable. Contrary to the 
popular belief that it's hard to recover information, it 's actually 
starting to appear that it's very hard to remove something even if you 
want to. The unrm/lazarus combination is a fine, if a bit unsettling, 
trash can analyzer. And while the results can be spotty for simple single 
file 'undeletion', robbing graves for fun and profit can be a lucrative 
venture for an aspiring forensic analyst. Indeed, when testing this 
software on a disk that had been used for some time on a Windows 95 
machine, then reinstalled to be a firewall using Solaris, and finally 
converted to be a Linux system, files and data from the prior two 
installations were clearly visible. Now that's data persistence!" 
(Farmer, 2001) 
2.1 Introduction 
This chapter provides a review of literature relevant to this research. There 
exist substantial bodies of academic and commercial literature of relevance to 
this research. In the discipline of computer science research relating to 
computer security, antivirus software, cyber crime and cyber terrorism have 
increased significantly over the last ten years. The organisational and legal 
aspects of computer security as well as research exploring broader social and 
privacy impacts of the information society have also increased dramatically. As 
a result, it is acknowledged that the literature review identifies only the key 
trends and directions across the three domains (technical, legal, organisational) 
with the aim of highlighting potential intersections that are then explored 
through the case studies'. 
'Given the rapid developments in each of the bodies of knowledge relevant to this thesis, it is 
noted that some of the web links and technical tools referred to have been superseded and as of 
March 2009 a number were found not to be 'live'. 
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The first section provides information about the information society and the 
influence of the growing availability of the Internet for the growth in risks of 
computer misuse. It also provides a classification of computer misuse that has 
been used through this research. 
The second section discusses various definitions and models of forensic 
computing as they have been developed by various researchers and forums. 
The third section provides an overview of Intrusion Detection Systems and 
research on them current at the time of the conduct of Case A data collection 
and analysis. 
The fourth section introduces key technological issues faced in information 
systems and computer security, and in particular the use of log files as a source 
of forensic data. 
The fifth section discusses legal aspects and dimensions of forensic computing, 
including privacy concerns. 
The sixth section introduces literature relevant to a consideration of key 
organisational challenges and issues with networked computer systems and the 
Internet. 
The final section of this chapter presents literature on emerging trends that has 
been published subsequent to the completion of case study analyses. 
2.2 Information Society and Risks of Computer Misuse 
The information society refers to the idea of a society in which information 
plays a significant economic, political and cultural role. This idea also 
acknowledges the central role of information technology in such a society, and 
this transformation is leading to the replacement of the 'industrial society'. 
Terms such as knowledge society, information revolution and network society 
are frequently used interchangeably with the term information society 
(Castells, 2000). 
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Unsurprisingly, debates continue on the idea of the 'information society' and 
there remains no universally accepted definition. Fortunately, most authors do 
agree that this social transformation started in the 1970s and that it continues to 
change the ways in which contemporary societies work. There is a large 
amount of literature discussing the evolution and definition of the information 
society, for example by Richta (1977), Webster (1997) and Touraine (1988). 
One useful broad definition comes from a report by European Union High-
Level Expert Group, defining the Information Society as 
"The society that is currently being put in place, where low-cost 
information and data storage and transmission technologies are in 
general use. The generalisation of information and data use is being 
accompanied by organisational, commercial, social and legal 
innovations that will profoundly change life both in the world of work 
and in society generally." (European Commission, 1997) 
Increased access to the Internet and to networked technologies has brought 
enormous opportunities for businesses, governments and citizens. On the other 
hand it also brings an increase in challenges and risks faced by the society. 
Debates about ownership, control, censorship and commercialisation of the 
Internet are becoming more and more prevalent (Heller, 2008; Wu, 2003; 
Zittrain, 2008). There are reasonable fears that if the network becomes too 
regulated and/or privately owned, the growth of it and the benefits of it to the 
society will be slowed down. Indeed, the 'gridlock economy paradox' as 
defined by Heller (2008) argues, the Internet can even be stopped. Authors like 
Wu (2003) and Zittrain (2008) argue that developments related to 'Internet 
network neutrality' may even lead to the 'death' of the Internet. This threat to 
the 'neutrality of the web' is so strong, that Internet Freedom Preservation Act 
Bill 2009 ("Internet Freedom Preservation Act," 2009) has been introduced in 
the House of Representatives on 31 July 2009. This is a third attempt for such 
legislation in the USA since 2005. 
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2.2.1 Growth of Computer Misuse 
The most visible risk to the information society, however, is the rapid growth 
in computer misuse and e-crime that has resulted from the increased number of 
ways that individuals and groups can engage in criminal, illegal or 
inappropriate on-line behaviours (Denning, 1999; Etter, 2000a, 2000b, 2000c). 
It is difficult to obtain accurate and reliable data on the scale and cost of these 
activities due to the fact that companies chose not to publish such data to 
protect their interests. As an example, even as early as 2004, the survey from 
the Australian Computer Emergency Response Team (Australian Computer 
Emergency Response Team, 2004) estimated that computer attacks on the 
integrity, availability and confidentiality of networks and systems in Australia 
had increased to over $15 million in 2004 up 20% on 2003. This survey at the 
time also indicated that: 
• Malware in the form of viruses, worms or trojans was the most common 
form of attack and the cause of the greatest financial losses. The majority of 
attacks were also sourced externally; 
• The second most significant cause of financial losses were the theft of 
laptops and the abuse/misuse of computer network access or resources; 
• The two most significant factors contributing to susceptibility to harmful 
electronic attacks were un-patched or unprotected software vulnerabilities 
and inadequate staff training and education in security practices. 
While the upward trajectory of these figures is alarming in itself, it is likely 
that the current reality is considerably more serious due to the incidence of 
non-reporting (AusCERT suggests this may be as high as 75% of incidences) 
and/or non-detection (Etter, 2001). Unsurprisingly, the increasing incidence of 
e-crime and computer misuse has stimulated strong demand from public and 
private sector organisations for effective ways to respond. This demand has 
contributed to a diverse range of research and development into technical, 
organisational and legal aspects of computer misuse and e-crime. 
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At one level, the rapid developments occurring in each of these areas are 
mostly laudable and exciting, but there is now increasing recognition that the 
development of truly effective defensive and offensive solutions will require 
the integration of insights from each area. While the complexity of specific 
issues within each area partly explains the limited collaboration that has 
occurred to date between researchers, it is also clear that it is inhibiting the 
development of the integrated solutions and skills that will be required to 
effectively balance needs for network security, individual privacy and the 
generation of legally admissible digital evidence. More significantly, there is 
growing proof to suggest that a consequence of this 'riding furiously in all 
directions' without an awareness of how developments in one area interact 
with developments in another is actually impairing the overall effectiveness of 
the responses developed (Broucek & Turner, 2001a, 2001b; Broucek, et al., 
2005; Hannan, Frings, Broucek, & Turner, 2003; Hannan, Turner, et al., 2003). 
2.2.2 Classification of Computer Misuse 
To be able to examine the inter-relationships of technical, organisational and 
legal responses to computer misuse and e-crime it is useful to firstly classify 
the types of the misuse and the nature and seriousness of associated 
behaviours. 
While existing mechanisms for addressing conventional societal misconduct 
(including law enforcement, education and security) remain relevant in the 
digital domain, there are also unique challenges for the investigation of 
behaviours in cyber-space because of the numerous ways in which individuals 
and/or groups can use digital technologies to engage in criminal, illegal or 
inappropriate on-line behaviour. As with conventional investigations when a 
computer incident occurs there is a need to assess its extent and effect and to 
rectify any damage caused. However, there may also be the need to gather 
evidence to identify the perpetrators and their 'intent' as a basis for future 
responses. From a forensic computing perspective it is these digital evidence 
acquisition activities, the 'last mile' connection (Hannan & Turner, 2004) 
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between them and an identifiable perpetrator, questions over the chain of 
custody, the determination of where the e-crime/misuse has occurred and 
questions on applicable law and legal admissibility that pose the most 
challenging technical, organisational and legal questions. 
In responding to these questions, an important component in ensuring the 
effective identification of the type of forensic evidence required and the best 
methods for its collection, analysis and presentation is the ability to classify the 
type of misconduct as early in the investigation as possible. In this regard, one 
classification approach based upon the identification of behaviours cross-
referenced with types of misuse was developed by Broucek and Turner (2001a, 
2001b) and explored in Harman, Frings et al (2003). The behaviours are 
identified as: criminal, illegal or inappropriate. This reflects the varying levels 
of seriousness of any behaviour committed and the likely penalties that will 
result from any investigations (i.e. criminal prosecution, civil proceedings or 
organisational censure or dismissal). The types of computer misuse identified 
are divided into two categories: 
• Computer misuse, and 
• Computer supported (or aided, assisted) misuse. 
The first category involves misuses that 
"encompass all offences against the confidentiality, integrity and 
availability (CIA) of computer data and systems. Examples include 
illegal access to computer systems or malicious code-writing" 
(Rathmell & Valeri, 2003). 
In this case the evidence collected will need to prove that the activities were 
intended to result in a specific criminal, illegal or inappropriate result. 
The second category is defined as crimes that 
"are 'traditional crimes' that can be, or have been, committed utilising 
other means of perpetration which are now being, or are capable of 
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being, executed via the Internet, computer-related venue (e-mail, 
newsgroups, internal networks) or other technological computing 
advancement. For example, intellectual property rights infringement 
(e.g. digital music and software piracy) and payment system frauds 
(e.g. credit card fraud via the Internet" (Rathmell & Valeri, 2003). 
In this case the evidence collected will need to prove that the delivery was 
intentional and the content of the transmission was not altered from the sender 
to the recipient. 
Another way to classify computer misuse is to adopt matrix of behaviours and 
types of computer misuse developed by Hannan, Frings, et al. (2003). In this 
approach, criminal, illegal and inappropriate behaviours are ranked on their 
severity and then two types of computer misuse are defined. 
Type 1 is defined as 
"misuse arising from the generation, collection, storage, manipulation 
or distribution of data that itself constitutes a criminal, illegal or 
inappropriate behaviour" (Hannan, Frings, et al., 2003) 
and Type 2 is defined as 
"misuse arising from the actions of the user deploying digital devices" 
(Hannan, Frings, et al., 2003). 
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By putting the behaviours and types of computer misuse together, the Matrix is 
created as displayed in Figure 1. 
Computer misuse 
Type 1 Type 2 
Criminal 
Illegal 
Inappropriate 
Figure 1: Matrix of behaviours and types of computer misuse (adapted from Hannan, 
Frings, et al., 2003) 
2.3 Definitions and Models of Forensic Computing 
Before exploring definitions and models of forensic computing, it is useful to 
explore approaches to the definition of digital evidence. Unfortunately, the 
same definitional problems that appear to hamper development in forensic 
computing also apply to the definition of digital evidence (DE). 
Digital evidence has been previously defined by several authors. Casey (Casey, 
2000) defines DE as 
"any and all digital data that can establish that a crime has been 
committed or can provide a link between a crime and its victim or a 
crime and its perpetrator. - 
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The definition proposed by Standard Working Group on Digital Evidence 
(SWGDE) is narrower and emphasizes the legal dimension of digital evidence 
defining it as 
"information of probative value stored or transmitted in digital 
form. "(Scientific Working Group on Digital Evidence (SWGDE) & 
International Organization on Computer Evidence (IOCE), 2002) 
Other attempts at digital evidence definition have been made by Chisum (1999) 
who again has an inclusive definition of 
"any data stored or transmitted using a computer that supports or 
refutes a theory on how an offence occurred or addresses critical 
elements of the offence such as intent or alibi". 
Interestingly, two of the most eminent researchers in the forensic computing 
domain have adopted Casey's broad definition in their work (Carrier & 
Spafford, 2003). 
Attempts at defining digital evidence were also made in the European Cyber 
Tools On-line Search for Evidence (CTOSE) project (CTOSE, 2003; Un -y & 
Mitchison, 2003). This project is examined in detail in Chapter 6. This 
definitional ambiguity appears to relate to the technical, organisational or legal 
backgrounds of the authors and again highlights the challenges facing forensic 
computing resulting from its multi-disciplinary roots. 
Academic research publications on forensic computing and its definition first 
began to appear at the end of 1990s (Bates, 1997, 1998). From the beginning, 
definitional difficulties were obvious as illustrated by the two different 
approaches adopted by McKemmish (1999) and Farmer and Venema (1999), 
respectively. 
McKemmish (1999) defines forensic computing as 
"the process of identifying, preserving, analysing and presenting digital 
evidence in a manner that is legally acceptable" 
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and then continues by defining four key elements of forensic computing as: 
o "identification of digital evidence, 
o preservation of digital evidence, 
o analysis of digital evidence, and 
o presentation of digital evidence." 
This clearly demonstrates the author's law enforcement background and clear 
interest in legally acceptable evidence. 
Dan Farmer & Wietse Venema, two well known computer security experts, 
started running forensic computing classes around the same time and for that 
purpose defined forensic computing as 
"gathering and analyzing data in a manner as free from distortion or 
bias as possible to reconstruct data or what has happened in the past 
on a system" (Farmer & Venema, 1999). 
This definition completely ignores any mention of the legal acceptability of the 
evidence produced. This is in spite of the fact that forensic computing by the 
nature of the word 'forensic' implies "used in or connected with a court of 
law" (Hanks, 1991). 
Subsequent to these definitions, Palmer (2001) provided a much broader 
definition containing implied criticism of both previous approaches because of 
their overly narrow focus (legal or technical). 
"the use of scientifically derived and proven methods toward the 
preservation, collection, validation, identification, analysis, 
interpretation, documentation and presentation of digital evidence 
derived from digital sources for the purpose of facilitating or furthering 
the reconstruction of events found to be criminal, or helping to 
anticipate unauthorized actions shown to be disruptive to planned 
operations" (Palmer, 2001). 
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The fact that several different definitions emerged at about the same time 
illustrates the 'youth' of forensic computing and the need for a conceptual 
framework to reduce confusion and frustration for researchers attempting to 
explore forensic computing and the inter-disciplinary dimensions of issues 
related to identification, collection and analysis of computer evidence. 
Broucek and Turner (2001a, 2001b) contributed to the development of this 
conceptual framework by assessing the range of topics and viewpoints 
intersecting in the research space central to the developing discipline of 
forensic computing. They developed a preliminary taxonomy for forensic 
computing and identified four major constituent disciplines — computer 
science, law, information systems and social science. Subsequent work 
expanded this list to include law enforcement and the basic taxonomy of the 
forensic computing domain is illustrated in Figure 2 (Broucek & Turner, 
2001a, 2001b; Hannan, Frings, et al., 2003; Hannan, Turner, et al., 2003). 
Figure 2: Forensic Computing Domain 
Based on this research work, Broucek and Turner developed their own 
definition of forensic computing as follows. 
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"Processes or procedures involving monitoring, collection, analysis 
and presentation of digital evidence as part of 'a priori' and/or 'post-
mortem' investigations of criminal, illegal or other inappropriate on-
line behaviours" (Broucek & Turner, 2006). 
This definition encompasses the fact that forensic computing is and will be 
used not only in criminal cases, but also in civil cases and other avenues where 
digital evidence will be required. It also encompasses fact that it is not 
necessarily enough to conduct 'post mortem' analysis of existing data, but also 
'a priori' data will be needed to provide evidence. 
It should however be noted that this taxonomy and definition are by no means 
the only attempts to define the domain. Indeed, as a result of collaborative 
work at the First Digital Forensic Workshop (DFRWS) in 2001, an entirely 
different approach based not on constitute disciplines but rather specific fields 
of computer forensic activity led to the development of an alternative model 
referred to as the 'Nucleus of Digital Forensic Research'. This model is 
displayed in Figure 3. 
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LUIVP,ILYIE 
Figure 3: Nucleus of Digital Forensic Research (from Palmer, 2001) 
Interestingly, both the 'taxonomy' and 'nucleus' frameworks emphasize the 
need to stimulate cooperation and collaboration amongst the various disciplines 
and fields concerned with forensic computing issues. The same urgency to 
support interaction and collaboration has also been suggested by Spafford 
(cited in Palmer, 2001, P.  7). Spafford argues that it is necessary to: 
• Abandon current 'band aid approaches' to forensics. The same approach 
was and still is often observed in the security world — the security elements 
are added into the existing or new systems, instead of designing the 
systems with security already built in; 
• Know exactly how much information and what type of it needs to be 
collected for further analysis in particular circumstances; and 
• Understand social aspects of 'the game'. 
Spafford concludes that in the forensic computing domain 
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"All aspects of the problem are essential. Therefore, it is imperative 
that each collaborates with the other. Researchers, investigators, 
legislators, and jurists must all work toward a central goal. This 
requires constant discussion within groups that have representation 
from all essential parties" (Palmer, 2001, p. 8). 
The significance of these remarks is that despite their apparent conformity and 
agreement, an academic analysis of the work arising from, for example the 
First Digital Forensic Research Workshop, reveals the markedly different aims, 
goals and objectives underpinning the approaches of different domain experts. 
As the presentations of the main speakers at the DFRWS workshop illustrate 
(i.e. Eugene Spafford representing academic research and government, Charles 
Boeckman representing DOD Operations, Chet Hosmer representing 
Commercial Tools development, David Baker representing Critical 
Infrastructure Protection and John Hoyt representing Law Enforcement), the 
different underlying positions can be summarised as follows: 
• Law enforcement agencies appear primarily interested in gathering 
evidence that can later be used for prosecution. It is worth pointing out that 
such evidence must follow rules of evidence established by particular 
jurisdictions to maintain evidential integrity (chain of custody) and that the 
digital evidence should form a part of the 'whole case' such that non-
technical elements are also taken into account; 
• Business requirements are more or less driven by economic pressures of 
remaining viable and competitive; 
• Academics are interested in exact, scientific methods and data and in the 
advancement of new knowledge; and 
• Military and Information Warfare Operations are mainly interested in what 
is referred to as Defensive Information Operations (DIO). DIO represents a 
multi-disciplinary approach to protecting digital systems. It includes 
Communication, Computer, Information and Operational Security as well 
as Physical Security, and other tactics used in active systems protection. 
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The main differentiation of defence operation requirements from those in 
law enforcement is willingness of DIO to sacrifice absolute and/or even 
measurable accuracy for quickness in order to serve a mission's timeline. 
The result of DIO is research conducted in defence operations concentrated 
mainly on three areas (Optimisation of data collection; minimisation of data 
corruption or destruction risks; Accommodation of operational time 
constraints). 
Table 1, adapted and extended from Palmer (2001), clearly demonstrates that 
investigators from each area deploy different paradigms when approaching 
forensic computing and its analysis. Furthermore, it appears that researchers 
also attempt to do this in different environments and/or timeframes. 
Significantly, it is suggested that Law Enforcement is only interested in 'post-
mortem' while all the other players tend to anticipate and try to take an action 
to thwart a possible threat even before it happens including such factors as 
financial cost, reputation, service availability. 
Area Primary Objective Secondary 
Objective 
Environment - Time 
Frames 
Law Enforcement Prosecution After the act/post-
mortem 
Military IW 
Operations 
Continuity of 
Operations 
Prosecution Real Time 
Business and 
Industry 
Availability of 
Services 
Prosecution Real Time 
Academics Advancement of 
Knowledge 
Dissemination of 
Knowledge 
Variable: Subject to 
Externalities 
Table 1: Suitability Guidelines for Digital Forensic Research (adapted and extended from 
Palmer (2001)). 
It is noticeable that the approach advocated by DFRWS can be directly linked 
to models that subsequently emerged focused on how to respond in 
conducting/implementing forensic computing investigations. Broadly these 
models can be divided into three categories Simple, Advanced and Complex. 
These are outlined below. 
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2.3.1 Simple Models 
Arising directly out of the DFRWS was the development of 7 step linear model 
for the conduct of forensic computing investigations: 
• Identification; 
• Preservation; 
• Collection; 
• Examination; 
• Analysis; 
• Presentation; and 
• Decision. 
Reith, Carr, and Gunsch (2002) extended this model to nine steps and called it 
the Abstract Digital Forensic Model. The nine steps included are: 
• Identification; 
• Preparation; 
• Approach Strategy; 
• Preservation; 
• Collection; 
• Examination; 
• Analysis; 
• Presentation; and 
• Returning Evidence. 
These models concentrate on processing digital evidence. They do not identify 
flow in investigation, do not include issues like chain of custody and different 
requirements and needs of different groups of users as defined above and in 
(Palmer, 2001). 
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2.3.2 Advanced Models 
Carrier & Spafford (2003) after analysis of several other models developed 
their 'Integrated Digital Investigation Process (IDIP)'. This model is based on 
crime scene theory for physical investigation. They argue that this investigation 
process has been refined over time through its use in thousands of 
investigations, and as such, is the most suitable model upon which to establish 
a model for digital investigations. As a result their model is based on the 
assumption that the computer should be treated as a separate crime scene to the 
extent that they use the analogy that the computer should be treated the same as 
a "body at the murder scene". (Carrier & Spafford, 2003, p. 18). 
Carrier & Spafford's model has been extended by Baryamureeba & Tushabe 
(2004) with their Enhanced Digital Investigation Model (EDIP). The EDIP 
expands the DIP to enable 'tracing back' in order to address the issues of 
digital investigations in networked and wireless environments. However, even 
with this enhanced model it is useful to consider how far the physical 
investigation analogy can be pushed given the challenges of incidental/multiple 
digital copies of any individual data element and the capacity of systems to 
'tamper' with data during analysis (Broucek & Turner, 2005a, 2005b, 2006). 
2.3.3 Complex Models 
More complex model/framework has been developed by the European project 
Cyber Tools On-line Search for Evidence (CTOSE). Discussion of this model 
has been widely published and it has been examined in depth in the following 
papers (Broucek & Turner, 2004a; Broucek, et al., 2005; CTOSE, 2003; 
Leroux & Perez Asinari, 2003; Sato, Broucek, & Turner, 2005; Urry & 
Mitchison, 2003). In summary, the CTOSE model was developed as a high 
level tool aimed to assist companies or other individuals/groups to respond 
correctly during the investigation and analysis of on-line behaviours in order to 
generate legally admissible evidence. The CTOSE approach was an attempt to 
develop an 'expert system' to guide users (for example, a company's security 
officer) in their preparations and responses to e-security incidents. 
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Importantly, the CTOSE approach aimed to bring to these organisations an 
overall benchmark against which to compare their own operations and 
procedures relating to evidence handling. The CTOSE framework offers an 
approach to integrate functionality across the whole spectrum of actors 
involved in the process of evidence handling. It appears that the CTOSE 
framework is the only framework to be comprehensive across the entire chain 
of evidence handling, across different types of organisations as well as across 
different countries. However, questions have now arisen over the extent to 
which this comprehensive approach has been adopted and used and what 
factors would stimulate more widespread implementation of the approach. 
Finally, it is useful to review Ciardhudin's (2004) 13 step model that integrates 
each step with a sequence of activities and information flows. To date, attempts 
have been made to validate this model through the conduct of interviews with 
police investigators and to deploy the model as part of genuine police computer 
forensic investigations. The thirteen steps of this model are: 
• Awareness; 
• Authorisation; 
• Planning; 
• Notification; 
• Search for and identify evidence; 
• Collection of evidence; 
• Transport of evidence; 
• Storage of evidence; 
• Examination of evidence; 
• Hypothesis; 
• Presentation of hypothesis; 
• Proof/Defence of hypothesis; and 
• Dissemination of information. 
In summary, it is evident that despite numerous attempts to model the forensic 
computing domain, definitional heterogeneity remains. It is evident that this 
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heterogeneity is at least partly due to the differing assumptions, aims, goals and 
objectives underpinning the approaches outlined above. Significantly, however, 
despite widespread recognition of the multi-dimensional nature of on-line 
behaviours and the challenges of understanding and responding to them, little 
progress has been made. Indeed, even where comprehensive frameworks have 
been developed the additional challenges of adoption and utilisation have 
emerged to limit the benefits, at the time when the incidents of computer 
misuse and e-crime continues to grow. 
At one level, all the models examined above can usefully be classified as either 
'organisational' or 'procedural'. As a consequence, these models do not 
explicitly consider actual practices, for example variations in the technical 
hardware and/or software, impact on the conduct and result of investigations. 
Similarly, these models also do not explicitly consider the impact of variability 
in the abilities and skills of investigators. In this regard, it is useful to note that 
within many jurisdictions it is sufficient to hold an undergraduate degree in 
computer science to enable an individual to act as expert e-forensic witness 
(Yasinsac, Erbacher, Marks, Pollitt, & Sommer, 2003). 
These models tend to concentrate on the defence side of the problem and do 
not sufficiently describe the 'offensive or attack side' of the problem. These 
observations support the argument that there is the need for a more detailed 
conceptual/theoretical approach. One way might be to revisit information 
theories or adopt a purely mathematical model style of approach as advocated 
by Filiol (2006b). 
While some readers may consider these issues merely of academic interest, this 
research highlights how this lack of coherence has directly inhibited awareness 
of the issues/challenges in the community, impaired the development and 
diffusion of specialised forensic computing skills and, most importantly, 
impacted directly on the effectiveness of responses to computer misuse and 
e-crime (Broucek & Turner, 2005b; Broucek, et al., 2005). 
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2.4 Information Systems and Technology Issues 
"We cannot hope to protect our information infrastructure without a 
sustained commitment to the conduct of research -- both basic and 
applied -- and the development of new experts. The incredible growth of 
our society's deployment of computing has too often been conducted 
with concerns for speed or lowest cost rather than with concern for 
issues of safety, security, and reliability. Security cannot be easily or 
adequately added on after-the-fact and this greatly complicates our 
overall mission. The software and hardware being deployed today has 
been designed by individuals with little or no security training, using 
unsafe methods, and then poorly tested. This is being added to the fault-
ridden infrastructure already in place and operated by personnel with 
insufficient awareness of the risks. Therefore, none of us should be 
surprised if we continue to see a rise in break-ins, defacements, and 
viruses in the years to come." (Spafford, 2001) 
This section of the literature review aims to briefly introduce some of the key 
technical dimensions relating to digital data as it relates to computer security 
and forensic computing. 
2.4.1 Distinguishing Computer Security from Forensic Computing 
Patel and Ciardhudin (2000) illustrated this distinction in their paper by noting 
that the distribution of child pornography is clearly illegal in most of the 
jurisdictions, however, it can be conducted without any breaches of computer 
security. Cases involving the distribution of child pornography highlight that 
the only technical requirements are properly setting up a digital distribution 
channel (for example web server). Consequently, there is no breach of 
computer security, but the activity is illegal and a subject of interest for 
forensic computing. 
Another example illustrating a difference between the two fields has been 
discussed by Broucek and Turner (2001a, 2001b). Using their own experience 
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in network administration at the University of Tasmania they examined an 
instance of e-mail communications being used to send life threatening 
messages to a female student. Initially with only verbal threats, but later on 
with attached pictures and movies. At no time were any security measures 
breached. In this particular case the 'forensic' investigation was very easy 
because the offending e-mails were sent from a 'hotmail' account with the 
sender making no attempt to disguise his/her identity. Using simple UNIX 
commands (nslookup, traceroute) and looking into several log/auditing files) 
the offender was traced back to his/her dial-up point. This again illustrates key 
distinctions between computer security and forensic computing. Again, these 
repugnant activities were the focus of a forensic investigation but did not 
involve the breaching of any computer security. 
Following Patel and Ciardhudin (2000) the most important differences between 
computer security and forensic computing can be illustrated through answers to 
four questions about the foci of the two fields. These questions are: why, when, 
who and for whom? 
• Why - Computer security is in place to protect against and to detect cyber-
attacks. Forensic computing does not protect against the attacks. However, 
it is worth noting that as the field of forensic computing evolves, more 
proactive forensic tools may be developed that will blur this distinction. 
Currently, there are numerous computer security resources available to 
network and systems administrators to prevent and detect cyber-attacks. 
But these tools are not designed to provide data sets that are suitable for the 
generation of forensic evidence. This results in either insufficient data 
being collected or the data being potentially unreliable. Both raise problems 
for collection and presentation of forensic evidence. 
• When - Computer security is ideally conducted in real time while forensic 
computing is primarily conducted 'post mortem' i.e. after the occurrence of 
criminal, illegal or other inappropriate behaviour. However, as noted in 
previous point this distinction will be again narrowed with the evolution of 
more proactive forensic computing tools. 
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• Who - Computer security is primarily conducted by computer specialists. 
Forensic computing can be conducted by a wide range of professionals, 
many of whom do not have specialised computer security skills. Of course, 
ideally forensic computing specialists should be trained in all the 
disciplines that were identified earlier. Indeed, there has already been at 
least one senior US government official proposing the establishment of 
training facilities and funding to develop these types of professionals 
(Reno, 1996). The same issues were identified during Police 
Commissioners' Conference on Electronic Crime Strategy held in March 
2001 in Australia (Australasian Centre For Policing Research, 2001). 
• For whom - Computer security is usually subject to minimal presentation 
requirements. Also if it is presented this is usually to a highly technically 
literate audience. However, the results of forensic investigation are always 
presented to non-IT/IS audiences and frequently in the context of legal 
proceedings. 
To conclude this topic, Table 2 shows distinctive differences between 
computer security and forensic computing 
Computer Security Forensic Computing 
Protects the system against attack Does not protect the system against attack 
Usually in real time Conducted 'Post mortem' 
Conducted by computer specialists Can be conducted by computer specialists, but 
often this is not the case 
Restricted environment for presentation of 
developments, issues 
Evidence is nearly always presented to non-
IT/IS personnel 
Can be bypassed by trusted individuals/users Integrity of the evidence is most important 
Table 2: Computer Security versus Forensic Computing 
Aside from these overt differences, there is a major problem with existing 
computer security approaches that is only revealed by adopting a forensic 
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computing perspective. This problem emerges from the fact that computer 
security measures can be, and often are bypassed by 'trusted users'. This fact 
points to a broader and age-old question of 'who polices the police?'. With root 
user2 access, it is possible to do almost anything on the systems including 
modifying or deleting log files and disabling system and security processes. 
Following Farmer (2001), deleted files can be relatively easy to restore; 
However, the processes used makes problematic the legal validity of the 
subsequent data set (Farmer, 2001). From a forensic computing perspective the 
lack of existing checks and balances on users with root access raises a 
fundamental problem concerning the integrity of computer data to be used as 
evidence. 
Despite these differences computer security expertise is a central plank for 
developing the appropriate skill sets for the field of forensic computing. The 
ability to identify, track, trace and analyse log files is central to forensic 
investigations where digital evidence is main source of data. However, the 
forensic computing perspective moves beyond these technical skills to develop 
sensitivity towards questions over the admissibility of evidence and legal 
validity of particular data sets. This is particularly the case during the analysis 
of log files where 'dirtying of the data' or `acontextuar presentation may 
significantly alter the meaning of the evidence. 
2.4.2 Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS) 
Intrusion detection systems have been suggested by some authors as suitable 
tools for collecting network data for legal evidence (Stephenson, 2000a, 
2000b). On the other hand, there have been strong arguments against the 
suitability of IDS for collection of forensic data (Sommer, 1998a, 1998b, 
1999). Research has been conducted and attempt made to produce commercial 
2 'root' user is historically username given to user with full access privileges on Unix/Linux 
systems. This term is generally used when talking about users with such privileges although in 
other systems the actual username might be different — administrator, admin etc. 
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products. For example Patel and Ciardhudin (2000) advocated the need for 
'network black box'. 
As the dangers of hacking and cyber-warfare for network security become a 
reality, the need to be able to generate legally admissible evidence of criminal 
or other illegal on-line behaviours has become increasingly important. While 
technical systems providing intrusion detection and network monitoring are 
constantly being improved, the security they provide is never absolute. 
As a result, when assessing the value and nature of the data these systems 
produce, it becomes critical to be aware of a number of factors: these systems 
themselves are susceptible to attack and/or evasion (Arona, Bruschi, & Rosti, 
1999; Handley, Paxson, & Kreibich, 2001; Ptacek & Newsham, 1998); these 
systems may only collect a partial data set; and, these data sets may themselves 
be flawed, erroneous or already have been tampered with (Broucek & Turner, 
2002c). Additionally, the issue of privacy and data protection is emerging as a 
central debate in forensic computing research (Broucek & Turner, 2002c). 
Although these advanced systems provide network administrators with the 
tools to treat some of the symptoms of such criminal, illegal and/or 
inappropriate on-line behaviours, they are not designed with the need to track, 
trace and generate legally admissible evidence about these behaviours. 
Additionally, there is a growing awareness that most computer security 
systems can easily be tainted and their evidence contaminated. As an example, 
it is well-known that there are numerous hacks for wtmpx, utmpx and other 
built-in system log files that are often used as a source of information on 
system events (Farmer & Venema, 1993) and papers have been published 
describing techniques used to avoid Intrusion Detection Systems (Handley, et 
al., 2001; Ptacek & Newsham, 1998). 
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IDS Classification 
Bace & Mel! (2001) classify IDS according to their three fundamental 
attributes — information source, analysis method and response. The first two 
attributes are particularly of relevance for forensic computing specialist. 
Bace & Mell (2001) further recognise that three different sources of 
information are network, host and application. Laing (2000) introduces fourth 
source of information, TCP/IP stack. By accepting these different sources, it is 
possible to classify four different types of intrusion detection systems — 
network based IDS (NIDS), host based IDS (HIDS), application based IDS 
(AIDS) and stack based IDS (SIDS). Each of these systems has its own 
advantages and disadvantages that have been extensively discussed in Bace & 
Mel! (2001) and in Laing (2000). 
Based on the way how IDS analyse their data they are further classified as 
misuse detection and anomaly detection IDS. Misuse detection IDS use pattern 
matching principles. The data collected is constantly being matched against the 
typical patterns or 'fingerprints' of known attacks and vulnerabilities. The 
quality of these systems is determined not only by quality of their 
programming, but more significantly by quality of their pattern ('fingerprint') 
database. These systems cannot detect new attacks until the 'fingerprint' is 
available. Anomaly detection IDS are based on attempts to identify abnormal 
or unusual behaviour compared against the normal one. These systems can 
discover new attacks; however they are subject to high amount of false-positive 
alerts and to many more privacy issues that the signature based (Lundin, 2000; 
Lundin & Jonsson, 1999a, 1999b). 
IDS Technical Issues for Forensic Computing 
Several technical issues were identified in relation to intrusion detection 
systems and have been in detail discussed in Broucek & Turner (2002a, 
2002c). 
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One of the major issues is that IDS may not be able to collect all the data that 
they are supposed to collect. Ever increasing speed of networking equipment 
requires further development in IDS. Better pattern matching algorithms and 
anomaly detection systems as well as data capturing methods need to be 
developed (Desai, 2002; Handley, et al., 2001; Kruegel & Toth, 2003). At the 
time of data collection for Case A, it was acknowledged that many then current 
systems had problems even at the speed of 100 Megabit per second. 
Second issue arises from the fact that IDS can collect only partial, hence 
insufficient, information data. For example, in a case of NIDS, attacker is 
identified by rP address. Unfortunately this 113 address is not enough to 
definitely identify attacking machine. Important research by Clayton (2000) 
suggests major limitations to traceability in legal proceedings. Even without 
legal limitations, LP addressing is clearly insufficient to identify actual host. 
Many sites and in particular ISPs employ dynamic DHCP to assign LP 
addressed to hosts. Each host is usually assigned different address during each 
connection. This can be overcome in a case of ISPs by using caller 
identification (CID — phone number) features and it is now a requirement in 
many countries that ISPs collect this CID. However, dynamic DHCP is used 
also at Universities etc and log files are not always maintained. Furthermore, 
even with CID and IP to MAC (even MAC can be spoofed) log files 
maintained, the attacker can be traced to the host only. The important question 
of a human being behind the attacking host remains again unsolved. This is 
mainly case where computers are shared and or on multi-user systems (e.g. 
UNIX and thin clients). 
Third issue arises from the fact that IDS can themselves be susceptible to a 
variety of attacks (Ptacek & Newsham, 1998). Some authors even suggest 
(Handley, et al., 2001; Mell, Marks, & McLarnon, 2000) that the majority of 
intrusion detection systems are fundamentally flawed. This leads to the 
conclusion that data collected by IDS cannot be trusted. This argument is for 
example strongly supported by one of the confirmed flaws in SNORT IDS. 
This flaw opened SNORT to possible root compromise (see ESB-2003.0141 
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Snort Vulnerability Advisory -- [SNORT-2003-001] at 
http://www.auscert.org.au/render.html?it=2816)  and made it vulnerable to data 
tampering by the intruder. 
Based on these issues and work by Peter Sommer from the Computer Security 
Research Centre at London School of Economics and Political Sciences 
(Sommer, 1998b, 1999) in relation to famous "Rome Labs" attack (Christy, 
1998), three major issues with IDS have to be examined: 
• These systems may not be able to collect the data that they are designed to 
collect; 
• Where data collection occurs, these systems may only provide a partial data 
set; and 
• This data may itself be flawed, erroneous or have already been tampered 
with. 
Finally, issues surrounding privacy principles and laws have to be examined as 
well. The debate about privacy highlights a curious paradox between 
requirements of privacy protection and increasing usage of communication 
tools that provide little or no privacy at all (e.g. e-mail systems using outdated 
and inherently insecure SMTP protocol (Klensin, 2001; Postel, 1982)). 
Unfortunately, the privacy issues are not related only to techniques for 
collecting data due to increasing need for constant monitoring and surveillance 
of computer networks. Age old question of 'who polices the police' emerges 
during the forensic examination of collected data. This data contain not only 
information about the case being investigated, but also about other individuals 
and other entities. Privacy concerns arising from constant surveillance are 
subject of research attention (Bislcup & Flegel, 2000a, 2000b, 2000c; 
Kvarnstrom, Lundin, & Jonsson, 2000; Lundin, 2000; Lundin & Jonsson, 
1999a; Sobirey, Fischer-Flabner, & Rannenberg, 1997), however, the results 
remain far from satisfactory both on technological and legal level. 
In turning to examine the legal issues surrounding the use of IDS as a tool for 
collecting, collating and presenting forensic evidence, the 'Rome Labs' case 
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provides a good example of the strong differences of opinion that are evident 
amongst experts in the forensic computing field. The 'Rome Labs' Attack 
refers to a hacker attack against the Rome Air Development Center, Griffiss 
Air Force Base, New York, on March 28, 1994. This case is interesting also 
because the proceedings against one of the attackers were initiated in the 
United Kingdom. 
Jim Christy (Christy, 1998) gave a report of this incident to the Senate 
Governmental Affairs Committee on May 22, 1996 that highlighted a number 
of key aspects of the case: 
• The attack was only discovered five days after it occurred; 
• The responsible commander at the Air Force Base allowed several systems 
to be kept open thereby allowing the forensic investigating team to trace the 
attackers; and 
• Despite a thorough investigation by the Air Force Office of Special 
Investigations (OSI), numerous questions remained unanswered. These can 
be summarised as follows: 
o The identity and motivation of the second attacker, nicknamed 
Kuji; 
o The extent of the attack; and 
o The extent of the damage. 
Peter Sommer from the Computer Research Security Centre at the London 
School of Economics was subsequently hired by defence lawyers in the UK to 
assess the quality of the evidence prepared by OS!. Sommer's assessment was 
significant in calling into question the quality of the evidence for presentation 
in a court of law. Subsequently published, Sommer (1998b, 1999) states that 
"Almost every individual stream of evidence could be challenged". 
Sommer goes on to discuss in detail several streams of evidence provided by 
OSI and as a result of his analysis provides a list of 11 points that should be 
followed in development of any new intrusion detection systems. Sommer's 
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work appears to be supported by the findings of the NSTAC Network Group 
Intrusion Detection Subgroup that in its December 1997 reports that: 
• "Current Intrusion Detection Systems are not designed to collect and 
protect the integrity of the type of information required to conduct law 
enforcement investigations". 
• "There is a lack of guidance to employees as to how to respond to 
intrusions and capture the information required to conduct a law 
enforcement investigation... "(cited in Sommer, 1998b, 1999) 
This analysis also details a range of issues involved in using log files to derive 
evidence, particularly that they can be compromised prior and during collection 
of the evidence as well as during post-collection analysis. 
Ultimately, this evidence was never tested in court because the defendant 
engaged in a plea-bargaining deal and pleaded guilty. 
In contrast to Sommer's views, other authors have argued that IDS are indeed 
suitable for evidence acquisition (Stephenson, 2000a, 2000b) while others 
choose to ignore the legal aspects of evidence acquisition (Yuill, Wu, Gong, & 
Huang, 1999). In reality the opinions of these different authors are probably not 
as polarised as they might first appear. However, the disagreements do 
highlight that while IDS are among the best tools available to date for 'trying' 
to collect data that could be used in a prosecution, serious problems remain. 
Since the Case A of this thesis examines SNORT that has been a forerunner in 
IDS area at the time of conducting the data collection for the case, it is 
beneficial to look at few more recent developments in IDS. 
Developments by SourceFire (which basically evolved from a Network 
Intrusion Detection System (NIDS) based on SNORT) have produced a set of 
tools called the 3D approach of 'discover, determine and defend'. 
This approach is represented in the Figure 4. 
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Figure 4: SourceFire's 3D approach (from http://www.sourcefire.com/products.html)  
SourceFire argue that this approach is the "only comprehensive intelligent 
network defense system that unifies intrusion and vulnerability management 
technologies to provide customers with real-time network security". At the 
centre of the system is the SourceFire Defense Centre (SDC) that correlates 
data from the intrusion sensors and agents with the network intelligence 
provided by the RNA Sensors to prioritize the most critical security events 
prior to taking action in real-time. SourceFire claim that as a result of the 'high 
level of contextual intelligence' organisations can determine why changes 
occur, whether an attack poses a serious threat and how to best prioritize and 
shape the response. While the move from intrusion detection systems (IDS) to 
intrusion protection systems (IPS) offers some significant advantages in terms 
of security, it also raises numerous questions for the collection of digital 
evidence as these systems adopt an approach analogous to 'pulling the plug' 
that inhibits evidence acquisition activities (Broucek & Turner, 2001a, 2001b). 
Given the experience that few if any systems are perfect, it would seem 
sensible to ensure that more consideration is given to addressing circumstances 
where systems fail or prove unsuitable for responding to the challenges of 
illegal or inappropriate on-line behaviours. 
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Tripp's (2006) paper explores a novel approach for string matching for high 
speed Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS) applying finite state machine 
approach. He proposes the use of a set of finite state machines, each working 
on single byte of the data input. The paper illustrates Tripp's hardware design 
for a parallel string matching engine built for implementation in a Xilinx Field 
Programmable Gate Array and tested by simulation. In his next paper, Tripp 
(2007) continues with his hardware design for use within network intrusion 
detection systems. The paper describes an optimised finite state automata based 
hardware design for implementing high speed regular expression matching. 
The approach presented addresses the conventional memory problem faced by 
standard Field Programmable Gate Arrays (FPGA). Tripp explains how using 
an existing 'packed array' style of table based automata implementation can be 
enhanced by adding a form of input compression to group together characters. 
Researchers from the Agent Technology Center, Department of Cybernetics, 
Czech Technical University in Prague and from the Institute of Computer 
Science, Masaryk University in Brno are working on a research prototype of a 
network intrusion detection system called CAMNEP (for more see 
http://agents.felk.cvut.cz/projects/camnep/) . This intrusion detection system is 
based on an idea of collaboration of a community of detection agents, each of 
which embodies an existing anomaly detection model. The agents use extended 
trust modelling, a technique established in a multi-agent research field to 
improve the quality of classification provided by individual models. The agents 
then process un-sampled data acquired by dedicated high-performance 
NetFlow aggregation cards. 
The researchers claim that their prototype provides among other benefits for: 
• Improved effectiveness, i.e. less false positives/false negatives; 
• High performance, the system is able to process 1Gb/sec of traffic on a 
single (multi-core) PC; and 
• Minimal configuration upon deployment thanks to the self-adaptation 
features. 
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CAMNEP falls into the class of Network Behaviour Analysis systems, as it 
detects the attacks only using the statistics about the network traffic. According 
to the authors, together with the use of anomaly detection paradigm, this 
ensures that the system respects the privacy of the users (content of the 
network traffic is not examined), is robust with respect to traffic encryption and 
does not rely on a set of rules to describe the existing attacks, making it 
suitable for detection of zero-day attacks. 
All these developments are targeted towards faster response to the new threats 
and improvement of the actual technology without considering other 
consequences. 
2.4.3 Log Files as a Source of Forensic Data 
Following Farmer and Venema (2000) the login session in Figure 5 reveals 
information recorded by three different login facilities of UNIX system. These 
are examined in turn to reveal problems in using this information in a forensic 
context. 
May 25 10:12:46 spike telnetd[13626): connect from hades.porcupine.org  
wietse 	ttypl 	hades 	Thu May 25 10:12-10:13 (00:00) 
hostname - wietse ttypl 0.00 
sed wietse ttypl 0.00 
stty wietse ttypl 0.00 
mesg wietse ttypl 0.00 
who wietse ttypl 0.00 
wietse ttypl 0.00 
pa wietse ttypl 0.00 
Is wietse ttypl 0.00 
wietse ttypl 0.00 
csh -S wietse ttypl 0.03 
telnetd -S root 0.00 
secs Thu May 25 10:12 
secs Thu May 25 10:12 
secs Thu May 25 10:12 
secs Thu May 25 10:12 
secs Thu May 25 10:12 
secs Thu May 25 10:12 
secs Thu May 25 10:13 
secs Thu May 25 10:13 
secs Thu May 25 10:13 
secs Thu May 25 10:12 
secs Thu May 25 10:12 
Figure 5: Adapted from Farmer and Venema (2000) 
60 
First, the entry from TCP wrappers log file (shown in the first line) shows that 
on May 25, at 10:12:46 local time, the machine spike received a telnet 
connection from the machine hades.porcupine.org . From a forensic perspective 
this is problematic because the TCP wrappers log files contain only 
information about the initial connection event. They do not provide a 
corresponding record for the end of the telnet connection. Therefore, for the 
forensic investigation, alternative sources of information have to be collected 
to substantiate the length of the connection. 
Second, the output from UNIX last command (shown in the line starting with 
wietse) shows that the user wietse was logged in on port ttyp 1 from host hades. 
This log apparently reveals that the login session lasted from 10:12 until 10:13 
but does not provide details of how many seconds the session lasted; hence the 
log file shows 00:00 for the length of the session. From a forensic perspective 
this is problematic because there is a lack of detail as to the length of 
connection time. The system output (00:00) is clearly in conflict with the 
connection time start-end 10:12-10:13. It is also worth noting that this output 
uses only short name for the machine from which user wietse connected, while 
TCP wrappers used full name. 
Third, output from the UNIX lastcomm command (lines starting hostname 
through to telnetd) shows the commands executed by the user wietse. 
Additionally, these lines show how much CPU time each command consumed 
in seconds, and at what time each command started (the last column of these 
lines). Significantly, lastcomm provides a record of the order in which each 
process is terminated (the column hostname through to telnetd). In this case 
the command interpreter (csh) and the telnet daemon (telnetd) appear at the end 
even though they were actually the first two processes started. From a forensic 
computing perspective this is problematic because there is no reliable and 
detailed record of the order in which the commands were actually run and for 
how long. 
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These technical weaknesses demonstrate the inadequacy of available login 
systems for forensic computing because the data provided is insufficiently 
complete, accurate or continuous. Additionally, as previously mentioned, any 
user with root access could easily modify these log files used by commands 
last and lastcomm to generate their respective outputs. Combined, these 
problems create major difficulties for the collection and presentation of digital 
evidence suitable for a court of law. 
Increasingly there is an acknowledgement that computer security systems can 
easily be tainted and their evidence contaminated. There are many known 
hacks to fix wtmpx, utmpx and other log files often used as a source of 
information on system events (Farmer & Venema, 1993). In a series of articles 
Farmer and Venema (Farmer, 2000, 2001; Farmer & Venema, 2000; Venema, 
2000a, 2000c) have dealt directly with these issues from a technical 
perspective. In a personal communication to the author, Venema indicated that 
forensic computing was still very immature and at the beginning of a steep 
learning curve (Venema, 2000b). However, beyond these technical approaches 
and given the 'Rome Labs' example there is a need for more consideration of 
the legal implications of manipulating log and audit files in terms of legal 
admissibility. 
The issue of using audit logs as a source of evidence per se was in detail 
investigated by Allinson (2002) by analysing 11 cases from Queensland, 
Australia. She concluded that 
"Legal and court proceedings do not yet appear to be at a level to fully 
assess the worth and acceptance of electronic evidence. This is 
demonstrated by the low level of cross-examination and the acceptance 
of material submitted at face value." 
While Allinson's conclusion is important, it is necessary to acknowledge the 
limited nature of her investigation to one state in Australia. It would be 
dangerous to make a general conclusion based on this investigation. 
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In terms of broad technical approaches, huge advances have been made in the 
last ten years in the ability of systems to detect intrusions, denial of services 
attacks and to improve user profiling and network monitoring. However, as 
AusCERT figures (Australian Computer Emergency Response Team, 2004) 
indicate it would be naïve to suggest that these approaches are wholly effective 
or even able to keep pace with the growing challenges of computer misuse and 
e-crime. Indeed, while these approaches may provide tools to address some of 
the major symptoms of computer misuse, problems remain in detecting, 
identifying and logging attacks. Additionally, as has been previously 
demonstrated through cases studies, many of the systems and tools developed 
within this approach have major limitations in terms of evidence acquisition 
capabilities (Broucek & Turner, 2002c, 2004b; Sommer, 1998a, 1998b, 1999). 
Significantly, it is also important to remain aware of the susceptibility of these 
systems and tools themselves to attack (Arona, et al., 1999; Handley, et al., 
2001). 
As the debates in the e-security and e-forensics literature indicate, responding 
to the challenges of computer misuse and e-crime has produced several streams 
of research and development including network survivability, self-healing 
networks, intrusion prevention/protection systems, anti malware systems and e-
forensic investigation tools. Whilst various disagreements and debates continue 
within each of these streams of research, there appears to be an increasing 
awareness of the need to move from reactive to more proactive approaches. 
These new approaches appear to increasingly acknowledge that the 
conventional 'fortress model' of perimeter defence is no longer sufficient to 
address security on networks that have numerous entry points due to the range 
of devices (wired and wireless) and application service models now commonly 
deployed. For example, current developments in malware protection (antivirus 
software) are increasingly displaying a move away from signature-based 
(reactive) detection of malware exploits towards a more proactive approach of 
vulnerability protection through the deployment of behavioural-based engines. 
While this approach clearly offers assistance in protecting systems against new 
exploits without having to rely on their signature, there has been little 
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consideration of the implications of these systems for user privacy and the 
collection of digital evidence. 
An example that illustrates another aspect of the interrelatedness of issues has 
occurred in the realm of anti-spam software. While many of these systems 
make valiant attempts to deal with the increasing problem of spam email, some 
of the solutions developed may be causing more harm than good. As the direct 
experience of one of the authors indicates, much anti-spam software is 
language specific and cannot cope with other languages, with the consequence 
that messages in these languages are frequently marked as SPAM. These types 
of problems with spam filtering may lead to the loss of messages (due to them 
being filtered to the junk mail folder and deleted without being examined). 
Additionally, given that some anti-spam software tools work on a principle of 
changing and or adding headers to e-mails to allow users to filter according to 
these headers, it remains unclear whether such modifications of e-mails might 
have legal implications, for example: 
• If e-mail is used as an official document and a dispute arises, the 
originating e-mail will be different from e-mail delivered to recipient and 
thus may become invalid; 
• If e-mail is going to be used as an evidence of criminal, illegal or other 
inappropriate activity, will such a modification render it inadmissible or 
invalid? 
Even where digital data is potentially available there are still numerous 
technical challenges. For example, EnCase (currently the preferred e-forensic 
investigation software tool used by Australian law enforcement agencies) was 
the focus of considerable discussion in 2003. While it offered access to file 
systems other than those used by Microsoft Windows and DOS platforms, it 
was mainly oriented towards the MS Windows environment. At that time it 
could be run only on this platform and it was discussed in forensic circles in 
relation to producing different (potentially incorrect) hash values for disks 
imaged/investigated on two different platforms (http://groups-beta.google.com/ 
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group/infosec-discuss/). This difference appeared to be the result of difficulties 
EnCase had in acquiring access to the HPA (Host Protected Area) 3 part of 
discs. Given the requirements in many jurisdictions for completeness of the 
disk image used for evidence, this raises interesting questions on admissibility. 
While other e-forensic software tools such as Brian Carrier's SleuthKit provide 
options for both MS Windows and Unix/Linux platforms, it too has some 
limitations, for example not supporting the ReiserFS file system used as a 
default on the commonly deployed SuSE (now Novell) Linux. 
From a forensic computing perspective there is evidence that the various 
technical responses to the challenges of criminal, illegal or inappropriate on-
line behaviours are increasingly raising problems for both the collection of data 
and its admissibility. However, it is clear that given our contemporary 
experience of computer security that we retain modest expectations of their 
capabilities. Therefore, even whilst arguing for the need for these systems 
developers to consider issues of evidence acquisition, there is a need following 
Broucek & Turner (2002c) to acknowledge that: 
• These systems may not even be able to collect the data that they are 
designed to collect; 
• Where data is collected it may only be a partial data set; and 
• The data collected may itself be flawed, erroneous or have already been 
tampered. 
More broadly, as technical responses become more 'proactive' they are raising 
increasing challenges for the conduct of forensic analysis and individual 
privacy. The nature of many of these new systems is also making the conduct 
of forensic analysis problematic because the methods that have to be used to 
access the evidentiary data end-up jeopardizing its legal admissibility. In 
3 HPA is defined as a reserved area for data storage outside the normal operating file system. 
This area is hidden from the operating system and the file system, and is normally used for 
specialized applications. Systems may wish to store configuration data or to save memory to 
the hard disk drive device in a location that the operating systems cannot change. 
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relation to privacy, the need for systems to collect data and also protect privacy 
is evidenced by work on pseudonymisation techniques for log files and 
intrusion detection systems (Biskup & Flegel, 2000a, 2000b, 2000c; Lundin, 
2000). 
Privacy concerns also emerge not just in relation to those individuals under 
investigation, but also to others whose activities are also part of the data sets 
being analysed. These knock-on effects involving privacy intrusion raise 
concerns about breaches of privacy and/or confidentiality without the 
knowledge or consent of the individual's concerned. With pro-active security 
measures, there are also privacy concerns arising from constant surveillance 
(Biskup & Flegel, 2000a, 2000b, 2000c; Kvarnstrom, et al., 2000; Lundin, 
2000; Lundin & Jonsson, 1999a; Sobirey, et al., 1997). The emergence of 
anomaly based intrusion detection systems that rely on analysis of 'normal' 
work patterns poses a further threat to privacy as is witnessed by efforts to 
develop privacy protection through pseudonymisation approaches. 
2.4.4 Anti-forensics 
While several tools and solutions were previously developed as tools for 
enhancement of privacy and/or security, they can now be also considered as 
'anti-forensic' tools i.e. tools and solutions that directly inhibit, hamper or at 
least limit accurate investigation of digital evidence. 
First and foremost, as soon as any form of cryptography is introduced, an e-
forensic investigation is significantly hampered. As previous work by Broucek 
and Turner (Broucek & Turner, 2003b, 2003c) observed and confirmed 
network based intrusion detection tools (NIDS) like SNORT can be rendered 
useless by simply using SSL for http protocol (https). Collected encrypted data 
has either no or minimal forensic value. The same applies for antivirus 
software. The majority of the detections are signature based and as such they 
are practically powerless against viruses that are distributed in encrypted form. 
As the Aldrich Ames Spy case illustrated (Reno, 1996), encrypted data files 
obtained as part of an investigation are basically useless as evidence. Clearly 
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for criminals, hackers and other individuals engaging in illegal or inappropriate 
behaviour, encryption provides protection. 
Privacy enhancement tools such as PGP (Zimmerman, 1996, 2001) again 
decrease the ability of forensic investigators unless they have legal powers to 
recover encryption keys. This in turn reintroduces a key topic on the socio-
political agenda at national and international levels about balancing privacy 
versus encryption control and recalls debates about Key Escrow (the old 
clipper debate) (Denning, 1997; Denning & Branstad, 1996; Reno, 1996). 
Significantly, in the post 9/11 era there have been some anecdotally reported 
cases of 'self-incrimination' in relation to the use of encryption. Just the plain 
fact that someone starts using encrypted e-mails may increase suspicion on 
these individuals from authorities by raising the question 'why are these 
individuals exchanging encrypted e-mails?'. 
Anti-forensic tools are increasingly the subject of debates at scientific and 
commercial conferences (for example, Annual Infosec World Conference and 
Expo; Black Hat Briefings). Increasingly, they are also becoming the subject 
of research and criticism. 
Liu and Brown (2006) conducted a two hour session at the Infosec 2006 
analysing various anti-forensic techniques and counter techniques from very 
simple ones that anyone can use, to complex and complicated approaches 
requiring tools and expert knowledge. 
Geiger, (2005) evaluated seven commercial anti-forensic tools with surprising 
results: 
"All the counter-forensic tools failed to eradicate some potentially 
sensitive information — either data specifically targeted for wiping by 
the user or records that contained information the tool was designed to 
eliminate. Some shortfalls were more serious than others. In one case, 
the tool failed to wipe, or overwrite, any of the files it deleted." 
(Geiger, 2005) 
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While it is acknowledged that currently there is not widespread awareness of 
these tools, perhaps this is only a matter of time. It can also be anticipated that 
cyber-criminals are already aware of and using these commercially available 
tools. Some of these tools are actually built into existing software. For 
example, tools like CIPHER.EXE included in the standard distribution of 
WindowsXP, Vista and Windows 7 can significantly hinder forensic analysis. 
While some recent research (for example, Geiger's evaluation (2005)) suggests 
that many of these anti-forensic tools are less effective than they claim to be 
and some actually do not work at all, their existence is illustrative of the nature 
of the problems faced and the need for integrated responses that balance the 
needs for security, privacy and legal admissibility. 
2.5 Legal Aspects and Dimensions 
"The world left the legal profession in the dust years ago. Attorneys are 
just coming to the realization that people have computers and have 
important information on them. I spend a good deal of time dragging 
attorneys kicking and screaming into the 20th century." (John Benson, 
e-discovery consultant, at Black Hat 2008) 
In contrast to the pace of change that has occurred in the development of the 
Internet and the information society, developments in the legal area continue to 
evolve relatively slowly and based on tradition bound approaches, processes 
and procedures. While national and international frameworks have emerged 
aimed at addressing some aspects of the challenges posed by digital 
technologies and the Internet, it is noticeable that the practice of law within 
national court systems continues to exhibit considerable variation. 
Alongside problems of 'applicable law' because of the transnational nature of 
digital communications, and the relatively slow pace of development of 
international laws, regulations and procedures, it is clear that there are 
fundamental differences between scientific and legal proofs. While many 
lawyers recognise the need for technological neutrality in legal codes, 
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problems continue to exist with legal professionals understanding of digital 
technology when making analogies with pre-existing case law. The digital 
domain poses significant conceptual challenges to notions of chain of evidence, 
chain of custody, original versus copy and legal admissibility. 
Additionally, the inter-relationships between responses in one legal area on 
another have often been ignored. This situation has become more significant 
with the expansion of the Internet and the information society as changes in 
one area of digital information law have direct or indirect consequences for the 
balance of rights in another area of information law. For example, it has been 
argued that strengthening digital intellectual property rights can have negative 
consequences for personal privacy and information access (Samuelson, 2002). 
2.5.1 Risks and Challenges: the Law and Digital Data 
In the 'information age' alongside exciting opportunities for activities such as 
e-business and e-learning, there is an awareness of the serious risks posed by 
malware, hacktivism and information-warfare. A fundamental cause of many 
of these risks is the variety of ways that individuals and/or groups can now 
utilise digital technologies to engage in criminal, illegal or other inappropriate 
on-line activities. While it can be assumed that much of this on-line behaviour 
continues to go undetected, when it is identified the need for evidence and 
proof becomes of paramount importance. 
Although technical advances in the ability of systems to detect intrusions, 
denial of services attacks, other forms of attacks and to enhance network 
monitoring and maintenance are well documented and subject to constant 
research and development, their utility for the presentation of evidence in the 
court of law is rarely evaluated (McKemmish, 1999). Additionally, the issue of 
privacy and data protection is emerging as a central debate in forensic 
computing research (Broucek & Turner, 2002c). 
Next section presents a short overview of three major legislative frameworks, 
namely EU Convention on Cybercrime (Council of Europe, 2001), Directive 
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on Privacy and Electronic Communication (European Parliament & Council of 
the European Union, 2002) and Cybersecurity Act of 2009 ("Cybersecurity Act 
of 2009," 2009). 
Convention on Cybercrime (Council of Europe, 2001) had been four years in 
making. It was finally proclaimed in Budapest on 23 November 2001. This 
convention was first international treaty on cyber-crimes, with particular 
interest in dealing with crimes related to Intellectual Property (copyright), 
computer related fraud, child pornography and attacks against network 
security. One of the main objectives was to set up common criminal policies 
amongst the EU member countries as well as other countries and to establish 
grounds for mutual international cooperation. 
The treaty is very conveniently divided into Articles and after the initial 
Article, Articles 2 to 10 clearly define the offense and what is expected from 
each party. There are following offences defined in these Articles: 
• Article 2 — Illegal access 
• Article 3 — Illegal interception 
• Article 4 — Data interference 
• Article 5 — System interference 
• Article 6— Misuse of devices 
• Article 7 — Computer-related forgery 
• Article 8 — Computer-related fraud 
• Article 9 — Offences related to child pornography 
• Article 10 — Offences related to infringements of copyright and related 
rights 
The Convention also conveniently describes following procedural provisions: 
• Article 15 — Conditions and safeguards 
• Article 16 — Expedited preservation and partial disclosure of traffic data 
• Article 19 — Search and seizure of stored computer data 
• Article 20 — Real time collection of traffic data 
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Chapter three stipulates principles of international cooperation. It deals with 
general principles of mutual cooperation, extradition, mutual assistance and 
spontaneous information. 
Importantly, Article 28 deals in detail with principles of confidentiality and 
limitation on use. 
The Convention entered force on 1 July 2004 after gaining minimal number of 
required signatures and ratifications. Unfortunately, process of signing and 
ratifying has been very slow and not exactly satisfactory. As of 15 April 2009 
the Convention was signed by 42 EU member countries and 4 non-members. It 
has been ratified only by 4 member countries and one non-member country 
(USA). 
Directive on Privacy and Electronic Communication (European Parliament 
& Council of the European Union, 2002) was adopted by European Parliament 
on 12 July 2002. This directive deals with questions and issues surrounding 
privacy in electronic communication. The directive provides valuable 
definitions for terms like 'user', 'traffic data', 'consent', 'value added 
services', 'electronic mail' and other in Article 2. 
In the Article 4, the directive stipulates need to provide security of the services 
and in a case of particular risks to the security, provide information of such risk 
to the subscribers. 
Article 5, provides for confidentiality of communication. It specifically 
requests adoption of national laws prohibiting listening, tapping, storage or 
other kinds of surveillance and interception without consent of the user, unless 
legally authorised, as provided for in Article 15. 
In relation to the data retention and other uses, the directive stipulates need for 
anonymisation of the data when no longer needed and that retention is possible 
only for billing purposes. 
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From issues pertaining to this thesis, the directive directly deals with issues 
surrounding unsolicited communication (SPAM), data related to geo-location, 
cookies and others. 
Article 15 of this directive is particularly important for forensic computing, 
since it allows for legislative measures that may need to be necessary for 
successful investigation, data collection and monitoring in cases of 
investigation of criminal, illegal and other inappropriate activities. 
Cybersecurity (sic) 4 Act of 2009 ("Cybersecurity Act of 2009," 2009) 
proposal in USA that has been introduced in the first week of April 2009 by 
senators John D. Rockefeller (D-WVA) and Olympia Snowe (R-ME) 
introduces legislation that would establish new role of 'National Cybersecurity 
Officer' responsible directly to the White House. This officer would have 
power to monitor and control Internet traffic to protect against threats to critical 
information infrastructure (CID. President of the USA can under the proposed 
Act declare `cybersecurity emergency' and shut down or limit Internet traffic 
'in any critical information network' in the interest of the national security. It is 
important to note, that the proposed Act does not contain the definition of 
'critical information network' or the `cybersecurity emergency'. The decision 
is left to the president of the USA, giving him virtually unlimited control over 
the Internet. 
In this regard, it is important to realise that there does not seem to be generally 
accepted definition of critical information infrastructure (CID, but EU is 
extensively using definition introduced in Green Paper on European 
Programme for Critical Infrastructure Protection (Commission of European 
Communities, 2005). This document defines CII as 
4 Please note spelling of the word — many authors prefer to use two words as in `cyber 
security'; however, this particular legislation strictly uses one word and consequently it is 
expected that this will be used instead of two words in the future. 
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"ICT systems that are critical infrastructures for themselves or that are 
essential for the operation of critical infrastructures 
(telecommunications, computer/software, Internet, satellites, etc.). - 
Additionally and according to MEMO/09/141 (Commission of European 
Communities, 2009), OECD defined CII in 2008 as 
"those interconnected information systems and networks, the disruption 
or destruction if which would have a serious impact on the health, 
safety, security, or economic well-being of citizens, or on the effective 
functioning of government or the economy." 
It is important to note, that European Commission (EC) is not proposing 
mandatory but only voluntary measures. According to EC, 
ensuring the security and resilience of CII requires cooperation 
between public and private actors, which is largely based on trust. A 
non-binding approach will be more effective in steering a dialogue 
through which interested parties can work out the best way to 
cooperate and share best practices. During the consultation process 
prior to the launch of this initiative, Member States' and private sector 
representatives strongly supported the proposed initiative and 
confirmed the need and willingness to cooperate at EU level, as long as 
this remained voluntary". 
However, it is also necessary to note that the document does not preclude 
possibility of using biding/mandatory approach when feasible and useful. 
2.5.2 Forensic Computing and the Law 
In this context, it is evident that a large number of the issues discussed above 
have direct relevance for forensic computing and forensic computing 
investigations. Usefully, Brungs & Jamieson (2005) have conducted a review 
of the key legal challenges for forensic computing. In the study that they have 
conducted, they identified 17 pivotal legal issues and problems for forensic 
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computing and later categorised them to three major classifications 'judicial 
flexibility, privacy and multi-jurisdictional nature." 
The issues are briefly described below. 
Jurisdictional issue relates to the differences between different legislations. 
The authors considered only issues arising from different legislations within 
Australia, however, this will apply even more strongly to international 
legislation frameworks. 
Computer Evidence Presentation Difficulties are closely related to 
jurisdictional issues. Each jurisdiction can have different requirements for 
evidence presentation and in some cases evidence acceptable in one state may 
not be acceptable in the other state. This again will be even more complicated 
in the international framework. 
Requirements to "Fire Up" Original issue arises from best practices guides. 
For example, in the state of Queensland it is a practice to use the original 
computer in the court. This creates numerous problems and issues; mainly the 
fact that once the computer is started it will no longer be in the original state as 
when it was at the time of ceasing it. This is in direct contrast with several best 
practice guides available (e.g. National High-Tech Crime Unit & Association 
of Cheif Police Officers, 2003; U.S. Secret Service, IACP, & DOJ, 2006). 
Computer Literacy in the Legal Sector issue is directly arising from the fact 
that many judges are old and technologically challenged. This creates problems 
in them understanding digital evidence. 
Confidential Record, Business Systems issue relates to the fact that during 
collection of electronic evidence and/or evidence discovery, privileged rights 
might be breached. 
Telecommunication Act (1979) Covering Data. This issue considers 
potential implication of the act on data interception. This federal act is 
supposed to provide privacy protection for data transmission. There is a 
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question whether this act covers only transmission of the data or also storage of 
such data. 
Criminal Prosecution versus Civil Trial. It is clear that there are differences 
between requirements for investigation for criminal or civil proceedings. The 
authors raise question about powers given to private investigators and/or 
consulting companies in cases where they investigate for example for company 
that is not prepared to prosecute. While police can obtain warrants in order to 
recover evidence, these organisations cannot do so and have to rely on different 
mechanisms to do so. 
Privacy Issues and Workplace Surveillance issue has been triggered by 
introduction of privacy legislations in Australia and is problematic in Europe 
due to EU Directive on the protection of individuals with regards to the 
processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data (European 
Parliament & Council of the European Union, 2002). According to the authors, 
these provisions have not been adequately tested and as such create primary 
concern again for private consulting firms. 
Interpretation of Telecommunications Act (1997) issue raises concerns 
about interpretation given in the act to the fact when communication occurred. 
This is highlighted in a case of e-mails, as it is not clear when to consider e-
mail as read or un-read, but this can be extended to question when e-mail is 
considered to be delivered etc. 
Access and Exchange of Information issue again relates to privacy. Authors 
argue that it is, for example, still unclear when ISP can provide its data to law 
enforcement and even what information they can gather. 
International Cooperation in Practice. From the nature of the computer 
crime, it is clear that international cooperation is essential. While there is 
agreement that this cooperation is necessary, there appears to be limited 
research on how to actually conduct such cooperation. Such research should 
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include questions of compatibility of different jurisdictions and should 
influence development of new legislation. 
Revision of Mutual Assistance issue relates closely to previous issue. While 
there are treaties allowing such assistance in place (e.g. Department of Foreign 
Affairs and Trade, 1997), they are of limited use due to their inflexibility. For 
example, they do not provide for real-time work. 
Contrast of Broadcast versus Communication issue concentrates on 
differences between communication and broadcasting. For example, in 
Australia these two modes of information transfer are covered by two different 
acts — Telecommunication Act (1997) and the Commonwealth Copyright 
Amendment (Digital Agenda) Act 2000. 
Are New Offences Needed? There is a tendency to introduce new offences in 
relation to electronic and digital communications. The questions are being 
raised if the newly created offences are enough 'technologically neutral' to 
avoid recurrent amendments of new laws and codes. It is noted that current 
Model Criminal Code does not cover piracy. 
Launching Actions against Unknown Persons in a Civil Trial. This issue 
again highlights the difficulty that private sector faces when obtaining 
evidence. For example, to receive subpoena to identify offender from 
communication company in civil litigation, civil case must first be launched; 
however, it is impossible to launch civil action against unknown person. 
Technical Issues — Testing of Tools and Techniques issue deals with the fact 
that forensic experts use different tools. It highlights the need for third party 
independent validation of these tools to guarantee repeatability and verification 
of techniques used by various experts. This also closely relates to best practices 
issues raised earlier. 
Qualifications - Expert Witness Skills and Techniques. The authors argue 
here for definition of skills and qualifications for forensic computing 
practitioners. 
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It should be noted that the study on which Brungs & Jamieson (2005) build 
their conclusion was limited to Australia and included only 11 participants. 
2.5.3 Some Other Dude Did It (SODDI) 
At this point it is appropriate to discuss some of the new defensive tactics used 
by defence lawyers in cases involving digital evidence. 
The first one involves a tactic widely used and often referred to as 'some other 
dude did it' or SODDI. In the area of digital evidence it is also referred to as 
the 'Trojan horse type defence' (Brenner & Carrier, 2004). 
Trojan horse is a type of malware, often incorrectly called a virus. However, in 
comparison to a virus, this type of malware is not self-replicating. It often 
presents itself as a piece of software doing something else that may be 
desirable to users (e.g. data cleansing) and while it may or may not actually do 
this, it also contains the malware. The name comes from Greek mythology 
about the large wooden horse containing enemy warriors inadvertently brought 
into Troy. Often, the purpose of Trojan horse is to give the attacker or hacker 
remote access to targeted computer. It is exactly this fact that is used by 
lawyers as the basis for the SODDI defence. 
Haagman & Ghavalas (2005a, 2005b) provide a review of several cases where 
the SODDI was successfully used (for example Regina v Aaron Caffrey, 
Southwark Crown Court, 17 October 2003) and issues that this type of defence 
creates for forensic computing. The first part of their work provides a good 
general overview of Trojan horses and how they can be constructed including 
two scenarios of simple and more complex Trojans using packers. They 
suggest the necessity to include not only static information gathered from the 
computer, but also the volatile and network information in the process of an 
investigation. In the second part, they provide examples of how to conduct 
analysis and they conclude that 
"when the techniques that have been described in this article are 
combined with traditional host based computer forensics, it is clear that 
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a forensic analyst is in a much stronger position to be able to prove or 
disprove a backdoor claim."(Haagman & Ghavalas, 2005b) 
Carney and Rogers (2004) claim that "as yet, there is no reliable way to 
counter the Trojan defense" and propose statistical methods for event 
reconstruction to prove or disprove the SODDI claim. This is a useful attempt 
to develop a standardised method for event reconstruction with measurable 
accuracy and significance. 
While this type of possible defence creates problems for forensic analysts hired 
by prosecutors, the use of Trojan horses have recently acquired another, much 
more worrying dimension. Recently, the Council of the European Union has 
recommended that Member States should undertake clandestine remote 
searches of computers of suspects, if provided for under national law and there 
have been calls for legalisation of spyware, key-loggers and Trojan horses in a 
recent Australian government commissioned report (Kim-Kwang, 2009). 
While it is clear that use of such tools could have significant benefit in the 
investigation of on-line crimes (for example in cases as appalling as child 
sexual offences), it also creates significant privacy and other legal issues that 
need to be addressed if an appropriate balance of rights is to be maintained. 
Alongside the SODDI type of defence, it is also useful to briefly mention some 
other more unusual related legal defences that have been used for particular on-
line behaviours, e.g. case where a teenage hacker obtained a 'not guilty' verdict 
based on a defence that such behaviour was 'computer addiction' ("Bedworth 
Case - UK," 1993; Kelman, 1999). A related issue that has sometimes been 
considered relates to the 'last mile' problem that a user is not sufficiently 
computer literate to have been able to undertaken the on-line behaviours of 
which they have been accused (Hannan & Turner, 2004). 
2.6 Organisational Challenges and Issues 
"It appears that far less security is applied to data held in computer 
systems than is the case for data held in manual systems. Office 
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workers are familiar with the security requirements of a filing cabinet 
but not necessarily those of a information system" (Backhouse & 
Dhillon, 1999). 
With developments in electronic commerce, organisations have been quick to 
recognise the commercial opportunities provided by the Internet. However, 
most have also become aware of the risks posed by criminal, illegal or 
inappropriate on-line behaviours by their employees, customers or criminals. In 
particular, organisations remain concerned about fraud, defamation and loss of 
reputation, financial loss and the loss of a competitive edge. 
In response to the above mentioned issues, organisations have developed 
policies and procedures to safeguard themselves. However, it can be seen that a 
lack of understanding of the nature of digital information and users on-line 
behaviours often means these approaches compound the very problems that 
they are trying to solve (Broucek & Turner, 2003a). 
Additionally, regardless of the effectiveness of organisational approaches, there 
remains a strong tendency to 'pull the plug' when problems are detected rather 
than to engage in a systematic investigation, collection and analysis of digital 
evidence of the on-line behaviours that have occurred (Leyden, 2000; Maher, 
2001; Microsoft, 2000; Microsoft UK website Hacked - VIGILANTe 
Statement," 2001; Mitnick, 2000; Rohde, 2000). 
2.6.1 Organisations, Digital Data and End Users 
From the perspective of allowing ongoing security breaches for evidence 
acquisition, it is clear that the 'Rome Labs' case (Christy, 1998), the Mitnick 
case (Shimomura, 1995), the development and use of 'Honey pots' (Even, 
2000) and the tracking of computer espionage (Clifford Stoll, 1988; Cliff Stoll, 
1989) provide strong arguments against 'pulling the plug'. These cases 
illustrate the advantages for forensic investigations of tracking and tracing 
hackers during ongoing security breaches. On the flipside of this, the well 
published Microsoft case (B. Bace, 2000; Leyden, 2000; Maher, 2001; 2000; 
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Mitnick, 2000; Poulsen, 2000; Rohde, 2000; Sliwa, 2000; Verton, 2000; Weiss 
& Rosencrance, 2000) highlights how sensitive this issue can be, particularly 
for information and communication based industries. Here business reputation 
as well as specific commercial data are at risk. 
With the increasing incidence of computer misuse and e-crime, public and 
private sector organisations have increasingly sought ways to respond. These 
responses have included increased e-security precautions, computer usage 
policies, monitoring and education as well as in some instances the 
establishment and deployment of forensic computing investigation teams. 
Whilst these responses are sensible and understandable, in some cases their 
implementation has had unforeseen results that have actually impaired the 
overall security of the organisations concerned. Partly, this results from 
draconian measures imposed on users of the systems and partly from a general 
lack of awareness amongst most users of the implications for e-security of their 
on-line usage behaviours. 
A good example of this relates to how some organisations approach the 
management of relatively insecure Internet applications such as e-mail and 
WWVV browsers. With e-mail for example, awareness of these security 
weaknesses has resulted in many organisations restricting access to 
organisational e-mail systems. From the users perspective, this has led to the 
perception of internal e-mail systems as being 'unfriendly' due to their 
inaccessibility outside the organisational 'firewall' and/or because 
organisational policies prohibit their utilisation for private communications. 
However, as a result of the increasingly important social dimension to e-mail 
usage most employees solve this 'problem' of limited access to e-mail by 
subscribing to one of the numerous free web-mail services e.g. hotmail.com, 
yahoo.com, excite.com, gmail.com etc. This user response in-turn introduces 
further risks for organisational IS security management, particularly as many 
employees adopt the 'single password for everything' approach. As a 
consequence, the same password may be used on organisational e-mail systems 
as well as on private web-mail accounts which in-turn dramatically increases 
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the possibility of password sniffing/spoofing type security breaches. These free 
web-mail services also appear susceptible to a higher incidence of direct or 
double-click attachment based viruses that can easily migrate to the 
organisational information systems as a result of employee on-line behaviours. 
More significantly, most of these free web-mail systems also allow the 
checking of POP3 e-mail accounts. Employees using these services are rarely 
aware that in doing so, they may be allowing unauthorised access to 
organisational information. Similarly, WWW browsers exhibit many security 
weaknesses that combine with users on-line behaviours to compound system 
security management problems. These include the use of cookies; web browser 
history and cache files being kept on local drives; active pages - using Java 
applets, Java scripts ActiveX technologies and executable elements in web 
pages all of which create potential risks for the spread of malware (Broucek & 
Turner, 2002b). 
It should be noted that it is these very insecurities in email and browsers that 
are most often exploited to create the invaluable resources for the basis of e-
forensic investigations, particularly in organisational environment, without 
need for law enforcement involvement. Access to such a data is usually 
covered by employee agreements regarding information and communication 
technology use. 
Additionally, access to the Internet through web browsers also creates further 
privacy issues for users and for system management. For example, many 
organisations use proxy/cache for speeding up, controlling and monitoring 
access to Internet by using proxy authentication. Proxy authentication and 
monitoring can create perceptions amongst users of a modern form of 
`Panopticon' (Dishaw, 2002). In particular, this perception can be created if 
such monitoring and/or authentication are introduced without proper policies 
and if the purpose of their introduction is not explained to users. Proxy 
authentication is generally used only for statistical purposes; however it can 
create a 'big brother' type of surveillance fear amongst the users that can 
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influence their behaviours in ways that impair overall system security. These 
examples highlight the need to balance requirements for improved security 
with those of the right to privacy of employees in a manner that does not 
compromise the potential for future forensic investigation of criminal, illegal or 
inappropriate on-line behaviours. 
Clearly, a major element in any organisational IS security management 
approach must be to provide detailed explanations and demonstrations to users 
on how their on-line behaviours can potentially harm the security of the 
organisation. If organisations feel the need to have the option of monitoring on-
line behaviours or conducting forensic investigations then the staff should be 
informed of the procedures and the results of any investigations or monitoring. 
Creating a 'big brother surveillance' perception amongst employees may well 
be counter-productive in terms of IS security and/or wider organisational goals 
(Dishaw, 2002). 
2.6.2 Forensic Computing and Organisational Responses 
From a forensic computing perspective there are also implications of the 
organisational responses to the incidence of criminal, illegal or inappropriate 
on-line behaviours when they are detected. This is particularly the case in 
relation to an organisation's ability to accurately handle digital evidence. As an 
Australian case discussed by Ajoy Gosh (University of Technology Sydney) 
and cited in the AusCERT 2004 computer crime survey (Australian Computer 
Emergency Response Team, 2004, p. 9) illustrates, organisations must examine 
evidence correctly or face the consequences — the case in question concerned 
"evidence of transactions made using a junior clerk's 'userid' that were 
fraudulent". The clerk was subsequently dismissed and asked to repay the 
funds or face prosecution. Both the company and clerk (through the Union) 
organised for the conduct of forensic examinations of the digital evidence by 
forensic experts. Subsequently it was revealed by the expert engaged by the 
clerk's solicitor that "the suspect transactions were in fact made by a company 
director pretending to be the clerk". Significantly, it was also revealed that "the 
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company had requested its forensic consultant to make certain omissions in his 
report". The end result was that the clerk received a substantial termination 
payment and agreed to sign a deed of confidentiality, the dishonest company 
director resigned and paid back the funds and the alleged fraud was never 
reported to the Police. This case highlights a number of issues that highlight the 
interrelatedness of organisational, technical and legal approaches: 
• Organisational responses, particularly where they are settled 'out of court' 
are analogous to the technical response to an incident of 'pulling the plug' 
in that they inhibit the development of understanding on how best to 
collect, analyse and present digital evidence. This in-turn is inhibiting the 
development of case law interpretations on acceptable practices, procedures 
and approaches to dealing with the admissibility and evidentiary weight of 
digital evidence; 
• The case also reveals the importance of examining links between digital 
evidence and other types of evidence. This in-turn highlights the problem 
of 'the last mile' (Harman & Turner, 2004) and the significance of 
conventional investigative techniques and other types of potentially 
corroborative evidence. 
More broadly, as organisations seek to respond to these challenges, they find 
themselves in a curious position in relation to law enforcement agencies (who 
under new legislations are increasingly being empowered to respond). The lack 
of delineation over responsibility for chain of evidence and chain of custody in 
relation to digital evidence creates uncertainty and further compounds the 
development of best practices in terms of technical and legal responses to 
incidents. Finally, there is also the inter-relationship between research and 
development into computer misuse and e-crime and organisational demands for 
e-security. 
Anecdotal evidence collected by the author of this thesis suggests that 
compliance with e-security requirements placed on staff in law enforcement 
agencies at state, national and international levels is inhibiting the ability of 
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these agencies to keep pace with the development of malware and new types of 
illegal or inappropriate on-line behaviours, e.g. some researchers in the field of 
child pornography have been inhibited from visiting/monitoring certain 
websites/chat-rooms because of organisational e-security approaches. 
While clear safeguards are required, it is important to note that e-criminals do 
not face any type of restriction on engaging in or developing new on-line 
behaviours. Indeed, the ingenuity of many types of computer misuse and 
digital crime display the willingness on the part of perpetrators to use any and 
all resources at their disposal, to not delineate between domains and to move 
between digital and physical environments and artefacts on the basis of 
'whatever works'. 
Another limiting factor is lack of methodologies for documentation and 
reporting of information technology incidents. Sandra Frings (2006) notes that 
there are much higher number of IT incidents than it is reported. According to 
Frings (2006) the two major reasons for not reporting are: 
• Non-disclosure due to fear of damaging image; 
• IT security incidents not recognised as harmful and even if they are, there is 
a lack of procedures to deal with them. 
Frings continues by suggesting fundamental attributes for IT incident 
documentation. This should be based on existing standards and practices (for 
example IS017799:2005 , ISO/IEC27001:2005, ACP° Good Practice for 
Computer Based Evidence), but most importantly it has to be: 
• Clear and comprehensible; 
• Meaningful and reasonable; 
• Complete; and 
• Structured. 
Frings concludes by suggesting that method of structured documentation needs 
to be added to CTOSE software prototype. 
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2.7 Emerging Trends 
"A (isolated) computer is quite never really disconnected from the 
outside" (Eric Filiol, Black Hat USA 2008) 
The number of publications relevant to this research has significantly increased 
since 2001 when this research started. As a result, it is acknowledged that the 
literature review identifies only the key trends and directions across the three 
domains (technical, legal, organisational) with the aim of highlighting potential 
intersections that are then explored through the case studies. 
2.7.1 Antivirus Research 
Josse's (2006) paper makes a useful contribution in relation to the criteria that 
can be used to assess the effectiveness of anti-virus products. A protection 
profile for assisting software manufacturers to design anti-virus products in 
accordance with a Common Criteria standard is advocated and a number of 
tests that can be carried out to validate the security requirements presented. 
Josse suggests that use of a protection profile and the specification of tests is a 
valuable basis for measuring the effectiveness of anti-virus products. 
Filiol (2006a) presents a new model of malware detection pattern based on 
Boolean functions. This paper also describes a combinatorial, probabilistic 
malware pattern scanning scheme that limits black-box analysis and can only 
be bypassed where there is collusion between a number of malware copycats. 
In another paper, Filiol and Josse (2007) present a statistical model of malware 
detection revealing how this points to the possibility for the development of 
undetectable malware. Building on research by Chess and White (2000) they 
demonstrate how existing detection techniques can be statistically modelled 
and precise definition of false-positive and non-detection presented. Moreover, 
they show how statistical model may be simulated in order to deceive antiviral 
detection. They conclude their paper by presenting a statistical variant of 
Cohen's (1986) undecidability results of virus detection. 
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Some of these ideas are further developed by Filiol (2007). In this paper Filiol 
illustrates a new class of codes (potentially malicious) called 'k-ary codes'. 
Instead of containing the whole instructions composing the program's action, 
these type of codes are composed of k distinct parts (each containing a subset 
of the instructions) which constitute a partition of the entire code. As a result, 
each part cannot be detected by anti-malware programs from conventional 
program code. Filiol proceeds to present a formalisation of these codes using 
Boolean functions and presents detailed taxonomy. The paper concludes that 
besides a huge number of beneficial applications using k-ary codes (e.g. 
protection against software piracy), these codes represent a potentially huge 
risk in terms of the generation of new malware. According to Filiol 's 
experiments, existing antivirus technologies are totally inefficient at detecting 
those codes since the detection has to face combinatorial problems that cannot 
be solved in an amount of time that is compatible with most commercially 
available antivirus software. 
Bayer, Moser, Kruegel & Kirda's (2006) paper presents TTAnalyze, a tool for 
dynamically analysing the behaviour of Windows executables. This tool runs 
binaries in an unmodified Windows environment and they argue that this leads 
to excellent emulation accuracy and makes the TTAnalyze tool ideal for 
quickly getting an understanding of the behaviour of an unknown malware. 
Avlonitis, Magkos, Stefanidakis, & Chrissikopoulos (2007) present a new 
spatial stochastic model of worm propagation by incorporating non-
uniformities within interacting subnets. The authors argue that efficient 
monitoring strategies can be deployed based on the results of random scan 
strategies and local preference scan worms. 
Ondi and Ford (2007) in their paper on metrics for worm and anti-worm 
measures argue that there exist no meaningful metrics by which one can 
quantitatively compare the effectiveness of different protection paradigms. 
They present several possible metrics for measuring worm spread and 
countermeasure effectiveness and highlight that the 'correct' metric for 
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comparative purposes will vary depending on the goal of the defender. They 
conclude by discussing what changes induced by worm design or 
countermeasures are actually meaningful in the real world. 
Aycock, deGraaf & Jacobson's (2006) paper presents a new method of anti-
disassembly based on cryptographic hash functions which is portable, hard to 
analyse, and can be used to target particular computers or users. They suggest 
that the obscured code is not available in any analysable form, even an 
encrypted form, until it successfully runs and that they have been able to 
empirically validate their results. The authors then proceed to examine possible 
countermeasures for this basic anti-disassembly scheme, as well as variants 
scaled to use massive computational power. 
In Vinoo and Nitin's (2007) paper the focus is also on practical measures but 
here in relation to counter-measures against bots on organisational internal 
networks. The authors argue that organisations should not rely only on their 
security vendor's protection against this type of malware but rather should 
develop their own intelligence gathering methods to improve protection. More 
specifically, the authors propose setting up an IRC honeypot on internal 
networks to function as an early warning system against bot-like activities. 
They argue that such a system can be set up with minimal effort and 
investment but can provide significant assistance in the fight against these 
types of malware. 
2.7.2 Computer Security 
Kayayurt & Tuglular's (2006) paper explores the use of end-to-end security 
protocols, specifically Transport Layer Security Protocol (TLS), in mobile 
devices for ensuring maintainability and extensibility. The authors then 
examine cryptographic operations via the use of the Bouncy Castle 
Cryptography Package (see http://www.bouncycastle.org/documentation) . 
Their implementation has been tested with a variety of cases and they argue 
that the object oriented architecture of this proposed end-to-end security 
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protocol implementation makes the replacement of this library with another 
cryptography package easier. 
Related to concerns with internal organisational security problems is Josse's 
(2007) paper on rootkit detection which presents a secure engine specifically 
designed for the security analyst to analyse rootkits and related programs that 
interact deeply with operating systems, including AV, FW and HIPS. This 
paper presents 'state-of-the-art' algorithms for rootkit detection and reviews 
forensic techniques and advanced heuristics. Interestingly, the paper uses a 
human analysis framework to conduct comparative analysis of security aspects 
of security products like AV, FW, HIPS and deals with the robustness of their 
driver stack and the quality of their implementation. The paper also proposes a 
reliable system for automatically gaining information about a rootkit and its 
interaction with the OS executive (stealth native API hooking and kernel 
objects integrity checking). 
One of the latest developments in computer security is related to the notion of 
The Biologically-Inspired Tactical Security Infrastructure (Carvalho, Ford, 
Allen, & Mann, 2008). As mobile ad-hoc networks (MANETs) become 
increasingly important (particularly in the areas of cyber warfare), it is even 
more important to protect these networks against security breaches and cyber 
attacks. These systems are highly collaborative and in mode of constant change 
in traffic, resources and topology. This research proposes novel approach based 
on concepts of artificial immune systems and danger theory. This is starting, 
cutting edge research and it remains to be seen how successful it will become. 
2.7.3 Cyber Crime 
Gordon & Ford (2006) adopt a high level conceptual approach in their analysis 
of on-going discussions and definitions of computer crime that they view as 
creating confusion amongst academics, industry experts and governments. 
Following a re-definition of terms, the authors present two case studies to 
illustrate the role of crime-ware and offer some observations on the role of 
cognition in the process of cyber crime. 
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PreuB, Fumel, & Papadaki (2007) explore the potential of criminal profiling for 
combating hacking based on the results of German case studies. The paper 
presents the commonalities and differences in motive and modus operandi 
(MO) identified in the twelve case studies provided by the 
Bundeskriminalamt 5 . The authors conclude that a basic principle that can be 
identified is that despite differing motivations hackers tend to take the path of 
least resistance in making their attacks. 
Coles-Kemp and Overill (2007) argue for the need for a specialised facilitation 
role in information security risk assessment. The authors suggest that without 
this role the possibility of generating outputs that are meaningful for businesses 
to act upon are much reduced. Their point of view is supported by reference to 
field observations of certification audits of a number of organisations combined 
with the standard models of BSI/ISO/IEC and FRAAP. 
Gattiker (2007) examines the issues of information assurance and education in 
the light of the Bologna Declaration (see 
http://www.ond.vlaanderen.be/hogeronderwijs/bologna/) . The paper focuses on 
European undergraduate and graduate education efforts in the area of computer 
security. Following an analysis of the issues the paper summarizes key findings 
and practical implications for European information assurance processes into 
the future. 
Educational issues are also a concern in Li and Helenius's (2007) paper on the 
use of anti-phishing toolbars. Based on a usability evaluation, the authors 
highlight issues and propose mechanisms for improvement particularly in 
relation to the client side of the available tools. 
Joms, Jung and Quirchmayr (2007) argue that without the implementation of 
proper privacy protection contextual information processed by 3rd party 
application providers may present privacy risks to end users. To address this 
problem the authors present a novel service architecture which fosters the 
5 German Federal Criminal Police Office 
89 
development of innovative applications but contains an underlying privacy 
enhancing mechanism that is based on the notion of pseudonyms. This service 
architecture is demonstrated through a transportation ticket application that 
supports location-tracking functionality. 
2.8 Summary Reflection on the Chapter 
In each area examined in the literature review, it is clear that digital evidence 
and its acquisition, analysis and presentation post challenges for technologists, 
law makers, law enforcement and business leaders. The responses in each of 
these areas are complex, constantly evolving and significantly only partial. 
Each stakeholder group involved is trying to generate coherent responses in 
their respective areas. Significantly, however, the inter-relationships between 
areas and responses generated have rarely been investigated and consequently 
are poorly understood. A major concern that underpins the approach outlined in 
the next chapter is the need to understand how these inter-relationships impact 
on the overall effectiveness of responses in each area. 
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3 Research Methodology 
"Research is to see what everybody else has seen and to think what 
nobody else has thought" (Albert Szent-Gyorgyi, 1937) 
3.1 Introduction 
This chapter presents the research method used to conduct this research. The 
methodological framework underpinning this research adopts a subjective 
ontology and employs an interpretative epistemology. The research strategy 
involves the examination of three cases on technical, legal and organisational 
challenges of digital evidence respectively. Each case is analysed 
independently to find key issues of the area. The interpretation and discussion 
adopts a forensic computing perspective to interpret and discuss the inter-
relationships across these areas and to explore the implications for digital 
evidence and the underlying problematic on-line behaviours. Case A examines 
the validity of quantitative data collected by running a network intrusion 
detection system (NIDS) SNORT on University network. Case B examines an 
Australian Federal Court case illustrating legal arguments applied to digital 
evidence, its discovery and presentation. Case C examines the Cyber Tools On-
line Search for Evidence (CTOSE) project highlighting the difficulties of 
developing and implementing organisational level processes for digital 
evidence handling. 
The first part of this chapter provides detail on the selected research 
philosophy. The second part details the research strategy used for this research. 
The third part of this chapter provides the research design used for each case. 
The fourth part provides detail on the approach to data analysis adopted for 
each case. The last section provides detail on the selected approach to 
interpretation and discussion. 
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3.2 Research Philosophy 
This research is of an exploratory nature, seeking to examine key technical, 
legal and organisational challenges in digital evidence in each area through 
three case studies independently and then employs a forensic computing 
perspective to explore the key inter-relationships between the areas. It also 
seeks to discover what implications these inter-relationships have for the future 
development of the responses to the challenges of digital evidence and the 
underlying problematic on-line behaviours. 
3.2.1 Ontology 
Ontology in philosophy is the study of the nature of being, existence or reality 
in general. More generally, ontology is a theory or study of existence and refers 
to the nature of the world around us. Ontology deals with questions concerning 
what entities exist or can be said to exist, in other words, if the world around us 
is considered to be objective or subjective (Burrell & Morgan, 1985; 
Orlikowski & Baroudi, 1991). 
According to Neuman (2000) exploratory descriptive research is useful to 
"clarib) a sequence of steps or stages", to "report on the background 
or context of the situation", and to "become familiar with the basic 
facts, settings and concerns." 
A subjective ontological view can be described as one, which emphasises the 
subjective reasoning through which humans construct their own reality 
(Orlikowslci & Baroudi, 1991). It implies that the researcher assumes that the 
social world is produced and reinforced by humans through their action and 
interactions. In exploring inter-relationships across cases, this research 
acknowledges the importance of subjective reasoning of technical, legal and 
organisational experts. 
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3.2.2 Epistemology 
Epistemology describes how the world is perceived by the researcher, and the 
relationship between the researcher and reality. The nature of the research 
questions selected for this research indicates the need for subjective 
interpretation of the data. This includes interpretation of the data generated 
through statistical methods in the Case A. An interpretative research approach 
is considered to be the most appropriate to identify and analyse factors within 
each selected area and to explore the inter-relationships between them through 
the adoption of a forensic computing perspective. 
The aim of this research is to gain a deep understanding of underlying key 
technical, legal and organisational challenges and to examine the key inter-
relationships between these areas. 
In conclusion, a methodological framework using subjective ontology with an 
interpretive epistemology was most appropriate for the exploratory nature of 
the presented research. The next section provides a description of the research 
strategy. 
3.3 Research Strategy 
The research strategy involves the examination of three cases on technical, 
legal and organisational challenges of digital evidence respectively. Each case 
is analysed independently and the interpretation and discussion explores the 
inter-relationships between the cases and their implications for digital evidence 
and on-line behaviours. 
3.4 Research Design 
"Though this be madness, yet there is method in 't. "(William 
Shakespeare, "Hamlet", Act 2 scene 2) 
Building on the three-case strategy, the research design for this investigation 
involves three sets of data collection techniques across the three cases. 
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3.4.1 Technical Data Collection for Case A 
The data for this study was collected on a production server operated by one of 
the schools at the University of Tasmania in August and September 2002. This 
server was used for providing web services and non-anonymous file transfer 
protocol (ftp) access for updating school's antivirus software clients. It was 
running on dedicated hardware unit. The data collection was conducted as a 
part of day to day operations of the system and as such was considered as 
normal business operation. 
3.4.2 Legal Court Documentation for Case B 
This case study is based on transcripts and judgements from Sony Music 
Entertainment (Australia) Limited v University of Tasmania case heard in the 
Federal Court of Australia ("Sony Music Entertainment (Australia) Limited v 
University of Tasmania [2003] FCA 532 (30 May 2003)," 2003; Sony Music 
Entertainment (Australia) Limited v University of Tasmania [2003] FCA 724 
(18 July 2003)," 2003; Sony Music Entertainment (Australia) Limited v 
University of Tasmania [2003] FCA 805 (29 July 2003)," 2003; Sony Music 
Entertainment (Australia) Limited v University of Tasmania [2003] FCA 929 
(4 September 2003)," 2003). In this case, Sony Music Entertainment was 
seeking discovery orders in relation to alleged copyright infringement by 
members of several Australian Universities. In this thesis, proceedings against 
University of Tasmania in particular are followed. The researcher was also able 
to consult directly with some of the key IT personnel involved in the case. 
3.4.3 Organisational Data from CTOSE Project for Case C 
This case study is based on a detailed analysis of data and documentation from 
the CTOSE project. This data was collected as part of researcher's involvement 
and collaboration with the CTOSE project. 
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3.5 Approach to Data Analysis 
Building on the research design above, this section describes the approach 
adopted for the conduct of analysis from each of the three cases. 
In each analysis chapter, the actual data analysis is conducted using a range of 
techniques, including statistical analysis, documentation analysis, and the 
analysis of observations and interview data. Throughout the analysis of each 
case, the researcher maintained a forensic computing perspective to ensure 
sensitivity to potential inter-relationships amongst the three data sets. Each 
analytical process used in each case is described in the following sections. 
3.5.1 Case A - SNORT 
The analysis of the case is based on SNORT's own outputs — alerts, log files 
and traffic collected in `tcpdump' format ("tcpdump/libpcap," 2002). These 
files were assessed using expert knowledge of the administrator responsible for 
the system and with additional help from University wide administrators and 
experts on networking. 
Traffic data collected in `tcpdump' format were analysed using two common 
free (under GNU licence) tools — `tcpdump' ("tcpdump/libpcap," 2002) and 
Ethereal ("ethereal," 2002) programs in addition to SNORT's own outputs. 
These tools were used on both UNIX based and Windows 2000 based 
workstations to eliminate possible bugs. Results received on both platforms 
were identical; however, small but from forensic computing perspective 
significant differences were observed between the two tools. In particular, the 
time resolutions used and the different amounts of detail provided in the 
outputs. 
Finally, the author had an opportunity to analyse and visualise collected traffic 
using commercial CA eTrust Network Forensics in 2005/2006. Unfortunately, 
significant bug was discovered in the tool's capability of acquiring and 
visualising these data and this part of the analysis was dropped from the thesis 
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due to commercial implications and limited capability of full reporting due to a 
non-disclosure agreement with CA. However, this fact supports one of the key 
findings of this research. 
3.5.2 Case B - MP3 
The analysis involves detailed critical analysis of the court rulings, together 
with analysis of available transcripts of court proceedings. Some additional 
insider knowledge and analysis was conducted by talking with UTAS 
personnel directly involved in initial response, preserving the evidence and 
testifying during the court hearings. 
3.5.3 Case C - CTOSE 
The analysis involves a detailed analysis of the CTOSE framework and a 
review of its achievement and results following completion of the project. As a 
result of the researcher's close collaboration with the CTOSE project, this 
analysis is able to examine some of the key issues that inhibited the 
framework's commercialisation, adoption and use by organisations for whom it 
was developed. This analysis is conducted in the context of the project having 
gained wide spread recognition, substantial financial support from EU and its 
results being considered to be a highly successful solution to the problems it 
identified. 
3.6 Approach to Interpretation and Discussion 
Interpretation and discussion of the analyses from the three cases adopts a 
forensic computing perspective and focuses on the nature of the inter-
relationships between the issues identified in each case. From this perspective 
the discrete approaches adopted in each case limit an appreciation of the 
complex interplay between technical, legal and organisational factors, an 
interplay that because of the nature of digital environments continues to have 
serious implications for each of these areas. More specifically, this 
interpretation and discussion reveals how and why this continued 
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fragmentation of discrete approaches is impairing the overall effectiveness of 
the responses developed. A consequence of this is the lack of integrated and 
coordinated solutions that would effectively balance requirements for legally 
admissible digital evidence, effective e-security and data privacy. 
3.7 Summary Reflection on the Chapter 
This chapter has presented the research methodology used in the conduct of 
this research. It has outlined the research philosophy, research strategy, and 
research design used in a three case approach. This chapter has also presented 
detail on the conduct of the data analysis, interpretation and discussion. 
The next three chapters (chapters 4, 5, 6) present analysis from each of the 
three cases. Chapter 7 adopts a forensic computing perspective to explore their 
inter-relationships. 
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4 Data analysis Case A — SNORT 6 
"The bad guys can essentially defeat most forensic computing efforts on 
standard hardware with ease ONCE the case law starts to get put in 
place. Anti-forensic tools pose a serious threat to the usability of 
electronic evidence" (Ford, 2008) 
4.1 Introduction 
This case provides a case study on the network traffic data collected by 
SNORT (Roesch, 1999, 2001a, 2001b) network intrusion detection system 
(NIDS) on a University school World Wide Web server over a two-month 
period. At this point, it is necessary to stipulate that this case study is based on 
the data collected by running SNORT as a part of 'normal' business operations, 
although some adjustments have been made to ensure consistent data. Further, 
it is not the intention of this study to evaluate the SNORT IDS. No 
comparisons are being made concerning the relative merits of SNORT against 
any other free or commercially available IDS systems and all the conclusions 
made in this study would apply to IDS in general. The case study is analysed 
and discussed from a forensic computing perspective. This perspective 
considers the nature of the intrusion detection and network monitoring security 
provided and evaluates the system in terms of its evidence acquisition 
('forensic') capabilities and the legal admissibility of the digital evidence 
generated. It also discusses privacy implications that the deployment of IDS 
creates and illustrates them with examples from the collected data. The 
SNORT system was selected primarily because of its easy availability (i.e. 
being free, open source software) and its widespread use in Universities, public 
institutions and many large commercial organisations. 
6  Please note some of the material presented in this chapter has been adapted from materials 
first published in the following peer reviewed publication: 
Broucek, V., & Turner, P. (2004). Intrusion Detection: Issues and Challenges in Evidence 
Acquisition. International Review of Law, Computers and Technology, 18(2), 149- 
164. 
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Hardware 
The server was based on an 'off-the-shelf' Intel Celeron 300 computer with 
256MB RAM and 3GB IDE hard drive. The server was connected to 100 
Mbit/sec port on a Cisco 2900 series switch that was further connected to the 
University backbone network. The server was located inside the University's 
network that contains more than 10,000 registered hosts. This network is 
protected against unauthorised access from the Internet by Cisco PIX firewalls. 
During the study, access to the server from the Internet was initially possible 
only on TCP/IP port 80 (http protocol) and after 30 days access was extended 
by enabling encrypted access on port 443 (https protocol). The server was not 
located in the demilitarised zone (DMZ) and as a result the computers 
connected to the internal University network had full access to the server. 
Although this was not an ideal situation because of an associated increase in 
security risks, it is very typical of University schools' WWW servers. 
Subsequently, this practice has been disallowed at the University of Tasmania 
and all wvvw services are now hosted on dedicated server within central 
Information Technology Resources data centre and located in DMZ. 
Software 
The server was using Sun Solaris 8 operating system. This operating system 
was completely patched on 31 July 2002 and the case study was conducted 
during the period 1 August to 30 September 2002. To maintain the integrity of 
the collected data sets, no further OS and application software patching was 
done during the period of the study. 
In relation to the software set-up used during the study standard security 
precautions based on AusCERT recommendations (Australian Computer 
Emergency Response Team, 2001a, 2001b; Smith & Indulska, 2001) were 
made prior the data collection. Among these, TCP Wrappers (Venema, 1992) 
were installed and configured to limit access to services run on the server. Non-
essential services, for example, telnet and tftp, were completely disabled. The 
web server was for the first 30 days of the study running Apache 1.3.26 http 
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daemon ("Apache HTTP Server," 2002) with Microsoft FrontPage 2002 server 
extensions: The MS FrontPage extensions were used for web authoring, as well 
as for collecting data from students using built in form tools. Subsequently, the 
server was extended to support encrypted SSL connections using mod_ssl 
version 2.8.10 ("mod_ssl," 2002) and openssl version 0.9.6g ("openssl," 2002). 
The ftp server was using the standard ftp daemon provided in Solaris 8, with 
TCP Wrappers limiting access to this server from two particular class B sub-
networks within the University. Anonymous access to ftp server was not 
enabled at all. This ftp server provided updates for McAfee antivirus software 
used in the school. An in-house developed Pen l based program contacted 
McAfee's master site twice daily and checked for the availability of software 
updates. If the updates were available, it downloaded them and sent an e-mail 
to the administrator. All IBM-PC hosts in the school (around 150) running 
various versions of Microsoft Windows were set up to contact this server every 
morning between the hours of 06:00 and 08:00, to check for the availability of 
update files and download them. The only additional access to the server was 
through ssh. The server was running ssh daemon version 3.2 ("ssh," 2002) and 
access to ssh daemon was again limited using TCP Wrappers to certain 
networks only. 
Three 'name based' (see Apache documentation at 
http://httpd.apache.org/doc/)  virtual web servers were running on the server. 
Two of these servers were accessible from the Internet on port 80 (http 
protocol). After thirty days of the study one of these two Internet-connected 
virtual servers was also made accessible on port 443 using Secure Socket Layer 
(SSL) for encryption. The third virtual server used `.htaccess' method to limit 
access from within the University networks only. However, being a 'name 
based' server and sharing same TCP/IP addresses with other two virtual 
servers, it was in some sense 'visible' to the Internet. 
Although SNORT (Roesch, 1999, 2001a, 2001b) is typically used as a network 
intrusion detection system (NIDS), it has been set up and installed directly on 
the web-server in this school. There were several reasons for this, including 
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that the primary focus was in monitoring only this particular server. After 
several months of testing with two different versions of SNORT on both UNIX 
and MS Windows platforms, version 1.8.7 was installed on 31 July 2002 on 
this server and started with a default, up-to-date rule set on 1 August 2002. The 
only modifications made to SNORT's default configuration files were to define 
'home' and 'external' networks, and to instruct SNORT to collect all traffic in 
`tcpdump' format. Due to the fact that the University's environment can be 
considered 'hostile', the 'external' network was set up as 'any network' with 
the exception of two 'trusted' hosts maintained and used solely by the author of 
this research. 
4.2 SNORT Data Collection Experience 
From the very first day of running the system, it was clear that Intrusion 
Detection Systems present many problems as reliable sources of intrusion 
alarms. To ensure they operate at their optimal levels requires highly trained 
network professionals and considerable efforts in fine-tuning the system. In the 
first several hours of being on-line, SNORT produced large amount of alarms 
caused by regular network traffic. The default rule set used at the start of the 
experiment is set to trigger low level alarms on many types of such traffic. The 
source hosts for these alarms were from all around the University network but 
mainly from the central Information Technology Services (ITS) department. 
This department provides a range of services that would regularly give reasons 
for alarms to be triggered including DNS, BOOTP/DHCP and SNMP network 
management. 
To eliminate these false alarms, it was necessary to adjust the system 
configuration files as well as the rule sets by making decisions on whether the 
hosts identified as the sources of these alarms should be treated as 'trusted' 
hosts or not. As a result of this fine-tuning, ITS hosts were treated as 'trusted' 
and this immediately reduced the number of false positive alarms. This is not, 
however, an ideal situation when fine-tuning IDS. Although the majority of 
these hosts were dedicated hosts managed by well-trained administrators, some 
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of these administrators may have a lack of understanding of several security 
issues related to services run on their hosts. This in-turn may lead to undetected 
security breaches. 
One finding came from an analysis of regular alerts triggered by one of the 
central hosts broadcasting `rusers' requests. Because 'r' commands are 
considered to be one of the least secure commands in the UNIX world, alarms 
concerning these activities were raised by both TCP Wrappers and SNORT. It 
has been found that these requests were generated by the CiscoWorks suite 
used by the University for managing its Cisco based network. This suite 
regularly tries to do `rusers' queries on every host known to it. It is surprising 
that Cisco is still using something that has been considered to be insecure and a 
source of information leaking. 
Further sources of alerts were triggered by a variety of other hosts around the 
University. One particular alarm was triggered by hosts trying connection on 
UDP port 161 (SNMP — Simple Network Management Protocol) using a 
default 'public' string. This was of particular interest due to, at that point 
recent, recognition of the vulnerability in SNMP protocol implementations. 
Investigation of these alarms discovered that they were triggered by HP 
JetAdmin and HP WebAdmin suites installed on these hosts. These suites can 
be set up to look for HP printers in regular intervals and then to check each 
printer in their databases regularly. Again, a decision had to be made as to 
whether these hosts should be 'trusted' or not. It was found that it is impossible 
to trust these hosts because in some instances they were not dedicated servers, 
for example, an MS Window NT 4 workstation used by a postgraduate student 
and an MS Windows 2000 Server that was not being maintained by an IT 
professional. It was later confirmed that this particular W2K server was 
running a default installation that had not been patched for several months and 
was as a result vulnerable to several security issues current at that time. 
Day two brought more false positive alarms as well as alerts indicating 
attempted attacks exploring the web server's vulnerabilities from the Internet. 
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These attempts mainly focused on known vulnerabilities in Microsoft IIS 
server. These attempts were futile, because of the Apache software miming on 
the server. In one particular case, a host based in Denmark continued to attempt 
gaining unauthorised access to the web server three times a day over several 
days. 
The first alarm of the second day was triggered by N0P86 rule on a connection 
from a host with a non-functioning reverse DNS lookup. Furthermore, this 
alarm was triggered on a connection initiated by the server that was running the 
IDS. Further investigation revealed that it was an ftp connection to Network 
Associates site initiated from the server for McAfee antivirus software updates 
- these updates having been found and downloaded by the server. The question 
as to why this activity triggered an alarm is surprisingly simple. One of the 
virus signatures in the zipped file exactly matches the N0P86 attack signature. 
This gave rise to a dilemma - was it possible to declare the McAfee server to be 
a 'trusted' host? The decision was made to do so, however, the alarm was 
triggered again in the afternoon during a second update triggered by a different 
host. Unfortunately, Network Associates provides (quite understandably) 
updates from a server farm where TCP/IP numbers can be different every time. 
The question remains why McAfee does not have a properly set up reverse 
DNS lookup. At the time of running the experiment, Network Associate's 
master site for McAfee antivirus software ftp.nai.com resolved to 
161.69.201.237 and 161.69.201.238. However, reverse lookup on both 
addresses did not resolve back. 
Similar problems arising from incorrect reverse DNS lookup were observed 
later in relation to one visiting web crawler/spider. In this case, the research 
section of one of the Blue Chip IT companies running the crawler was 
contacted and the issue was resolved very quickly. The crawler was based 
behind the company's firewall and was being assigned a dynamic TCP/IP 
address without a proper DNS entry. 
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During the second and subsequent days more false positive alerts were 
triggered. Many of them remained unexplained — for example why Netware 5.1 
servers quite regularly trigger 'Possible evasive RST' alerts; and why filling in 
a MS FrontPage form on the web server and submitting it triggers several MS 
FrontPage Vulnerability alerts. One possible explanation of this last point may 
be that SNORT's 'default' rule set is not detailed enough to recognise this form 
of FP extensions usage as legitimate and for reasons stated before it was 
impossible to consider departmental computers in the labs as trusted. 
For the rest of the month data were collected and no further adjustments were 
made to the rule sets or SNORT's configuration to ensure comparable data was 
collected under the same rule set and configuration. It was also decided not to 
update the rule sets or configuration during the remainder of the experiment for 
any newly discovered security threats. Such a decision would be totally 
unacceptable in a commercial environment; however, in the context of this 
study it was acceptable because the departmental web server does not hold any 
commercially valuable data and mechanisms were in place to ensure that data 
and server could be restored quickly without any losses. 
One bug in SNORT version 1.8.7 was identified during this period. Its analysis 
and implications are discussed further in this thesis. 
At the beginning of the second month, the server was extended to provide for 
the secure socket layer (SSL) capability, providing the duplicate information 
from one of the virtual servers on port 443 (https) in addition to standard port 
80 (http). The reason for this was to prove that signature based intrusion 
detection systems would not be able to detect any attacks conducted over SSL. 
An internal host was used to try to exploit several known security issues. As 
expected and quite understandably, none of the attacks were detected by 
SNORT. However, it was possible to observe them in the web server's log 
files. 
Monitoring continued in the same fashion, again without any updates or further 
tuning of the system, and further data were collected. Several hosts on the 
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Internet discovered that the server was running also on port 443 and several 
attempts on that port were recorded in the log files of the server. However, as 
expected, none of these attempts were detected by SNORT. Indeed, again as 
expected, even detailed analysis of traffic data using ethereal and tcpdump did 
not provide any more information than that there was encrypted traffic flowing 
between two hosts. 
4.3 Analysis of Data Collected for Case A 
Data for this experiment were collected from 1 August 2002 till 30 September 
2002. Overall, there were 2669 alerts triggered during the period, with first 
trigger on 1 August 2002 at 00:33:43 EST (GMT+10) and last trigger on 30 
September 2002 at 18:30:19 EST. These triggers were coming from 301 
different sources and had 41 different signatures. 
The first step was to eliminate the false positives. This process was gradual 
through the whole period of the experiment and each trigger was investigated 
using available tools and contacts. 1212 triggers were identified as false 
positives and 1457 triggers remained. 
Out of these, 540 (more than 33%) were found to come from domains within 
Denmark. These findings are summarised in Figure 6. 
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Figure 6: False Positive versus Positive Alerts 
Most of the hosts triggering the alerts were mainly coming from Denmark and 
as their FQDN suggested, these were using ADSL (asymmetric digital 
subscriber line) connections. There is a well-founded suspicion that many of 
these attacks were launched automatically from infected machines and the 
owners/users of these computers were not aware of what was happening on 
their hosts. A further 408 alarms were from hosts with TCP/IP addresses 
without domain name service (DNS) entries. These hosts' TCP/IP addresses 
did not resolve to host names, hence it can be presumed that these hosts were 
not properly registered with their Internet Services Provider (ISP), or ISP did 
not provide correctly DNS services. Another possible conclusion is that these 
triggers were in fact coming from properly registered hosts but using anti-
forensics tools and/or other techniques to obfuscate their real identity. 
One particular form of attack was most prevalent. It was the exploitation of the 
Microsoft IIS server via the `cmd.exe' weakness. Of the total, 592 (22.18%) 
alerts were of this form of attack. Again, most of these came from hosts based 
in Denmark. Other forms of attacks that were noted included 83 (3.11%) 
attempts using 'WEB-FRONTPAGE author.exe' access, 60 (2.25%) attempts 
using 'WEB-IS ISAPI .ida' and 46(1.72%) using 'WEB-IIS CodeRed v2 
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root.exe' accesses 7 . These statistics clearly illustrate that the majority of 
attempted attacks tried to exploit known weaknesses of the Microsoft IIS 
server. This is in spite of the fact that the server being used was running 
Apache web server software that would be very easy to query before trying to 
make an attack. Those attackers trying to exploit these weaknesses 
consequently only succeeded in leaving data about themselves. This leads to 
the preliminary conclusion that many of these attacks were either initiated by 
so called 'script kiddies' or launched automatically by infected computers. 
4.3.1 Example of Alarm Analysis 
This part provides an analysis of one particular alarm that revealed a bug in 
SNORT version 1.8.7. The same method was used to analyse all other 
interesting alerts during the course of the trial. The real TCP/IP addresses have 
been replaced with addresses in form of `XXX.XXX.XXX.XXX' where they 
were in 'dotted' form and in form of 'XX XX XX XX' where they were in 
hexadecimal form. MAC addresses were left intact. It is believed it would be 
nearly impossible to identify involved hosts from their MAC addresses. 
Figure 7 shows the alarm that was raised on 17 August 2002 at 
05:15:22.029533. This alert was most probably triggered by a host on the 
Internet using 'decoy' techniques during scanning for vulnerabilities. However, 
interestingly SNORT claims that there was communication from port zero to 
port zero in the original datagram dump part. This is clearly erroneous. To find 
out what was really happening, tcpdump and ethereal were used to view the 
actually captured packet. Ethereal's GUI interface unfortunately does not 
provide for easy copying and pasting of output to documents, hence its less 
user-friendly 'command line based' brother called tethereal was used for 
dumps presented in this study. 
7 Readers are encouraged to visit computer security related sites to find out more about these 
attacks. Some examples of good sites to visit are http://www.snort.org/,  
http://www.whitehats.com/, http://www.auscert.org.au/, http://www.sans.org/ and many more. 
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(**1 [1:485:2] ICMP Destination Unreachable (Communication Administratively 
Prohibited) [**] 
[Classification: Misc activity] [Priority: 3] 
08/17-05:15:22.029533 XXX.XXX.XXX.XXX -> YYY.YYY.YYY.YYY 
ICMP TTL:242 TOS:Ox0 ID:54572 IpLen:20 DgmLen:56 
Type:3 Code:13 DESTINATION UNREACHABLE: ADMINISTRATIVELY PROHIBITED, 
PACKET FILTERED_ 
** ORIGINAL DATAGRAM DUMP: 
YYY.YYY.YYY.YYY:0 -> ZZZ.ZZZ.ZZZ.ZZZ:0 
UDP TTL:126 TOS:Ox0 ID:7936 IpLen:20 DgmLen:71 
Len: 51 
** END OF DUMP 
Figure 7: Alarm Raised by SNORT 
First, the packets were printed in hexadecimal/ascii format. This is the simplest 
possible format to print, however its analysis requires significant knowledge of 
packet structure, theory of TCP/IP networking and all the protocols involved. 
Both tools provide simple decoding of the packet together with the hex/ascii 
dump. Also note time resolution differences between Figure 8 to Figure 9. 
Frame 226 2002-08-17 05:15:22.0295 XXX.XXX.XXX.XXX 
Destination unreachable 
-> YYY.YYY.YYY.YYY ICMP 
0000 00 30 cl Oa 82 6b 00 04 9b 2f e3 fc 08 00 45 00 .0...k...1....E. 
0010 00 38 d5 2c 00 00 f2 01 ca 48 XX XX XX XX YY YY .8., 	..... H.n.... 
0020 YY YY 03 Od 55 6e 00 00 00 00 45 00 	00 	47 if 00 #...Un....E..G.. 
0030 00 00 7e 11 el 7f 83 d9 23 06 ZZ ZZ ZZ ZZ 00 89 ..... #..=.... 
0040 00 35 00 33 a6 93 93 a6 4b 71 .5.3... .Kg 
Figure 8: Hexadecimal output using tethereal 
05:15:22.029533 0:4:9b:2f:e3:fc 0:30:c1:a:82:6b 0800 74: XXX.XXX.XXX.XXX > 
YYY.YYY.YYY.YYY: icmp: host ZZZ.ZZZ.ZZZ.ZZZ unreachable - admin prohibited 
filter 
Ox0000 	4500 0038 d52c 0000 f201 ca48 XXXX XXXX 	E..8., ..... H.n.. 
Ox0010 	YYYY YYYY 030d 556e 0000 0000 4500 0047 	..#...Un....E..G 
0x0020 	1f00 0000 7e11 el7f 83d9 2306 ZZZZ ZZZZ ..... #..=.. 
0x0030 	0089 0035 0033 a693 93a6 4b71 	...5.3....Kg 
Figure 9: Hexadecimal output using tcpdump 
Figure 8 represents the output from tethereal. Bytes at addresses Ox003E and 
Ox003F represent the source port of the original datagram (0x0089 = 137 - 
NetBIOS Name Service) and bytes 0x0040 and 0x0041 destination port of 
original datagram (0x0035 = 53 - Domain Name Server). 
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Similarly, Figure 9 is an output from tcpdump. It outputs slightly differently by 
taking out of the hexadecimal output the link-level header. To see it, `-e' option 
was used and it is displayed at the top. In this case the source and destination 
ports are at bytes 0x0030-0x0031 and 0x0032-0x0033 respectively. What is 
significant is that the numbers are the same with both tools, 137 and 53 
respectively, although SNORT was reporting both as 0. 
To confirm this direct, 'hands-on' analysis, more advanced options were used 
to decode the packets to obtain more details directly from the tools. Ethereal 
and tcpdump produced again same results for source and destination ports of 
original datagram reported back with ICMP message. 
Output from tethereal in much more readable format is presented in Figure 10. 
This is arguably most detailed view of a packet one can get with tools 
easily/freely available. 
Frame 226 (74 bytes on wire, 74 bytes captured) 
Arrival Time: Aug 17, 2002 05:15:22.029533000 
Time delta from previous packet: 695.795558000 seconds 
Time relative to first packet: 231551.206677000 seconds 
Frame Number: 226 
Packet Length: 74 bytes 
Capture Length: 74 bytes 
Ethernet II, Src: 00:04:9b:2f:e3:fc, Dst: 00:30:c1:0a:82:6b 
Destination: 00:30:c1:0a:82:6b (HEWLETT-_0a:82:6b) 
Source: 00:04:9b:2f:e3:fc (Cisco_2f:e3:fc) 
Type: IP (0x0800) 
Trailer: 93A64871 
Internet Protocol, Src Addr: XXX.XXX.XXX.XXX (XXX.XXX.XXX.XXX), Dst Addr: 
YYY.YYY.YYY.YYY (YYY.YYY.YYY.YYY) 
Version: 4 
Header length: 20 bytes 
Differentiated Services Field: Ox00 (DSCP Ox00: Default; ECN: Ox00) 
0000 00.. = Differentiated Services Codepoint: Default (0x00) 
....0. = ECN-Capable Transport (ECT): 0 
...0 = ECN-CE: 0 
Total Length: 56 
Identification: Oxd52c 
Flags: Ox00 
.0.. = Don't fragment: Not set 
= More fragments: Not set 
Fragment offset: 0 
Time to live: 242 
Protocol: ICMP (0x01) 
Header checksum: Oxca48 (correct) 
Source: XXX.XXX.XXX.XXX (XXX.XXX.XXX.XXX) 
Destination: YYY.YYY.YYY.YYY (YYY.YYY.YYY.YYY) 
Internet Control Message Protocol 
Type: 3 (Destination unreachable) 
Code: 13 (Communication administratively filtered) 
Checksum: 0x556e (correct) 
Internet Protocol, Src Addr: YYY.YYY.YYY.YYY (YYY.YYY.YYY.YYY), Dst Addr: 
ZZZ.ZZZ.ZZZ.ZZZ (ZZZ.ZZZ.ZZZ.ZZZ) 
Version: 4 
Header length: 20 bytes 
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Differentiated Services Field: Ox00 (DSCP Ox00: Default; ECN: Ox00) 
0000 00.. = Differentiated Services Codepoint: Default (0x00) 
....0. = ECN-Capable Transport (ECT): 0 
...0 = ECN-CE: 0 
Total Length: 71 
Identification: Ox1f00 
Flags: Ox00 
.0.. = Don't fragment: Not set 
= More fragments: Not set 
Fragment offset: 0 
Time to live: 126 
Protocol: UDP (0x11) 
Header checksum: Oxel7f (correct) 
Source: YYY.YYY.YYY.YYY (YYY.YYY.XYY.YYY) 
Destination: ZZZ.ZZZ.ZZZ.ZZZ (ZZZ.ZZZ.ZZZ.ZZZ) 
User Datagram Protocol, Src Port: netbios-ns (137), Dst Port: domain (53) 
Source port: netbios-ns (137) 
Destination port: domain (53) 
Length: 51 
Checksum: 0xa693 
Figure 10: Verbose output using tethereal 
The most 'verbose' or detailed output from tcpdump is in Figure 11. It doesn't 
give as many details as ethereal, but all necessary details are clear. 
05:15:22.029533 XXX.XXX.XXX.XXX > YYY.YYY.YYY.YYY: icmp: host ZZZ.ZZZ.ZZZ.ZZZ 
unreachable - admin prohibited filter for YYY.YYY.YYY.YYY.137 > 
ZZZ.ZZZ.ZZZ.ZZZ.53: 	37798 updataA+$ [b2&3=0x4b71] [1537a] [1579q] [513n] 
[11013au][Idomain] (ttl 126, id 7936, len 71) (ttl 242, id 54572, len 56) 
Figure 11: Most verbose output using tcpdump 
4.3.2 Analysis of Collected 'traffic' Data 
This part illustrates privacy implications arising from an analysis using ethereal 
on a full `tcpdump' format log file. 
Figure 12 is 'ethereal' output of one particular ftp session obtained from 
tcpdump data. It clearly shows that in a case of ftp connection all traffic flows 
unencrypted and is clearly visible to any person with access to the files. The 
same would apply for SMTP, POP and many other protocols regularly used on 
networks. Bold lines show user/password negotiation between two hosts on the 
network. Real addresses of the hosts were again replaced. 
220 XXX.XXX.XXX.XXX FTP server (SunOS 5.8) ready. 
USER antivir 
331 Password required for antivir. 
PASS McAfee 
230 User antivir logged in. 
TYPE A 
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200 Type set to A. 
PORT YYY,YYY,YYY,YYY,4,23 
200 PORT command successful. 
LIST 
150 ASCII data connection for /bin/ls (YYY.YYY.YYY.YYY,1047) (0 bytes). 
226 ASCII Transfer complete. 
TYPE I 
200 Type set to I. 
PORT YYY,YYY,YYY,YYY,4,24 
200 PORT command successful. 
SIZE update.ini 
500 'SIZE update.ini': command not understood. 
RETR update.ini 
150 Binary data connection for update.ini (144.6.34.23,1048) (710 bytes). 
226 Binary Transfer complete. 
TYPE I 
200 Type set to I. 
PORT YYY,YYY,YYY,YYY,4,25 
200 PORT command successful. 
SIZE delta.ini 
500 'SIZE delta.ini': command not understood. 
RETR delta.ini 
150 Binary data connection for delta.ini (YYY.YYY.YYY.YYY,1049) (1234 bytes). 
226 Binary Transfer complete. 
TYPE I 
200 Type set to I. 
PORT YYY,YYY,YYY,YYY,4,26 
200 PORT command successful. 
SIZE 42174218.upd 
500 'SIZE 42174218.upd': command not understood. 
RETR 42174218.upd 
150 Binary data connection for 42174218.upd (YYY.YYY.YYY.YYY,1050) (118475 
bytes). 
226 Binary Transfer complete. 
421 Timeout (900 seconds): closing control connection. 
Figure 12: FTP session analysis using ethereal 
Figure 13 shows that the above privacy concerns apply not only to 
communication between the two hosts, but also to transferred data. The figure 
shows what data have been transferred between the two hosts and subsequently 
captured by IDS after the command LIST was issued (underlined in Figure 12) 
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total 16808 
drwxr-xr-x 2 antivir staff 1536 Aug 16 09:00 . 
drwxr-xr-x 5 root other 512 Feb 2 2002 .. 
rw 	 1 antivir staff 2674 Aug 14 09:36 .history 
1 antivir staff 322 Jan 29 2002 .tcshrc 
1 antivir staff 10171 May 5 02:04 42004201.upd 
1 antivir staff 128208 May 10 02:04 42014202.upd 
1 antivir staff 116751 May 16 18:36 42024203.upd 
1 antivir staff 102355 May 23 08:15 42034204.upd 
1 antivir staff 113660 May 31 02:04 42044205.upd 
1 antivir staff 110231 Jun 7 02:10 42054206.upd 
1 antivir staff 99892 Jun 15 02:06 42064207.upd 
1 antivir staff 122500 Jun 21 02:13 42074208.upd 
1 antivir staff 108621 Jun 28 02:08 42084209.upd 
1 antivir staff 114676 Jul 4 14:16 42094210.upd 
1 antivir staff 106037 Jul 11 10:18 42104211.upd 
1 antivir staff 39037 Jul 16 14:17 42114212.upd 
1 antivir staff 109103 Jul 18 15:05 42124213.upd 
1 antivir staff 113554 Jul 25 03:18 42134214.upd 
1 antivir staff 121067 Aug 1 08:31 42144215.upd 
1 antivir staff 45615 Aug 3 15:04 42154216.upd 
1 antivir staff 127155 Aug 8 15:09 42164217.upd 
1 antivir staff 118475 Aug 15 15:13 42174218.upd 
rwx 	 1 antivir staff 2362 Jan 29 2002 antivirload 
rwx 	 1 antivir staff 781 May 22 12:10 checkupdate 
1 antivir staff 2237545 Aug 15 15:08 dat-4218.zip 
1 antivir staff 1234 Aug 15 15:13 delta.ini 
1 antivir staff 4349267 Aug 15 15:13 sdat4218.exe 
1 antivir staff 710 Aug 15 15:13 update.ini 
Figure 13: FTP session (data) analysis using ethereal 
4.4 Analysis and Discussion of Case A 
One of the most significant findings from this two-month study was a bug in 
the reporting/alerting part of the SNORT system. As it has been shown in 
previous section (see 4.3.1), while the system correctly raised alarms on one 
particular rule set, the report it produced was not correct. From a network 
administrators' or security officers' point of view, this bug is not very 
significant because they would be able to identify a potential problem and then 
examine the captured network packets using tcpdump and/or ethereal tools to 
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provide the correct information. However, from a forensic computing 
perspective this bug could hamper the admissibility and/or validity of evidence 
derived from the captured data. The discrepancy between text of the alert and 
real data (illustrated in Figure 7 - Figure 11), supports the view that IDS' are 
problematic as tools for the collection of forensic computing data sets (Broucek 
& Turner, 2002a, 2002c; Sommer, 1998b, 1999). This bug was fixed in 
SNORT version 1.9.0; however, another bug, that time in formatting alert 
output files was discovered. The new bug prevented some of the tools 
developed for SNORT log files manipulation (e.g. SnortSnarf) from correct 
operation. 
The two months of monitoring the server provided large amounts of data. As a 
matter of the fact, due to storage limitations full `tcpdump' format log file 
could not be collected for the whole period. The study has illustrated that rule 
sets and configuration files have to be highly customised and continuously 
fine-tuned. Decisions about 'trusted hosts' have to be made often on the basis 
of partial knowledge. It has further been shown that many hosts that should 
potentially be granted 'trusted status' due to the service provided cannot be 
granted such a status due to the nature of other problems, for example with 
DNS lookups. The data reveals that attempted attacks were made both from 
inside the University Network and the Internet. The server was probed not only 
on ports that have been made available and known (the server was advertised 
on University's website), but also on ports that were not readily 'visible' to 
users of the University network or the Internet. On ports 80 and 443, probes 
mainly attempted to exploit known vulnerabilities in Microsoft ITS server. The 
persistence of these repeated attempts suggests that many of these attacks were 
automated and the scripts not written very well. It is questionable why a 'would 
be attacker' risks being discovered by repeating these attacks on a system that 
is not susceptible to such attacks. This is especially the case given that it is 
possible for them to identify first the server software and then make decisions 
about whether to attempt an attack. While external attacks from the Internet 
were only experienced on TCP ports 80 and 443 due to firewall restrictions, 
internal attempts were much broader. Again, some of the attacks were 
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completely futile for the attacker but provided valuable data for a forensic 
investigator wishing to identify the location or intention of the attacker. 
Using the IDS system can help to protect the web server against malicious 
attacks. However, the amount of false positive alarms, fine tuning and alert 
monitoring required definitely proves that properly trained security 
personnel/system administrator needs to be available to monitor such a system 
continuously. It has proved useful to collect all the traffic in the `tcpdump' 
format. This is particularly the case because it opens up the possibility of the 
data later being examined by other tools, in this case ethereal and tcpdump. 
Clearly, it is very hard, if not impossible, to rule out all of the false positive 
alarms based only on information obtained from alert file produced by 
SNORT. However, with careful analysis of the whole connection it is possible 
to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the traffic is either malicious or false 
positive alarm. However, even such data would have only limited value in 
prosecuting potential attackers as the information provided in the `tcpdump' 
format file is limited to the TCP/IP packet load. Additional information needs 
to be obtained from other sources — log files, route tracing etc. 
As an example of this point (see 4.3.1), one particular repeating alert in the 
data collected during the study highlights that such data does not provide 
sufficient information for tracking back and tracing the attacker or source of 
the alarms. In this case, an attack exploiting vulnerabilities of NetBIOS name 
service and Domain Name Service on UDP ports 137 and 53 appeared to be 
initiated inside the University network. This triggered `ICMP Destination 
Unreachable' alerts. It appeared that the `ICMP Destination Unreachable' 
packets were being sent to local network due to a host on local network 
attempting this particular attack. The TCP/IP address of the 'offending' host 
pointed to a Hewlett-Packard printer located on local network. However, 
checking the firewall log files and firewall set up proved that the attack was not 
initiated inside of the University's network. The conclusion reached was that 
the attacker, somewhere on the Internet, was using a 'decoy' technique and the 
server with IDS was unlucky enough to be in the 'decoy' address space. When 
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the attacker tried to attack the site that had port 53 blocked, local network was 
receiving a broadcast ICMP message. 
To be completely sure that there was not something going wrong, the host 
supposedly causing the messages that generated the alarms was shut down. The 
alerts continued to be triggered in nearly regular 12 hours intervals. 
Administrators of the router sending the ICMP messages were contacted and 
asked for help in locating the attacker. While they did not respond, the 
messages stopped coming after several days, even with local host back on-line. 
After some time, the messages started to come yet again, from a slightly 
different router, however at the same domain. Furthermore, as described 
previously and analysed in section 4.3.1, this particular alert message suffered 
from a bug in the used version of SNORT. 
This experiment also confirms that SNORT N1DS is not capable of protecting 
against attacks conducted over the secure socket layer (SSL). The only way of 
detecting these attacks is to examine carefully server log files. The encrypted 
traffic simply does not provide patterns that could be used for creating rules for 
attacks run through SSL. These results suggest that it might be highly desirable 
to develop a module for Apache server software that would provide 
'application based' intrusion detection. With the availability of rule sets (either 
from SNORT or any other public domain source), application programming 
interface (API) and in particular the greater modularity of Apache version 2.x 
this should be a relatively straightforward module to develop. 
Finally, these findings support calls being made by governments and law 
enforcement agencies for continuous monitoring of network traffic. However, 
to protect individuals' privacy it is necessary to develop techniques for this 
monitoring that will not interfere with the individual's rights (Biskup & Flegel, 
2000a, 2000b, 2000c; Kvarnstrom, et al., 2000; Lundin, 2000; Lundin & 
Jonsson, 1999a; Sobirey, et al., 1997). 
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43 Preliminary Findings for Case A 
By adopting a forensic computing perspective this study has confirmed 
concerns raised about the suitability of Intrusion Detection Systems as sources 
for evidence acquisition (Sommer, 1998b, 1999). Specifically, two main 
concerns previously raised by Broucek & Turner (2002a, 2002c) have been 
validated by this case study: 
• IDS systems may collect only a partial data set — it has been shown that 
data collected by SNORT were not sufficient to track and trace attackers 
and that the data collected in the case of encrypted communication using 
SSL had no value in this regard; 
• The data sets collected may be flawed, erroneous or already have been 
tampered with — it has been shown that even with significant fine-tuning 
SNORT produced numerous false positive alerts and/or wrongly identified 
the source of attacks. 
More significantly, the case study has highlighted that from a legal perspective 
IDS, the data they produce and how that data is analysed pose numerous 
challenges for those interested in evidence acquisition that produces legally 
admissible evidence. In particular, even where data has been captured, the 
process of its technical analysis may invalidate it in terms of legal admissibility 
by 'tampering' with the evidence. Considering the underlying problem of 
unclear and ambiguous definitions, it is then imperative that in approaching the 
collection of forensic evidence that there is awareness of some key principles: 
minimise handling of the original data set; account for any change; comply 
with the rules of evidence; and, do not exceed your knowledge (McKemmish, 
1999). 
The case study has also highlighted that the 'collect everything' approach is 
highly desirable but has severe limitations and implications: 
• Section 4.3.2 provides an analysis of one FTP session. It shows how much 
information investigators with access to such data can obtain from it. Clear 
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text transactions are easily visible and, source and destination hosts are 
easily identifiable. If SNORT was deployed in its usual configuration as a 
network IDS, it would collect large amount of data that could clearly 
violate the privacy rights of academics, students and other network and 
Internet users. 
• More generally, the log files are huge in size even where SNORT is 
monitoring only one rather minor and uninteresting web server. All alerts 
were collected into one 'flat' file and several binary `tcpdump' files were 
also collected. The longest time period collected into one file was about 
193 hours — during which 664848 packets were captured and the size of the 
file was 157MB. To read this file into Ethereal with only MAC and 
transport name resolutions switched on took 3 minutes and 50 seconds on a 
Pentium IV 1.7GHz system running RedHat Linux 8.0. It took even longer 
on Sun Ultra 5 running Solaris 8 that was used for these analyses. Requests 
for filtering or 'following TCP stream' took even longer. This clearly 
demonstrates that in a case of serious deployment, large storage space is 
needed and that an effective log rotation system has to be developed to 
allow quick and timely analysis. 
The study also confirms that Intrusion Detection Systems can play an 
important role in protecting Information Systems Infrastructure. However, to 
be effective they require attention of highly trained security personneUsystem 
administrators in: 
• Regular monitoring and analysing alerts and other log files and acting upon 
them; 
• Continuous fine-tuning the configuration files and rule sets for the ever 
changing IS environment; and 
• Regular updating the rule sets to accommodate newly discovered threats. 
This case confirms that Intrusion Detection Systems face significant challenges 
as part of the armoury of computer security. Research and development in this 
area continues working on solutions for these challenges (see 2.4.2). However, 
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this chapter also reveals that these developments, aimed at responding to the 
challenges faced by computer security, tend to occur without any consideration 
of possible knock-on effects for other areas. This raises the concern that the 
'clever' solutions being developed may end up adversely impacting on 
solutions being developed in other areas, and impede forensic investigations 
and the acquisition of digital evidence. 
4.6 Summary Reflection on the Chapter 
This chapter provides analysis of Case A. The analysis involves descriptive 
statistical analysis of network data and reveals problems with the validity and 
quality of the data. The results of the analysis show that data collected by 
SNORT are not sufficient to track and trace the sources of the attacks. The 
analysis also reveals that the data sets collected may be flawed, erroneous or 
already have been tampered with. Despite significant fine tuning, SNORT 
continued to generate numerous false positive alerts and/or wrongly identified 
sources of attacks. This case highlights that intrusion detection systems can 
play an important role in protecting information systems infrastructure, but to 
be effective they require the attention of highly trained security 
personnel/system administrators. These personnel also need to engage in 
regular monitoring and analysis of alerts and other log files, and to ensure 
regular updating of the rule sets used by these systems. 
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5 Data Analysis Case B — MP3 8 
Question: "What are the problems that you as an individual face?" 
Answer (laughing): "Too numerous to mention —for example; 
investigator requests a print out of the hard drive so that he/she can 
look at the contents..." (Detective Sergeant Paul Wright, City of 
London Police, UK, interviewed at DFF 2007, Prague) 
5.1 Introduction 
The case in the Federal Court of Australia involving Sony Music Entertainment 
(Australia) Limited, Universal Music Australia Pty Limited and EMI Music 
Australia Pty Limited (the applicants) and three Australian Universities — the 
University of Tasmania, University of Melbourne and University of Sydney 
(the respondents) generated considerable public interest and debate. 
Unfortunately, much of the debate and conjecture around the case had been 
misplaced due to incorrect reporting in many media reports that suggested the 
case was about the Universities being sued for copyright infringement. There 
were also other media reports suggesting eleven Australian Universities were 
involved in the `MP3 Piracy Case' as it has alternatively been called ("Aust 
unis in court over file-swapping," 2003; Lamount, 2003; Morgan, 2003; Rose, 
2003). If this was the situation, it is indeed noting that of all the Australian 
Universities approached only these three offered any resistance to initial 
requests by the Music Industry for access to their digital files and networks. 
8 Please note some of the material presented in this chapter has been adapted from materials 
first published in the following peer reviewed publications: 
Broucek, V., Turner, P., & Frings, S. (2005). Music piracy, universities and the Australian 
Federal Court: Issues for forensic computing specialists. Computer Law & Security 
Report, 21(1), 30-37. 
Broucek, V., Frings, S., & Turner, P. (2003). The Federal Court, the Music Industry and the 
Universities: Lessons for Forensic Computing Specialists. In C. Valli & M. Warren 
(Eds.), 1st Australian Computer, Network & Information Forensics Conference. Perth, 
WA, Australia. 
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In reality this Federal Court case was procedural in nature and involved the 
Music Industry applicants seeking a 'discovery ruling' against the three 
Universities involved ("Sony Music Entertainment (Australia) Limited v 
University of Tasmania [2003] FCA 532 (30 May 2003)," 2003; Sony Music 
Entertainment (Australia) Limited v University of Tasmania [2003] FCA 724 
(18 July 2003)," 2003; Sony Music Entertainment (Australia) Limited v 
University of Tasmania [2003] FCA 805 (29 July 2003)," 2003; Sony Music 
Entertainment (Australia) Limited v University of Tasmania [2003] FCA 929 
(4 September 2003)," 2003). Next section reviews the case, identifies issues 
and challenges and draws out challenges posed for legal environments. 
5.2 Descriptive Analysis of Case B 
On January 23, 2003 the Australian Record Industry Association (ARIA) 
released information suggesting that the industry was suffering significant 
losses in earnings due to on-line piracy and that the industry was determined to 
combat these activities ("Online piracy hurts 2002 music sales: ARIA," 2003). 
While peer-to-peer (P2P) networks were not specifically targeted in this case, 
ARIA also cited its US counterpart, the Record Industry Association of 
America (RIAA), ongoing war with peer-to-peer networks and their users. 
At around the same time, three Australian Universities (University of 
Tasmania, University of Melbourne and University of Sydney) were 
approached by members of the Australian music industry (Sony Music 
Entertainment (Australia) Limited, Universal Music Australia Pty Limited and 
EMI Music Australia Pty Limited) and requested to preserve digital evidence 
on these Universities systems of the distribution of MP3s by students and staff 
at these Universities. In the case of the University of Tasmania, music industry 
legal representatives sent an e-mail regarding one particular web site that was 
allegedly hosting copyright MP3 files. These were found using a GoogleTM 
search. Subsequently, these machines were copied as requested and stored in 
the fire proof safe in late January 2003. From forensic computing view, it is 
important to note that due to the nature of the request and lack of training and 
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forensic readiness, the copies were made using built in ufsdump backup 
command instead of more appropriate binary copy that would be obtained by 
using another built in command (dd). 
These MP3s and distribution activities were being categorised by the music 
industry as potentially constituting breaches of copyright laws. Subsequent to 
this request to the Universities, the members of the music industry further 
requested access to this evidence for discovery. In response, the three 
Universities concerned refused to provide this access. At the University of 
Tasmania, this occurred in the context of on-going concerns about privacy in 
contracts with external research collaboration projects. 
On February 18, 2003 these music industry members (applicants) launched 
legal proceedings against the respondents in order to gain access to the 
evidence preserved by the respondents at their request. The basis of the legal 
proceedings were procedural with applicants seeking a right of access to the 
preserved evidence in order to conduct discovery investigations that could 
possibly lead to identification of person(s) involved in copyright infringements 
who would then be acted against in subsequent litigation. 
At the initial hearing on February 18, 2003 the case was adjourned and orders 
made to the respondents to preserve the data. Immediately, the case and initial 
ruling created outrage amongst academics, students and civil liberty groups 
who viewed this as the beginnings of a major assault on the privacy of 
individuals. Indeed, the demands made by the applicants at the initial hearing 
were labelled as 'witch-hunting' and using students and Australian universities 
as 'scapegoats'. A series of questions were raised, including as to whether the 
Universities should be forced into the role of policing and/or taking 
responsibility for the on-line activities of their staff and students (Morgan, 
2003). 
Subsequently, on May 30, 2003, after a number of further court sessions and 
out-of-court attempts to find a mutually acceptable solution, the presiding 
judge, Justice Tamberlin, made his decision in favour of applicants ("Sony 
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Music Entertainment (Australia) Limited v University of Tasmania [2003] 
FCA 532 (30 May 2003)," 2003) and on July 18, 2003 ordered the respondents 
to hand over the evidence to the applicants and their forensic expert for further 
investigation ("Sony Music Entertainment (Australia) Limited v University of 
Tasmania [2003] FCA 724 (18 July 2003)," 2003). While the legal right of the 
court to make this ruling cannot be doubted, it raises serious questions about 
the courts understanding of the nature of the digital evidence in question. 
Significantly, on July 29, 2003 ("Sony Music Entertainment (Australia) 
Limited v University of Tasmania [2003] FCA 805 (29 July 2003)," 2003) 
Justice Tamberlin also ordered the respondents to bear the cost of the discovery 
process and in determining which data to be handed over, argued that 'deleted 
files are equal to overwritten files', when one of the respondents pointed out 
that the backup tapes in question had accidentally been overwritten and 
therefore did not have any forensic value for the applicants (Pearce, 2003). 
Again, this reveals a worrying lack of understanding of the technical nature of 
digital logs and data storage. While there may have been a 'suspicion over the 
accidental overwriting', from a technical perspective it was inappropriate to 
consider overwritten backup tapes as part of the evidence. Subsequently, this 
ruling was used by the Music Mndustry in mounting 'a possible contempt of 
court' challenge against the University of Sydney. This challenge resulted in a 
small but significant victory for the respondents, as it was dismissed and the 
applicants ordered to pay cost ("Sony Music Entertainment (Australia) Limited 
v University of Tasmania [2003] FCA 929 (4 September 2003)," 2003). 
5.2.1 Subject of Dispute 
Initially, the three involved Universities did not agree with the request for the 
discovery at all. However, as the case has evolved these respondents were 
forced to find additional arguments to oppose the arguments used as the basis 
for the requests made by the applicants. The respondents' initial opposition was 
primarily based on the premise that excessive access to this data could lead to 
breaches of privacy and intellectual property law covering aspects of the data 
held. They had, however, been willing from the outset to provide some digital 
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evidence to the applicants, providing that this evidence was collected by 
respondents and then handed onto the applicants. Several offers of this kind 
were made; however, the applicants were dissatisfied with the amount of data 
and discovery offered. 
From the beginning the applicants demanded the rights to conduct full forensic 
investigation of the preserved data. It should be noted that the vast majority of 
the data in question contains (or contained) information on the on-line 
activities of thousands of 'presumably innocent' users and not just data on 
users that were alleged to be guilty of illegal practices. However, what is 
certain is that the most of this data related to activities pertaining to personal, 
confidential and commercial activities of the Universities' staff and students as 
part of their research, teaching and commercial activities. In this context, the 
judgement in this case provided unprecedented access to huge amounts of 
potentially highly sensitive data because of a suspicion that some of it might 
contain evidence of illegal practices. Unfortunately, the judgement did not, 
however, provided this data access to an independent third party (for example, 
an external forensic investigation team) but rather to the very same groups who 
have 'pointed the finger' in the first place. These applicants were then allowed 
to 'mine' this data in search of what they themselves deem 'illegal practices'. 
Quite apart from the intrusion into the data of thousands of 'presumably 
innocent' users, issues of data tampering/manipulation (except where MD5 
check-sums were calculated and stored by respondents), breaches of privacy, 
commercial dealings, intellectual property were all only protected by 
confidentiality provisions placed on the applicants. 
As a result of this case and concerns over the issues at stake in such 'data hand-
overs', the majority of Australian Universities have now started to conduct 
their own forensic investigations. Numerous Universities have embarked on 
'scare campaigns', reminding staff and students about importance of copyright 
protection and possible outcomes for breaches. They have also engaged in 
network traffic monitoring and scanning computers for MP3 files often without 
knowledge of the users (Nelson, 2003a). Many of these searches are being 
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conducted in a manner that further creates dangerous precedents and fears over 
violations of privacy and academic freedoms. In many instances the techniques 
employed were very amateur. For example, in one instance computers and 
servers were searched using thefind command with *.mp* mask 9 . Searches of 
this type clearly produce numerous false positives and identify files that do not 
have anything to do with audio or video recordings (e.g. files with extension 
*.mpp that belong to Microsoft Project program). Furthermore, many audio 
card drivers and software themselves contain sample MP3 format files (e.g. the 
Microsoft Software Development Kit (MSDK) contains MP3 and mpg 
samples). As a consequence, many users were harassed by overly active and 
poorly instructed network and computer administrators and forced to delete 
legitimate files in a fear of possible copyright law breaches. 
Combined, this case and the responses of Australian Universities resulted in 
making many network administrators at the Universities afraid to report 
suspected computer misuse of their systems. This is because they are either 
afraid that they will be held responsible or that they will have to conduct or be 
involved in forensic investigation for which they feel unqualified. 10 
5.3 Complexity of Issues and Implications for Stakeholders 
This case and the responses of its participants highlight a number of issues 
worthy of consideration. Firstly, from the users' perspective, education about 
appropriate behaviour in digital environments is still a major issue (Broucek & 
Turner, 2003a). The majority of people are not aware of the legality of creating 
MP3 copies from their CDs and are not aware that 'state-swapping' is illegal in 
9 It should be noted that these techniques were only used as initial indicators; however 
anecdotal evidence of the author is that University of Tasmania conducted similar searchers as 
recently as in 2009. 
10 Also resource requirements in SW, HW and HR. 
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Australia (Nelson, 2003b)". This is perhaps partly because the market is 
flooded with MP3 players and that some operating systems now come with 
'ripping software'. There is therefore an urgent need for improved user 
education (Broucek & Turner, 2003a). 
Secondly, it is noticeable that none of the Universities involved in the case 
were prepared for the initial request for the preservation of the evidence. The 
initial collection was conducted by the Universities network and systems 
administrators, without any training in forensic procedures as is evidenced by 
the nature of the evidence collection and storage processes used. File level 
copies of file systems were made to CD-ROMs or standard backup procedures 
were used to preserve the evidence. For example, in the case of University of 
Tasmania, the standard backup tapes created were subject to the discovery and 
the evidence from one particular computer where allegedly illegal MP3 files 
were held was collected by standard UNIX backup command, ufsdump. 
While these tapes may contain the necessary evidence of files being stored on 
the computers, in the opinion of the author, this evidence will be of very low 
value in a subsequent legal proceedings as it was not collected using binary 
copies and neither the chain of custody or rules of evidence were followed 
(Broucek & Turner, 2001a, 2002a, 2002c, 2003b). 
Thirdly, the approach adopted in the case is potentially short-sighted in that it 
is probable that many University users will now proceed to encrypt all of their 
communications to impede subsequent 'snooping 12 . Overall this highlights a 
it  This has changed since the original analysis and it is now legal to create copies of legally 
purchased CD-ROMs for own use on personally owned devices. It is important to notice the 
'personally owned', because it is still illegal, for example, to play legally purchased MP3 files 
on computer owned by company or university. 
12 • i.e. PGP or SSL with keys 1024 or greater. Of course, it can be argued that pushing the 
introduction of encryption would inhibit the availability of illegal material because most P2P 
networking is not possible or hampered by this technique. 
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lack of 'forensic readiness' on the part of all participants and the need for set 
procedures, covering all possible variants of investigations involving digital 
evidence to reveal any criminal, illegal or other inappropriate behaviours. 
Forensic procedures should be in place to protect organisations and in this 
context the next section briefly examines the CTOSE framework that has made 
a significant contribution to the development of a generic process model and 
advisory tools for conducting forensic investigations (Frings, Stanisic-Petrovic, 
& Urry, 2003; Urry & Mitchison, 2003). 
5.4 Preliminary Findings for Case B 
In the post September 11 th era, the threat of global terrorism has stimulated 
significant extensions being given to law enforcement agencies. These powers 
have increasingly been extended into the digital domain through legislative 
developments at national and international levels e.g. Australian Cyber-Crime 
Act 2001, 'Patriot Act' in USA, and on-going legislative discussions within the 
European Union, Council of Europe and the USA. In conjunction with these 
legislative developments efforts were made to generate practical tool-kits for 
investigating computer misuse and e-crime in a manner that will produce 
legally admissible evidence e.g. CTOSE (Cyber Crime Tools for On-line 
Search for Evidence) (Broucek & Turner, 2004a; Broucek, et al., 2005). 
However, as was discussed above, while these efforts are laudable, numerous 
questions on the legal admissibility, legal validity/weight, chain of evidence 
and chain of custody of digital evidence continue to make problematic the 
development of legal responses to illegal or inappropriate on-line behaviours 
(Broucek & Turner, 2002a, 2002c). 
More significantly, in the context of the discussions here, even where digital 
evidence is available and has been accepted as admissible, critical issues have 
emerged over the understanding of the courts on the nature of this evidence. 
For example, the MP3 piracy case involving representatives from the 
Australian music industry and three Australian Universities in a dispute over 
the distribution of MP3s by students and staff at the Universities reveals a 
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"worrying lack of comprehension of the technical nature of digital logs and 
data storage" (Broucek, Frings, & Turner, 2003; Broucek & Turner, 2004a; 
Broucek, et al., 2005). More specifically, this lack of understanding resulted in 
the provision of access to data sets that contained information on the on-line 
activities of thousands of presumably innocent users and not just data on those 
alleged to be guilty of computer misuse. This provision of unprecedented 
access to huge amounts of potentially sensitive data pertaining to the personal, 
confidential and commercial activities of innocent users is clearly of concern. 
This is especially the case where access to the data was not handed over to an 
independent third party but rather to the applicants in the case. 
From a forensic computing perspective, not only does the case reveal a lack of 
forensic readiness on the part of the courts, the applicants and defendants, it 
also raises questions about the supposed expertise of the forensic experts used 
in the case. However, quite apart from the consequences of these circumstances 
in the specific case, other important questions are raised in relation to the 
potential consequences of these types of approaches being displayed by courts. 
Indeed, as has been argued elsewhere, the approach adopted by the Australian 
Federal Court and the applicants in the case "is short-sighted and may back-fire 
on the music industry's desire to crack-down on piracy". This is because it is 
probable that many users will now proceed to encrypt all their communications 
to impede subsequent 'snooping'. The case has also made "many network 
administrators in Universities reticent about reporting on suspected computer 
misuse of their systems". This is because they are either afraid that they will be 
held responsible or that they will have to conduct or be involved in e-forensic 
investigations for which they feel unqualified (Broucek, et al., 2003; Broucek 
& Turner, 2004a; Broucek, et al., 2005). The case may also influence the way 
in which organisations `back-up' their systems and how long they retain this 
data. Combined, all of these factors are likely to make collection, investigation, 
generation and presentation of digital evidence of illegal or inappropriate on-
line behaviours more difficult. 
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More broadly, as the law continues to generate responses to the challenges 
faced, it is clear that there are strong inter-relationships with public perceptions 
and changing end-user and organisational behaviours for on-line environments. 
Critically, there is the danger that if legal responses do not show sensitivity 
towards these inter-relationships end-users and organisations seeking to protect 
themselves will behave in ways that will problematise the acquisition of digital 
evidence and potentially reduce overall system e-security. 
This case confirms that the legal area faces significant challenges. This area 
continues to work on 'technology neutral' solutions for these challenges (see 
2.5.1). However, this chapter also reveals that these developments, aimed at 
responding to the challenges faced by the legal area, are hampered by tradition 
bound legal process and problematic analogies between analogue and digital 
domains. This is additionally hampered by the problems in defining forensic 
computing and even digital evidence as it has been presented in section 2.3. 
5.5 Summary Reflection on the Chapter 
This chapter has reviewed and examined an Australian Federal Court case 
between the Music Industry and three Australian Universities. From a forensic 
computing perspective the case reveals the strong and urgent need for 
development of standard procedures for collecting and preserving the digital 
evidence and the need for greater 'forensic readiness' whether dealing with 
criminal, civil or inappropriate on-line behaviours. While it remains unclear 
what the end result of the 'discovery' activities of the music industry was, it is 
evident that the case also had a number of worrying implications for individual 
users' privacy and the confidentiality of data held within institutions. 
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6 Data analysis Case C - CTOSE 13 
"All investigations are reactive in that an event must occur (fraud) 
before the investigation can take place; there is little scope to be pro- 
active in this role. The time frame for investigations, by their very 
nature, is on average about 4 years, but bear in mind that we will be 
reviewing many millions of items to construct the case" (Keith Foggon, 
head of the digital forensics unit, Serious Fraud Office, UK). 
6.1 Introduction 
With the increasing incidence of computer misuse and e-crime, public and 
private sector organisations have increasingly sought ways to respond. These 
responses have included increased e-security precautions, computer usage 
policies, monitoring and education as well as in some instances the 
establishment and deployment of forensic computing investigation teams. 
Whilst these responses are sensible and understandable, in some cases their 
implementation has had unforeseen results that have actually impaired the 
overall security of the organisations concerned. Partly, this result from 
draconian measures imposed on users of the systems and partly from a general 
lack of awareness amongst most users of the implications for e-security of their 
on-line usage behaviours. 
In this context, this chapter provides an analysis of EU funded CTOSE project. 
This project received significant funding and attention across Europe and many 
13 Please note some of the material presented in this chapter has been adapted from materials 
first published in the following peer reviewed publications: 
Broucek, V., Turner, P., & Frings, S. (2005). Music piracy, universities and the Australian 
Federal Court: Issues for forensic computing specialists. Computer Law & Security 
Report, 21(1), 30-37. 
Broucek, V., Frings, S., & Turner, P. (2003). The Federal Court, the Music Industry and the 
Universities: Lessons for Forensic Computing Specialists. In C. Valli & M. Warren 
(Eds.), 1st Australian Computer, Network & Information Forensics Conference. Perth, 
WA, Australia. 
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major institutions were involved in it. The results were considered to be very 
positive and it was expected that the CTOSE solution would become the 'de-
facto' standard across Europe. This methodology has been taken up by various 
users, but has also been adapted by them to suit their specific needs. Some of 
the elements of the project have also been adopted commercially including by 
the Bank of Scotland (see below, forensic readiness section 6.3) or 
incorporated into government policies (e.g. UK). 
Following the conclusion of the CTOSE project, some of the partners in the 
original project established the CTOSE Foundation with the aim of the 
commercialisation of the project results. Unfortunately, the initial excitement 
did not produce the expected results and the foundation ceased to operate after 
less than two years. 
However, it is important to note that the original aim of the CTOSE project 
(and its funding by EU) was not to produce commercial products and as such 
the project was very successful. 
In terms of key lessons learned from the CTOSE project, one of the two project 
managers of the CTOSE project has stated that the most important lesson learnt 
from the project was the fact that 
"the path from methodology to operational methodology is a long and 
expensive one" (Mitchison, 2009). 
In one sense, the CTOSE project was a victim of its own success in that it 
achieved a great deal but ended up trying to do too much in the short time 
frame provided by the funding (3 years). These challenges however did not 
become evident, even to the project's partners, until the project was finished 
and the CTOSE foundation established. 
Some of the reasons for failure of the commercialisation stage (CTOSE 
Foundation) that need to be considered were: 
• Lack of management/commercialisation skills amongst the key researchers; 
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• Lack of real proof that the model was practicable and would work outside 
of the demonstration projects in a range of organisational settings and 
contexts; 
• Despite commercial partners in the project, it was driven by academic 
researchers focused on questions of methodology rather than commercial 
potential; and, 
• Although there was great input from experts in the field there was a failure 
to adequately address the multi-dimensional aspects of electronic evidence 
in a manner that effectively balanced all interests. 
6.2 CTOSE Development 
The CTOSE (Cyber Tools On-Line Search for Evidence) project aimed at 
developing and testing methodology suitable for collection of digital evidence 
in various environments and for various purposes. The primary motivation 
behind the establishment of the CTOSE project was to improve the ability of 
companies to respond to computer misuse incidents. The significant benefit of 
this project is that it did not limit itself to criminal investigation, but focused 
also on other avenues where forensic computing could possibly be used. 
The project was funded under the 5 th Framework Programme and brought 
together various players, namely: 
• University of Namur, Belgium; 
• St Andrews University, UK; 
• Fraunhofer, Institute Arbeitswirtschaft und Organisation, Stuttgart, 
Germany; 
• The Joint Research Centre (JRC), Italy; 
• QuinetiQ, UK; and 
• Alcatel, France. 
This has been complemented by a network of user focus groups under the 
leadership of JRC. This network included representatives from the legal, 
financial, law enforcement and IT industry. Author of this thesis had the 
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privilege to take part in several focus groups, including attendance and 
presentation at the CTOSE 2003 Conference in Namur Belgium (Broucek & 
Turner, 2003b, 2004b). 
6.3 CTOSE Outputs 
One of the first tasks that CTOSE conducted was an attempt to formalise the 
definition of digital evidence. During the initial interview and questionnaire 
phase with key stakeholders in the Special Interest Groups (SIG), the following 
types of digital and/or electronic evidence were determined to be of importance 
in 'proving' a particular case. Members of the SIGs were asked to provide 
examples of electronic evidence during interviews and in questionnaires. Based 
on their answers, the following list of types of electronic evidence was 
compiled: 
• Log files — this includes server logs, ISP logs, IDS log files etc; 
• Core files; 
• Copies of hard disks including all log files; 
• E-mails; 
• Network dumps; and 
• Network traffic samples and grabs. 
It was noted that such electronic evidence should satisfy two legal tests: 
• Admissibility; and 
• Weight. 
On the basis of this list a project deliverable was prepared. This deliverable 
was the Electronic Evidence Specification Model (EESM). Figure 14 shows 
the model. 
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Figure 14: Electronic Evidence Specification Model (EESM) 
This model clearly emphasizes the legal and organisational dimensions of 
digital evidence acquisition and presentation. It provides a useful schematic of 
the processes involved and draws attention to some of the inter-relationships 
involved in these processes as they relate to evidence specification. 
Unfortunately, the model appears to have been generated on the basis of a 
consideration of only legal dimensions. That the project did not use any of the 
previously mentioned definitions (see section 2.3) and developed its own 
approach again highlights how definitional ambiguity can impact on responses 
to criminal, illegal or other inappropriate on-line behaviours. 
Forensic Search Online Info Search 
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More specifically, the lack of incorporation of any other definitions of digital 
evidence may have impacted on the later acceptance or adoption of the project 
outputs in the wider community. Critically, the absence of any direct or explicit 
acknowledgement of the definitional ambiguity around digital evidence and the 
challenges that this poses for the generation of a coherent model is 
disappointing. From a practical perspective, working with the project's SIG 
clearly made the production of the above model easier but the dominance of 
the 'legal' perspective ended up leading to a model that does not adequately 
address the challenges of the multi-dimensional aspects of forensic computing 
and displays limited consideration of the technical aspects. This perpetuation of 
the divide between legal and technical is unhelpful and again contributes to the 
foci of this thesis 
Subsequently, the project has developed a methodology that aims to provide a 
consistent approach for identifying, preserving, analysing and presenting 
digital evidence. 
In this regard, the CTOSE project began by developing a reference process 
model resembling organisational, technical and legal guidelines on how a 
company should proceed when computer misuse occurs. The focus of the 
model is on the acquisition of digital evidence and on how it is to be collected, 
conserved and analysed in a manner that will be legally admissible should 
court proceedings be instigated. Figure 15 illustrates how this reference model 
links to a detailed examination of technical, legal and presentational 
requirements, which in-turn link to the project software demonstrator. 
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Figure 15: CTOSE Project 
The CTOSE reference process model is composed of five phases: preparation, 
running, assessment, investigation and learning phases. It articulates the flow 
of actions and decisions that have to be considered or executed in the case of 
an investigation of computer misuse. Moreover, additional detailed information 
is provided that directly addresses the investigator roles and the necessary 
skills, checklists, references to documents and tools, and legal advice that are 
required to support the action or decision in each step (see Figure 16). By 
providing this information the CTOSE reference model aims to support user 
through a checklist approach that can be consulted prior to, during and at the 
conclusion of an investigation of an IT incident. This checklist also supports 
investigators by addressing in detail the technical information that law 
enforcement agencies may require from the individual and/or organisation 
involved. The model also aims to support the optimisation of communication 
between the two parties. 
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Figure 16: CTOSE Phases of Response 
Significantly, the CTOSE project emphasizes the preparation phase, also 
referred to as 'Forensic Readiness', because IT security measures critical to the 
whole process are defined and implemented in this phase. For example, this 
phase includes technical aspects like implementing a firewall and/or an 
intrusion detection system and assures that qualified staff is present to 
administer the systems and evaluate their logging. 
This was arguably the most successful part of the project. Two of the CTOSE 
member teams (QinetiQ and Alcatel) further developed it and now offer it as a 
commercial service. Furthermore, it has now been incorporated into the UK 
government's security policy (see http://www.cabinetoffice.gov.uklspf.aspx ). 
While the majority of the rest of the reference model concentrate on details of 
the running, assessment and investigation phases the model also acknowledges 
the importance of having a feedback loop to capture insights from concluded 
investigations to further strengthened and enhance the approach of an 
individual and/or organisation. This final phase is referred as the learning 
phase. 
Although in Figure 16 above the learning phase is presented as being the last 
phase, in fact the CTOSE approach emphasizes the importance of capturing 
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learning and insights during each phase as well as in a dedicated learning phase 
at the end of each and every investigation or even test run. 
The aim of this learning phase was to reflect on the achieved results and 
problems faced and where possible adjust or enhance any parts of the 
investigation process including internal methodology, the software tools, the 
recordings. 
In particular, the learning phase contains a series of questions that individuals 
and/or organisations are encouraged to consider: 
• Was everything correctly and completely documented? 
• Were the people involved qualified enough for given task? 
• Was the process correct or is there need to modify or update it? 
• Were all contact people the correct ones? 
• Was there anything else that could be improved for next time? 
Following informal communication with the former leaders of the CTOSE 
project to obtain some additional information about the project and in 
particular the learning phase, it is useful to note that a number of them 
recognised the challenges of 'doing this phase well'. It was acknowledged that 
organisational context, individual skill sets and the time-frames of the 
investigation directly impacted on the ability of organisations to respond to any 
learning. Additionally, it was acknowledged that in some instances 
organisations found it difficult to even enter the learning phase formally. 
"In practice the project - even in the demonstrators - never got as far 
as doing that, because we were busy setting up the initial approach. But 
in real-life uses of parts of the project methodology, they did indeed do 
that."(Mitchison, 2009) 
6.3.1 The Software Prototypes 
As a consequence of the complexity of the process reference model (see Figure 
17 for a small fragment of it), it was decided that the CTOSE project would 
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develop an electronic version. Sandra Frings (Fraunhofer, Institute 
Arbeitswirtschaft und Organisation, Stuttgart, Germany) who was the principal 
author of the model, admitted in private conversation with author of this thesis 
that if printed in reasonably readable format, the model would cover floor of 
large lecture theatre... 
Figure 17: Fragment of the Process Model 
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This prototype was called the 'Cyber Crime Advisory Tool' (C*CAT) and is 
made up of a database connected to a database administration tool containing 
all actions, decisions, relationships (sequence of flow charts) and all additional 
information. The architecture of C*CAT is presented in Figure 18. 
Database Admin Tool 
	
Apache Web Server 
	
Web Interface 
Figure 18: C*CAT Architecture 
The Web based front end of C*CAT (see Figure 19 and Figure 20), connected 
via an Apache Web server to the database, is the interface between the 
information to be processed and the people involved in investigating a 
computer misuse incident. 
Figure 19: C*CAT's Web Based Interface, part  1 
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Figure 20: C*CAT's Web Based Interface, part 2 
From the evaluation of C*CAT, it is clear that it is easy to use, and allows 
users to define the situation (by selection among different choices). Following 
this phase C*CAT presents the necessary actions and decisions that should be 
taken. In each case the user is able to ask for more advice and guidance. Since 
the integrity of the chain of custody is critical, following correct procedures is 
of vital importance. At the end of the process, the user will be able to give 
feedback concerning the usage of the model to further improve its operation 
and utility. 
The future aim of CTOSE was to refine and improve the methodology and 
distribute it as widely as possible. As part of these activities the CTOSE project 
has developed a simulation environment (CTOSE Demonstrator) as an 
educational awareness and validation tool. The demonstrator describes the 
process model using several different scenarios. Each scenario provides the 
user with a clear and understandable way to proceed with do's and don'ts when 
handling digital evidence for each phase. 
The project anticipated that the widespread utilisation of the CTOSE 
methodology would assist companies in being able to recover more rapidly 
from computer misuse incidents and improve their ability to conduct computer 
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forensic investigations (Frings, et al., 2003; Urry & Mitchison, 2003). The 
CTOSE project has unquestionably made a very significant contribution to the 
development of a methodology for a standardised approach to computer 
misuse. Unfortunately, the next phase of the project — commercialisation — 
failed completely. 
6.4 Preliminary Findings for Case C 
The CTOSE project produced so far most comprehensive model and 
methodology for forensic computing. It contributed by accepting the facts that 
forensic computing investigation is not limited to criminal law environment 
only. On the other hand it produced very complicated model that has 
unfortunately proved too complicated to be widely adopted, if not adopted at 
all. 
Additionally, although the project was deemed to be highly successful, some of 
the involved researchers now admit, that it needs further improvement (e.g. 
Frings, 2006). 
In working towards a more integrated solution that balances requirements for 
network security, individual privacy and the need for legally admissible digital 
evidence, CTOSE project confirmed recommendations previously articulated 
by Broucek & Turner (2004a): 
• Best practice for digital evidence handling should involve deploying the 
highest investigative standards at all stages in the identification, analysis 
and presentation of digital data; 
• Targeted training and education of network administrators and end-users in 
the key principles of digital evidence handling is urgently required. As is 
education and awareness amongst users of the consequences of their on-
line behaviours for system security; 
• Opportunities exist for the further refinement of e-forensic methodologies 
and processes such as those developed by CTOSE and these must include 
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recognition of the dynamic and multi-faceted nature of the forensic 
computing domain; and 
• Enhancing e-forensic professionalism through the rapid development of 
processes for e-forensic computing competences and certification is an 
essential element in building and implementing integrated solutions. 
This case confirms that organisations continue to face significant challenges in 
responding to threats of criminal, illegal or inappropriate on-line behaviours 
(see 2.2.2). Management approaches and the development of policies and 
procedures continue to be developed in this area as part of the solution for 
these challenges (see 2.6.1 and 2.6.2). However, this chapter also reveals that 
these developments, aimed at responding to the challenges pose their own 
issues for adoption, implementation and use. 
6.5 Summary Reflection on the Chapter 
This chapter provided analysis of the development, outputs and results of EU 
funded Cyber Tools On-Line Search for Evidence (CTOSE) project through 
analysis of the framework and a review of its achievement and results 
following completion of the project. As a result of the researcher's close 
collaboration with the CTOSE project, this analysis is able to examine some of 
the key issues that inhibited the framework's commercialisation, adoption and 
use by organisations for whom it was developed. The analysis highlights the 
practical challenges faced at the organisational level in the implementation of 
models and tools for digital evidence handling. The analysis highlights that 
models and tools that have been developed for handling digital evidence are by 
their very nature and complexity highly problematic to adopt and utilise in 
organisational settings. A key element that continues to inhibit their use is the 
lack of early and comprehensive end-user education. The results highlight 
amongst others the critical need for organisations to have greater 'forensic 
readiness' for dealing with criminal, illegal or inappropriate on-line 
behaviours. 
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7 Interpretation and Discussion: Forensic Computing 
Perspective" 
"The outcome of any serious research can only be to make two 
questions grow where only one grew before." (Thorstein Veblen, 185 7-  
1929) 
7.1 Introduction 
By adopting a forensic computing perspective this chapter will examine the 
inter-relationships between the challenges for digital evidence identified across 
the three cases and draw out their implications for emerging responses to 
criminal, illegal and inappropriate on-line behaviours. This examination 
explores the inter-relationships through nine challenges which form the basis of 
the four key research findings. 
The chapter also presents a discussion of the four research findings that support 
a more coherent and holistic approach to understanding, implementing and 
evaluating digital evidence and responses to criminal, illegal and inappropriate 
14  Please note some of the material presented in this chapter has been adapted from materials 
first published in the following peer reviewed publications: 
Broucek, V., & Turner, P. (2005). "Riding Furiously in All Directions" - Implications of 
Uncoordinated Technical, Organisational and Legal Responses to Illegal or 
Inappropriate On-line Behaviours. In P. Turner & V. Broucek (Eds.), E1CAR 2005 
Conference Best Paper Proceedings (pp. 190-203). Saint Julians, Malta: EICAR. 
Broucek, V., & Turner, P. (2005). Considerations for e-forensics: Insights into Implications of 
Uncoordinated Technical, Organisational and Legal Responses to Illegal or 
Inappropriate On-line Behaviours. International Scientific Journal of Computing, 
4(2), 17-25. 
Broucek, V., Turner, P., & Frings, S. (2005). Music piracy, universities and the Australian 
Federal Court: Issues for forensic computing specialists. Computer Law & Security 
Report, 21(1), 30-37. 
Broucek, V., & Turner, P. (2006). Winning the Battles, Losing the War? Rethinking 
Methodology for Forensic Computing Research. Journal in Computer Virology, 2(1), 
3-12. 
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on-line behaviours. It is anticipated that these forensic computing findings will 
contribute to addressing the inherent paradoxes across technical, legal and 
organisational domains. 
From the three cases described in previous chapters it has been confirmed that 
each area is facing its own significant challenges. Research and development in 
each area is working on solutions for these challenges, and some examples 
have been provided. However, this research has also highlighted that these 
developments tend to concentrate on 'fixing their own' challenges without 
consideration of any knock-on effects for other areas. 
From a forensic computing perspective, this raises concerns about digital 
evidence and about the inter-relationships amongst technical, legal and 
organisational solutions being developed. More specifically, the concern is that 
these solutions are adversely impacting on one another with detrimental 
impacts for digital evidence and responses to computer misuse (see 2.2.2). 
Before exploring these inter-relationships across the three cases, it is useful to 
revisit the primary research questions. 
Research Question 1: What are the key technical, legal and organisational 
challenges of digital evidence? 
Research Question 2: What inter-relationships exist between technical, legal 
and organisational approaches and what implications do these have for the 
responses being developed? 
Analyses in chapters 4, 5, and 6 have generated insights that contribute directly 
to answering these questions. The first part of this chapter will revisit the 
analyses from these chapters and adopting a forensic computing perspective 
will identify challenges for digital evidence. 
7.2 Interpretation across three Cases 
Analyses of the data from the three cases presented in chapters 4, 5 and 6 have 
identified challenges for digital evidence from technical, legal and 
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organisational perspectives. This section aims to examine the inter-
relationships amongst these challenges and to interpret their significance for 
emerging responses to criminal, illegal or inappropriate on-line behaviours. 
7.2.1 Key Inter-relationships and Digital Evidence 
In examining the key inter-relationships amongst the challenges identified in 
each case, this section commences by drawing on the technical challenges 
identified in Case A and explores their inter-relationships with the other cases. 
This is followed by an examination of the legal challenges identified in Case B 
in relation to the other cases. Finally, this section explores the organisational 
challenges identified in Case C in relation to the other cases. 
The key technical challenges identified in Case A are: 
1. Quality of collected data including factors of its reliability, 
completeness and correctness; 
2. Problems with establishing clear timelines; 
3. Need for correlation of data from various sources including possibility 
of tainting the data during the process; and 
4. Reproducibility of analysis of these data using various and even same 
tools. 
Challenge 1: Quality of collected data including factors of its reliability, 
completeness and correctness. 
Case A demonstrates that quality of data collected by SNORT is questionable 
for the purposes of computer security and intrusion detection. The data 
collected by SNORT may not be complete, may not be able to give a 'full 
picture' and most importantly can even be incorrect. This has been clearly 
demonstrated by the identification of a bug in the version used for the 
experiment. Significantly, this illustrates that from a technical perspective, the 
system is not providing the protection that it is ostensibly designed to provide. 
As it will be discussed in section 7.3, solutions being developed to respond to 
these technical issues further compound the challenges for digital evidence. 
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From a legal perspective, the fact that the data cannot be guaranteed complete 
or correct renders such data inadmissible or at least invalid in court of law 
(Sommer, 1998b). This directly supports Sommer's conclusion that 
"current intrusion systems are not designed to collect and protect the 
integrity of the type of information required to conduct law enforcement 
investigations" (Sommer, 1998b). 
From an organisational perspective, the unreliability of the data potentially 
creates an increased workload on system personnel who need to analyse the 
data. It also puts organisation in the risk of false alarms and/or can make 
organisation falsely believe that it is protected against intrusion detection while 
it may not actually be protected at all. Alternatively, the organisation may 
wrongly accuse another organisation for wrongdoing as it could easily happen 
in the Case A study. 
Challenge 2: Problems with establishing clear timelines 
The case study demonstrates that various computer security tools needed to 
analyse collected data can produce different time stamp results. While this may 
not be relevant for IDS purposes, this might be a significant factor if such data 
were to be used as digital evidence. 
From a legal perspective this challenge creates a similar legal challenge as the 
Challenge 1 above. This could additionally cause issues regarding chain of 
evidence rules and correct timeline. 
From an organisational perspective this might not be such a big problem, until 
the organisation decides that it wants to use the data as digital evidence. Yet 
again, this shows how closely all the areas are inter-related. 
Challenge 3: Need for correlation of data from various sources including 
possibility of tainting the data during the process 
Data collected by the tool itself may not be enough to produce enough data to 
ascertain real source of intrusion. There is a need to correlate data from 
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different sources to get 'full picture'. Such correlation can be done either by 
hand or by another computer tool. Both approaches further problematicise 
quality of final data as they both can create errors or misinterpretation. It has 
indeed been shown that at least one commercial product actually misinterpreted 
data collected in Case A so much that it has been dropped from this thesis. 
From a legal perspective, the need for correlation of data from various sources 
poses significant challenge. The correlated data are different from 'original 
data' and questions of chain of the evidence are immediately raised. The 
manipulation of original data can again create errors. Additionally, questions of 
reproducibility would arise from such manipulation again. For correlation of 
data from various sources, common attribute is needed. This attribute is 
obviously the time; however, it has been shown in Challenge 2 above that 
technical tools have problem with keeping correct time stamps. 
From an organisational perspective, this brings expense and need for additional 
resources both in technical area as well as in human resources. Correlation of 
digital data where gigabytes of it are collected is nearly impossible to do 'by 
hand' and suitable tools can be very expensive, complicated to use and they 
often require significant computing resources. 
Challenge 4: Reproducibility of analysis of these data using various and 
even same tools (different versions producing different results) 
The case study demonstrated that reproducibility of the results is questionable. 
Various tools will produce different results (for example different resolution of 
time stamps from exactly same data) and even re-analysing the collected data 
with newer version of the same tool can produce different result. This has been 
confirmed when the data was re-analysed with version that fixed bug identified 
in the cases study. 
From a legal perspective, this challenge only reinforces legal implications of 
Challenges 1 — 3 above. As various forensic experts have access to different 
tools, this reinforces calls for standardised testing and evaluation of forensic 
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tools. It has been shown in Case B that University of Tasmania did not have 
access to EnCASE tool used by the counsel for music industry and this caused 
significant questions about the process of e-discovery in the case. The case 
being about breach of copyright, it was rather interesting when forensic expert 
for music industry offered the University of Tasmania to loan his license to run 
EnCASE locally ("Sony Music Entertainment (Australia) Limited v University 
of Tasmania [2003] FCA 532 (30 May 2003)," 2003). It is author's opinion 
that this would be in direct breach of EnCASE licensing agreement. 
From an organisational perspective, this highlights need for the organisations 
to be ready for possible investigation. This yet again reinforces calls for 
'forensic readiness' to be part of organisational standard ICT policies and 
procedures. 
Compared with the speed of development in the technical area, development in 
legal area is often very slow and cumbersome. Development of new laws is 
often very slow and complicated by the need to satisfy many other 
requirements than just legal. Political issues can play significant role as it has 
been apparent in post 9/11 developments in anti-terrorism laws. 
The key legal challenges identified in Case B are: 
5. Legal validity and admissibility of collected data; 
6. Questions of privacy and confidentiality; and 
7. Lack of technical knowledge by legal profession. 
Challenge 5: Legal validity and admissibility of collected data 
The problem of legal validity and admissibility of evidence (collected data) is 
well understood by legal profession but not by people who actually collect the 
data. It has been shown that legal validity and admissibility evidence used in 
Case B was at least questionable. No proper forensic technique was used to 
collect initial evidence and subsequent copying of initial backups from tapes to 
the set of hard disks for further analysis by forensic expert was done by one of 
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the system administrators at the University premises without proper control of 
the chain of the evidence. 
From a technical perspective this again stresses the fact that current computer 
security or standard system utilities (for example backup utilities as used in the 
case of the University of Tasmania) were not designed to collect digital 
evidence. 
From an organisational perspective, the case supports the notion of forensic 
preparedness for companies. If a company is approached to collect data by 
outside request or if the need arises internally, the company has to be prepared 
to do so in forensically sound way — that is in a way that will produce data (or 
evidence) suitable as an evidence in a case of criminal, illegal or other 
inappropriate on-line behaviours. It has been recommended (e.g. CTOSE 
project) that organisation always attempts to collect data in the highest possible 
quality; that is as if it were preparing for criminal case. 
This requirement of course means that company needs to have not only suitable 
tools, but also suitably trained personnel. Additionally, it has to have in place 
policies and procedures to manage this. 
Challenge 6: Questions of privacy and confidentiality 
The Case B demonstrates that improperly conducted collection of digital 
evidence and/or even discovery of such evidence can have significant 
implications for privacy and confidentiality. In the case analysed in Chapter 5, 
the request was made for copy of e-mails of all members of the University of 
Tasmania (all students and staff). This could have significant implication for 
confidentiality of student data and more significantly for the confidentiality of 
research being conducted at the University. It has been commented by 
McCullagh and Caelli (2003) (Professor Caelli being one of the leading 
computer security experts) that 
"A further point about this case is that the court has in effect condoned 
an organisation, in this case Sony, to undertake a fishing expedition for 
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evidence in the possession, power or control of a third party. It is 
similar to an order that party A (Sony) has the right to rifle through a 
filing cabinet or filing cabinets under the possession power or control 
of party B (the Universities) so as to locate some information (the 
certainty of which is unknown) that may incriminate party C who at the 
time is indeterminate (unknown university students)."(McCullagh & 
Caelli, 2003) 
From a technical perspective, this challenge again raises the question of 'how 
much data to collect'. As it has been shown, probably most ideal situation 
would be to collect 'everything'. Unfortunately, such solution is technically 
impossible and collecting 'everything' is usually viable for short time purposes 
only. Even if it was possible, then the issues of privacy arise again and 
techniques would have to be developed to protect individuals' privacy. At the 
same moment, the same techniques would have to enable efficient 
investigation and analysis of collected data. These two requirements of course 
are contradictory and demonstrate one of the biggest paradoxes of today's 
world of computer security and forensic computing. 
From an organisational perspective, this challenge highlights how lack of pro-
active measures can cause risk to organisation's intellectual property, its 
employees' privacy and possibly to confidentiality of data being held on 
organisation's digital systems. While the University of Tasmania had 
appropriate policies about usage of University networks and computers in 
place, there were no procedures in place to avoid this legal case. 
Challenge 7: Lack of technical knowledge by legal profession 
Legal profession lacks in the knowledge of contemporary technology, judges 
are often nearly computer illiterate. Judges have poor understanding of 
technological terms. The case demonstrates this fact on judge's insistence of 
producing backup tapes that have already been overwritten with different data 
as a source of possible evidence. 
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From a technical perspective, this means that developers of technical solutions 
for digital evidence must keep in mind that they are not dealing with computer 
professionals but rather with audience with limited computer knowledge. In 
some legal systems this does not mean judges only, but also juries. The tools 
and techniques being developed seem to be concentrating more on computer 
professionals and while some of the presentation capabilities of these tools are 
impressive, to understand these is sometimes difficult even for computer 
professionals (for example 3D visualisation graphs used in tool called CA 
eTrust Network Forensics). 
From an organisational perspective, this means that organisation must be 
prepared to deal with sometimes unreasonable requests and be prepared to 
produce materials suitable for personnel without much technical knowledge. It 
is even more important to realise that digital evidence must be understandable 
by personnel with limited technical knowledge in cases of inappropriate on-line 
behaviours that are not being dealt with by courts, but for example by internal 
investigation only. 
The key organisational challenges identified in Case C are: 
8. Lack of user education; and 
9. Problematic or missing policies and procedures. 
Challenge 8: Lack of user education 
The case study demonstrated that lack of user education at end-user, network 
administrator and management levels can lead organisations to face numerous 
challenges in detecting, reporting, managing and responding to computer 
misuse. For example, a lack of end-user education about proper use of e-mail 
illustrates the potential for computer security and privacy issues to arise by the 
use of inherently insecure products (for example POP based e-mail systems) 
(Broucek & Turner, 2002b). Despite technical awareness of the insecure nature 
of the POP protocol (Myers & Rose, 1996), it is still widely used by many 
organisations who would profess to be concerned about computer misuse. 
151 
From a technical perspective, lack of user education may lead towards 
incorrect use of tools not suitable for specific tasks. This user education must 
be understood as education of end-users as well as systems administrators and 
most importantly the management. As an example, individuals concerned 
about their privacy and security may adopt encryption tools to increase their 
sense of security and privacy. Unfortunately, while this can increase the 
technical security of the data, it is easy for end-users to implement it 
incorrectly or to manage their encryption keys insecurely, thereby undermining 
the encryption protocols. For organisations, these end-user behaviours can also 
pose significant problems, including data access and management, commercial 
confidentiality and employee management. 
From a legal perspective, the use of encryption by individuals as well as by 
public and private sector organisations has become increasingly common. For 
policy-makers access to encryption creates issues in relation to law 
enforcement, privacy and surveillance powers. Clearly for criminals, hackers 
and other individuals engaging in illegal or inappropriate behaviours, 
encryption provides protection. As the Aldrich Ames Spy case illustrated 
(Reno, 1996), encrypted data files obtained as part of an investigation are 
basically useless as evidence. 
Challenge 9: Problematic or missing policies and procedures 
The case study also confirmed that problematic policies, policies that are not 
explained and/or are too draconian can cause more trouble than benefit. As it 
has been noted, imposing unnecessary restrictions on use of company e-mail 
accounts for private purposes may lead to wide spread adoption of 
unauthorised software, for example access to 'free' e-mail services (Gmail, 
hotmail, yahoo etc) (Broucek & Turner, 2002b). Ultimately this ends up 
increasing the security risks faced by organisations, as the typical end-users 
may be 'lazy' or complacent about the use and re-use of usernames and 
passwords. 
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From a technical perspective, problematic policies dramatically increase the 
burden of 'unnecessary' monitoring, perceptions of 'big brother' surveillance 
and may lead to creating an environment of fear and self-monitoring that may 
produce further unhelpful behaviours in the organisation. 
From a legal perspective, both employees and organisations are increasing the 
risk of breaches of personal privacy, but also significantly the risk of increased 
vulnerability to loss of intellectual property and other criminal, illegal or 
inappropriate on-line behaviours. 
This section has presented an exploration of the inter-relationships amongst 
technical, legal and organisational challenges identified in Chapters 4, 5 and 6. 
This exploration has highlighted the inter-connectedness across these domains. 
The next section of this chapter presents a discussion of the research findings 
and considers them within the context of the research literature (see Chapter 2). 
The four key research findings are based on a synthesis of the nine challenges 
examined above. 
7.3 Discussion of Findings 
The section presents a discussion of the research findings that support a more 
coherent and holistic approach to understanding, implementing and evaluating 
digital evidence and responses to criminal, illegal and inappropriate on-line 
behaviours. It is anticipated that these forensic computing findings will 
contribute to addressing the inherent paradoxes across technical, legal and 
organisational domains. 
From the definition of forensic computing advocated by Broucek & Turner 
(2006) as being 
"processes or procedures involving monitoring, collection, analysis 
and presentation of digital evidence as part of `a priori' and/or `post-
mortem' investigations of criminal, illegal or other inappropriate on-
line behaviours" 
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and the taxonomy of forensic computing developed by Broucek & Turner 
(2001a, 2001b) and further expanded by Hannan, Frings et al. (2003) and 
Hannan, Turner et al.(2003), it is clear that technical, legal and organisational 
responses to computer misuse are intimately related and influence each other. 
The taxonomy covers a broad range of issues and approaches impinging on the 
emerging discipline of forensic computing. It highlights that any coherent 
research framework must acknowledge differences in the focus of the 
approaches: individual, organisational, national, and supra-national; differences 
in the scale of systems: personal computer and other individual devices; 
intranet; extranet, VPN and the Internet; and differences in the participants and 
audiences engaged in these topics. 
The key findings from this research thesis are: 
1. Data collected by computer security tools can contain errors, be 
incomplete or be open to incorrect analysis and interpretation. Collected 
digital data alone, rarely provide enough data to confidently generate a 
complete picture of what has happened on the system and how this 
relates to any computer misuse and the 'last mile' connection with 
identifiable user. 
2. Current approaches towards 'forensic readiness' within technical, legal 
and organisational domains continue to be merely a 'band aid' approach 
that appears to be increasingly ineffective. Presuming forensic capacity 
or trying to add it post facto is unlikely to be effective going forward. It 
is therefore necessary to start developing technical tools, legal 
frameworks and organisational policies that contain 'forensic readiness' 
in their designs. 
3. Lack of education and training about the inter-relationships between 
technical, legal and organisational responses to computer misuse is 
inhibiting the development of coherent and holistic approaches to 
forensic computing. Critically, for organisations (public and private) 
this requires a more proactive approach to acknowledging these inter- 
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relationships in their approaches to detecting, reporting and managing 
criminal, illegal or inappropriate on-line behaviours. 
4. Current approaches to 'technology neutral' legislation are sensible, but 
they need to be more coherently embedded in 'technology neutral' 
legislative frameworks that can operate within and between 
jurisdictions (local, national, international). At the level of legal 
practice there is a need for widely agreed 'best practices' for collection, 
preservation and presentation of digital evidence and standardised 
testing and evaluation of the tools and for certification of expert 
witnesses. 
Next section discusses each finding in more detail. 
Key Finding 1: Data collected by computer security tools can contain errors, 
be incomplete or be open to incorrect analysis and interpretation. Collected 
digital data alone, rarely provide enough data to confidently generate a 
complete picture of what has happened on the system and how this relates to 
any computer misuse and the 'last mile' connection with identifiable user. 
It is not possible to rely on existing technology to provide fully reliable 
evidence. It has been validated in this research that some tools used for 
collection of electronic evidence can provide both erroneous as well as 
incomplete data. In many cases, even where evidence is correlated from several 
different tools to obtain an improved analysis and interpretation of the data, 
challenges remain. This correlation can be done manually, potentially 
introducing human error factor, or using other tools, introducing again both 
human factor (tool used incorrectly) and/or problematic functionality of the 
new tool. 
Case A clearly demonstrates that the results obtained were at least misleading, 
if not completely erroneous. It also clearly demonstrates that data obtained 
from the tool were not good enough to identify the misleading information, and 
that additional data or further investigation was needed. These points clearly 
demonstrate how current gaps in technology can be used by attackers 
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deploying anti-forensic tools. For example, to avoid detection attackers can use 
the 'decoy' mode of the NMAP tool that is used for network reconnaissance 
and probing to avoid detection (see 2.4.4). 
Additionally, it is important to realise, that digital data alone cannot identify 
the actual user of the digital device. This can particularly be a problem in 
shared environments (computer labs) and be compounded by bad user practices 
(sharing passwords, leaving computers while being fully logged in etc). This 
fact calls for recognition of 'last mile' problem (Hannan & Turner, 2004). This 
problem highlights that the person involved in conducting criminal, illegal or 
inappropriate behaviour may not be the person whose login credentials are 
currently used at the computer. For forensic computing investigators it also 
highlights that they need to address the possibility of the computer being 
compromised and used as an intermediary in their investigations otherwise they 
are open to the legitimate legal defence of SODDI type (see 2.5.3). 
Key Finding 2: Current approaches towards 'forensic readiness' within 
technical, legal and organisational domains continue to be merely a 'band aid' 
approach that appears to be increasingly ineffective. Presuming forensic 
capacity or trying to add it post facto is unlikely to be effective going forward. 
It is therefore necessary to start developing technical tools, legal frameworks 
and organisational policies that contain 'forensic readiness' in their designs. 
With the exception of several products developed specifically for forensic 
analysis of electronic evidence, most of computer security tools that 'could' 
provide forensic evidence do not provide it. Furthermore, the development in 
computer security tools makes this even more complicated, since the presumed 
increased security is often making it impossible or more difficult to collect any 
forensically sound data. One example could be development of Intrusion 
Prevention Systems (IPS) instead of Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS). While 
the later was only detecting and alerting with the possibility of collecting some 
(albeit questionable data), the new system simply 'pulls the plug' on possible 
attacker without giving any evidential data. 
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Both Key Finding 1 and Finding 2 are well support by the body of available 
literature and by findings by other researchers as discusses in 2.4.2 and 2.4.3. 
Resulting from these two findings are two paradoxes of current understanding 
of the play, where: 
1. Increased sophistication of technical measures hampers capability of 
these measures to collected digital evidence; and 
2. There still exist the misconception that forensic computing is equal or 
at least is part of computer security (see 2.4.1). 
Key Finding 3: Lack of education and training about the inter-relationships 
between technical, legal and organisational responses to computer misuse is 
inhibiting the development of coherent and holistic approaches to forensic 
computing. Critically, for organisations (public and private) this requires a 
more proactive approach to acknowledging these inter-relationships in their 
approaches to detecting, reporting and managing criminal, illegal or 
inappropriate on-line behaviours. 
Many organisations do have security policies, usage agreements and risk 
management policies, but there is visible lack of forensic policies. This in turn 
creates lack of preparedness. Organisations are prepared to deal with breach of 
security by plugging security holes, installing patches, but there are hardly 
policies/procedures for proper investigation — again, business continuity has 
highest priority mostly. 
Organisations are still unprepared. This was demonstrated by: 
• Development of CTOSE and inability to commercialise this project 
although the results were considered to be very good and promising (Case 
C); and 
• The way collection of the evidence was handled in the RI v. AU (Case B). 
Users are uneducated and often threatened by security and privacy policies 
imposed on them by organisations. In many cases they do not receive proper 
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explanation of why and what for these policies are. Cases have been reported 
where end user that was sure of not doing anything wrong rather paid ransom 
money than calling security officer in fear of being dismissed from the 
company. 
Many organisations spend vast amount of money on training system and 
network administrators, on computer security tools, on establishing computer 
security officer positions, but rarely do they spend much on forensic readiness. 
In many cases, collection of evidential material is done by system and network 
administrators without minimal or even no knowledge of proper collection of 
the evidence, not mentioning proper handling of it and its continuity. 
It has been noted in Challenge 9 above, that imposing unnecessary restrictions 
on use of company e-mail accounts for private purposes may lead to wide 
spread adoption of unauthorised software, for example access to 'free' e-mail 
services (Gmail, hotmail, yahoo etc) (Broucek & Turner, 2002b). Ultimately 
this ends up increasing the security risks faced by organisations, as the typical 
end-users may be 'lazy' or complacent about the use and re-use of usernames 
and passwords. 
This leads to situation where it can be concluded that: 
• User education does not work, or 
• Temptation of the technology is bigger than the fear and desire for privacy, 
or 
• Perhaps computer security people are too much concerned. 
Something needs to be done and it clearly demonstrates need for: 
• Change and improvement in education of managers and decision makers in 
the organisation since the current situation is often cause by: 
o lack of money, 
o inertia in the system that is in paradox with rapid change in 
technology, 
o wrong pretence of better security, 
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o wrong understanding of the need for monitoring and data 
collection (e.g. collection of proxy log files as possible evidence 
of visited sites by individual users for cases of inappropriate 
usage — these log files do not have any value, since they only 
show 'who authenticated' during the access, but not who was 
sitting in front of the computer — 'last mile problem'), 
• Change and improvement in education of systems administrators who often 
blindly follow management orders or have to work with whatever they 
have available and provide substandard, insecure and privacy breaching 
products to the users. 
Business continuity is often more important than investigation and instead of 
allowing continuous investigation of the security breach, company rather 'pulls 
the plug'. From the perspective of allowing ongoing security breaches for 
evidence acquisition, it is clear that the Rome Labs case (Christy, 1998), the 
Mitnick case (Shimomura, 1995), the development and use of 'Honey pots' 
(Even, 2000; Spitzner & Roesch, 2001a, 2001b) and the tracking of computer 
espionage (Clifford Stoll, 1988; Cliff Stoll, 1989) provide strong arguments 
against 'pulling the plug'. These cases illustrate the advantages for forensic 
investigations of tracking and tracing hackers during ongoing security 
breaches. On the upside of this, the highly published Microsoft case (B. Bace, 
2000; Leyden, 2000; Maher, 2001; Microsoft Responds to Security Issue," 
2000; Mitnick, 2000; Poulsen, 2000; Rohde, 2000; Sliwa, 2000; Verton, 2000; 
Weiss & Rosencrance, 2000) highlights how sensitive this issue can be, 
particularly for information and communication based industries. Here 
business reputation as well as specific commercial data are at risk and must 
therefore be protected. 
Key Finding 4: Current approaches to 'technology neutral' legislation are 
sensible, but they need to be more coherently embedded in 'technology neutral' 
legislative frameworks that can operate within and between jurisdictions (local, 
national, international). At the level of legal practice there is a need for widely 
agreed 'best practices' for collection, preservation and presentation of digital 
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evidence and standardised testing and evaluation of the tools and for 
certification of expert witnesses. 
The computer crime is often multi-jurisdictional. While the actual crime (or 
breach of computer security later resulting in crime) can occur in one country, 
the perpetrator can be located in another country. It is not only problem 
between countries; it can also be within one country that has different state 
laws covering such crimes. For example, in Australia, it is often unclear 
whether the activity is covered by state or federal law at the beginning of the 
investigation. 
Additionally, different countries are using different legal systems, making 
digital crime even more complicated. The way courts deal with new crimes is 
completely different in procedural legal system than in precedential legal 
system. The need for juries in some legal systems even increases need for 	 —11 
CID having sound laws and, significantly, procedures for presentation of digital 	 c:C 
evidence. In these systems the lack in knowledge of modern technology by 
judges, banisters and other legal professions is compounded by need to deal 
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with jury. Members of jury can have even less knowledge, or significantly 
better knowledge, particularly in younger generation. 
L1-1 
>c' 
An example of a judge's poor understanding of technology has been given in 
Case B where the judge's ruling was that overwritten magnetic tape is in his 
learned opinion equal to deleted magnetic tape. Lawyers are also often lacking 
technical knowledge, although the 'new generation' are starting to appear and 
developing expertise in niche fields such as intellectual property and electronic 
crimes. Consequently, this 'poor understanding' by judges could possibly be 
exploited by knowledgeable defence lawyers using novel and unusual tactics, 
for example 'Trojan horse type defence' or 'addiction to hacking' type defence 
as discussed before (see 2.5.3). 
The need for best practices has been highlighted both in Case B and Case C as 
well as in the available body of literature, for example (Brungs & Jamieson, 
2005; Yasinsac, et al., 2003). The problems with different interpretation of 
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laws and best practices have been demonstrated in section 2.5.2 on example of 
state of Queensland requirement to use the original data (computer) during 
presentation in the court. 
Legislation remains lacking behind developments in technology and unless 
technologically neutral legislation is developed, it will remain so. 
Qualification requirements for expert witnesses are questionable, in some 
jurisdictions nearly non-existent. Access to quality equipment and forensic 
investigation tools is hampered by high cost and in some case by only limited 
availability. Interestingly, some tools are available to law enforcement agencies 
only. This prevents these tools from being independently examined and 
validated. This in turn creates difficulties in validating the evidence. In some 
cases (RI v. AU) prosecution has access to the tools; however, the tools are not 
available to the defence. 
At the broadest level, these four key research findings reveal the complex inter-
relationships in the forensic computing domain and confirm that they are likely 
to continue into the future as a result of uncoordinated research and 
development, commercial product development and difficulties of legal theory 
and practice. 
The underlying paradoxes prevalent within the forensic computing domain 
result from the different concerns, interests and expectations of stakeholders 
and the nature and foci of research and development in each domain. This in 
turn ultimately leads to developments that are beneficial for improved 
performance in one area and at the same moment creates new challenges and 
inhibitors in another area. These circumstances have the on-going potential to 
trigger 'chain reactions' that ultimately may lead to more significant challenges 
than the problems they solve. 
This research also reveals that the digital domain itself is also intimately related 
to the physical world where corroborative evidence and conventional 
investigative techniques have an equally important role to play. Ultimately, it is 
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human behaviours that create these ongoing opportunities, challenges and 
risks. As a result, 'forensic readiness' also implies being able to grapple with 
moral, ethical and even political dimensions of these debates across the 'last 
mile' connection between digital behaviours and identifiable citizens. 
In this context, forensic computing emerges as an approach that does not 
advocate for stronger laws, stricter technical systems and/or organisational 
protocols per se, but rather for the beginning of dialogue amongst these 
different requirements. In responding to the complex inter-relationships and 
definitional problems identified in this research, it is clear that solutions 
developed need to be aware of their specific aims and objectives as well as the 
broader context, if we are to avoid the on-going 'band-aid' approaches. 
7.4 Summary Reflection on the Chapter 
This chapter provided an interpretation and discussion of the complete data set. 
The interpretation of the data brought together analyses conducted in Chapters 
4 to 6. 
The interpretation and discussion of the analyses from the three cases adopted a 
forensic computing perspective and focused on the nature of the inter-
relationships between the issues identified in each case. From this perspective 
the discrete approaches adopted in each case limit an appreciation of the 
complex interplay between technical, legal and organisational factors. This 
interplay continues to have serious implications for each of these areas because 
of the nature of digital environments. More specifically this interpretation and 
discussion reveals how and why this continued fragmentation of discrete 
approaches is impairing the overall effectiveness of the responses developed. A 
consequence of this is the lack of integrated and coordinated solutions that 
would effectively balance requirements for legally admissible digital evidence, 
effective e-security and data privacy. 
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8 Conclusion and Future Work 
"If we knew what it was we were doing, it would not be called research, 
would it?" (Albert Einstein) 
8.1 Introduction 
This thesis concludes by providing a brief synthesis of the major challenges 
identified and the key research findings. This chapter discusses the 
contributions this thesis makes to the development of forensic computing and 
to understanding of complex inter-relationships between three major areas — 
technical, legal and organisational. 
This thesis addresses two research questions: 
Research Question 1: What are the key technical, legal and organisational 
challenges of digital evidence? 
Research Question 2: What inter-relationships exist between technical, legal 
and organisational approaches and what implications do these have for the 
responses being developed? 
8.2 Synthesis of Findings 
This section presents a short summary review of this research. The first three 
parts briefly summarise preliminary conclusions generated from chapters 4, 5 
and 6. 
8.2.1 Technical Area 
Case A (see Chapter 4) has presented a case study on use of SNORT intrusion 
detection system as a possible candidate for collecting digital evidence data. 
The case study demonstrated that the technology faced significant problems of 
its own. The case study revealed these problems and documented them on an 
example of data collected at the University of Tasmania. 
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The analysis of the Case A concluded (see 4.5) that: 
• IDS systems may collect only a partial data set — it has been shown that 
data collected by SNORT were not sufficient to track and trace attackers 
and that the data collected in the case of encrypted communication using 
SSL had no value in this regard; and 
• The data sets collected may be flawed, erroneous or already have been 
tampered with — it has been shown that even with significant fine-tuning 
SNORT produced numerous false positive alerts and/or wrongly identified 
the source of attacks. 
More significantly, the case study has highlighted that from a legal perspective 
IDS, the data they produce and how that data is analysed, pose numerous 
challenges for those interested in evidence acquisition that produces legally 
admissible evidence. In particular, even where data has been captured the 
process of its technical analysis may invalidate it in terms of legal admissibility 
by 'tampering' with the evidence. 
The case study has also highlighted that the 'collect everything' approach is 
highly desirable but has severe limitations and implications. 
The study also confirms that Intrusion Detection Systems can play an 
important role in protecting Information Systems infrastructure. However, to 
be effective they require attention of highly trained security personnel/system 
administrators. 
8.2.2 Legal Area 
Case B (see Chapter 5) presented analysis of one particular legal case in the 
Federal Court of Australia. 
It has been revealed that even where digital evidence is available and has been 
accepted as admissible, critical issues have emerged over the understanding of 
the courts on the nature of this evidence. For example, this particular case 
being a dispute over the distribution of MP3s by students and staff at the 
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Universities reveals a "worrying lack of comprehension of the technical nature 
of digital logs and data storage" (Broucek, et al., 2003; Broucek & Turner, 
2004a; Broucek, et al., 2005). More specifically, this lack of understanding 
resulted in the provision of access to data sets that contained information on the 
on-line activities of thousands of presumably innocent users and not just data 
on those alleged to be guilty of computer misuse. This provision of 
unprecedented access to huge amounts of potentially sensitive data pertaining 
to the personal, confidential and commercial activities of innocent users is 
clearly of concern and has been called by some authors "fishing expedition" 
(McCullagh & Caelli, 2003). This is especially the case where access to the 
data was not handed over to an independent third party. 
8.2.3 Organisational Area 
Case C (see Chapter 6) presented an analysis of the Cyber Tools On-Line 
Search for Evidence (CTOSE) project. 
It can be concluded that the CTOSE project produced so far most 
comprehensive model and methodology for forensic computing. It contributed 
by accepting the facts that forensic computing investigation is not limited to 
criminal law environment only. 
On the other hand, it produced very complicated model that has unfortunately 
proved too complicated to be widely adopted, if not adopted at all. This 
concern has been confirmed by failure of this project to commercialise and as 
far as the author is aware only one organisation in Europe is still using the 
CTOSE methodology. 
The next part below summarises the interpretation of the inter-relationships 
from Chapter 7. 
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8.2.4 Forensic Computing Perspective 
Each case study revealed its own set of challenges, the inter-relationships 
amongst these cases were presented in chapter 7 (see 7.2.1). A total of nine 
challenges were presented: 
1. Quality of collected data including factors of its reliability, 
completeness and correctness; 
2. Problems with establishing clear timelines; 
3. Need for correlation of data from various sources including possibility 
of tainting the data during the process; 
4. Reproducibility of analysis of these data using various and even same 
tools; 
5. Legal validity and admissibility of collected data; 
6. Questions of privacy and confidentiality; 
7. Lack of technical knowledge by legal profession; 
8. Lack of user education; and 
9. Problematic or missing policies and procedures. 
The next part of this section briefly summarises the key research findings first 
presented in chapter 7 (see 7.3). These four key research findings are based on 
a synthesis of the nine challenges outlined above. 
The key findings from this research thesis are: 
1. Data collected by computer security tools can contain errors, be 
incomplete or be open to incorrect analysis and interpretation. Collected 
digital data alone, rarely provides enough data to confidently generate a 
complete picture of what has happened on the system and how this 
relates to any computer misuse and the 'last mile' connection with 
identifiable user. 
2. Current approaches towards 'forensic readiness' within technical, legal 
and organisational domains continue to be merely a 'band aid' approach 
that appears to be increasingly ineffective. Presuming forensic capacity 
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or trying to add it post facto is unlikely to be effective going forward. It 
is therefore necessary to start developing technical tools, legal 
frameworks and organisational policies that contain 'forensic readiness' 
in their designs. 
3. Lack of education and training about the inter-relationships between 
technical, legal and organisational responses to computer misuse is 
inhibiting the development of coherent and holistic approaches to 
forensic computing. Critically, for organisations (public and private) 
this requires a more proactive approach to acknowledging these inter-
relationships in their approaches to detecting, reporting and managing 
criminal, illegal or inappropriate on-line behaviours. 
4. Current approaches to 'technology neutral' legislation are sensible, but 
they need to be more coherently embedded in 'technology neutral' 
legislative frameworks that can operate within and between 
jurisdictions (local, national, international). At the level of legal 
practice there is a need for widely agreed 'best practices' for collection, 
preservation and presentation of digital evidence and standardised 
testing and evaluation of the tools and for certification of expert 
witnesses. 
8.2.5 Conclusion 
This research thesis concludes that there is no easy solution to resolve the inter-
relationships and paradoxes inherent within forensic computing issues. 
However, by recognising that these paradoxes exist, how they work and what 
their impacts are, measures can be developed to reduce their negative effects. 
This research proposes that only coordinated academic research contributing to 
the emergence of cohesive and holistic approaches to understanding, 
implementing and evaluating the paradoxes within forensic computing can 
produce new approach to forensic computing. 
Without a cohesive and holistic approach, forensic computing will continue to 
suffer from uncoordinated research in all contributing areas and developments 
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in one area will continue compounding problems in other areas. It is 
anticipated that this research thesis has contributed insights that will enable a 
more coherent approach and mitigate the dangers of "Riding Furiously in All 
Directions" (Broucek & Turner, 2005b) and/or continuing "Winning the 
Battles, Losing the War?" (Broucek & Turner, 2006) 
8.3 Limitations of the study 
"The trouble with research is that it tells you what people were 
thinking about yesterday, not tomorrow. It's like driving a car using a 
rear-view mirror." (Bernard Loomis) 
The thesis examined only a limited part of proposed taxonomy of forensic 
computing, that is technical, legal and organisational area. It is envisaged that 
this research provides foundation to subsequent forensic computing research in 
the future. 
The data for the three cases studies have been collected in early stages of this 
research. It has been conducted as part-time PhD study and subsequently some 
of the tools and sites mentioned in the study have been deprecated since then. 
At the beginning of this study in 2001, there was a very limited body of 
literature pertaining to forensic computing. Since 2001, the amount of available 
literature grew exponentially, conferences and workshops were held and 
several forensic computing journals appeared. This demonstrates huge interest 
in the topic and it can be expected that this interest will grow even more. 
Case A examined one particular intrusion detection system available at the 
time when the data were collected. The case in no way attempts to compare 
SNORT intrusion detection system with another IDS and it does not attempt to 
determine the technical quality of the system. The main concern of this thesis 
was the suitability of such system for collection of digital evidence and to 
illustrate problems that technology faces on its own and then to illuminate 
problems arising from using this technology for collecting digital evidence. 
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Case B examined one particular legal case in context of Australian legal 
system. The case has been examined on a basis of available court materials 
(judgements and transcripts) and with additional insights gained through direct 
access to some of the people directly involved in the case. In the end, the case 
was settled out of court and the settlement conditions remain confidential. 
Case C examined EU funded CTOSE project. This project received significant 
funding and attention across Europe and many major institutions were involved 
in the project. The results were considered to be very positive and it was 
expected that the CTOSE solutions would become 'de-facto' standard across 
the Europe. The analysis of the project was to some degree limited by 
confidentiality of some information available through direct participation in 
some CTOSE activities. 
All research methods have a set of strengths and weaknesses. Some limitations 
of this research are directly linked to the selected methodology. Case study 
research can be influenced by the way the data collection and analysis were 
conducted (Galliers, 1992). Researcher's background and experiences can also 
affect researcher's interpretation of the data (Yin, 1994). 
Further limitations of a case study research stem from the scope of the 
research, in particular if it is conducted as a requirement for fulfilment of 
doctoral thesis. The amount of time, funding and resources is strictly limited. 
Fortunately, these limitations are predetermined and defined by the rules and 
guidelines set by the University overseeing this study. 
The lack of generalisability and possible research bias are possibly the biggest 
limitations of this study. The bias is unavoidable in any case study research. 
The influence of the researcher conducting the research creates a bias when 
data collection is in progress. In this particular case, researcher's employment 
as Information and Communication Technology Manager at the University and 
his extensive 'hands-on' experience in systems management and security could 
potentially create bias towards technological issues and challenges. 
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However, the author believes that he was as objective and unbiased as possible 
and the presented results can be used in general context. 
8.4 Future Work 
This research clearly identifies the need for targeted research into forensic 
computing and different prime focus in relation to which type of organisation 
this research is done in. It is necessary to realise that by the nature of the 
business they conduct, different stakeholders have completely different interest 
and expectations from forensic computing. 
Forensic computing is a multidisciplinary field and it is imperative to follow 
findings and results of all the contributing fields. As it has been highlighted by 
recent appearance of conferences and workshops, it is necessary to conduct 
more research not only into human behaviour and security, but also into human 
behaviour and forensic computing. 
Key Proposal: Existing models are not general enough to address the multi-
dimensional aspects of forensic computing and the definitional ambiguities that 
continue to hamper the dialogue necessary to move forward. One possible 
solution would be to adopt a mathematical approach towards the development 
of a mathematical model as suggested by Filiol (2006b). 
It is also necessary to address 'post 9/11 issues'. Although the 9/11 events 
clearly illustrated that communication networks can be heavily hit and even 
disabled without actually targeting them, most of the reactions appear to be of 
'knee-jerk' type of reactions. New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) had to be 
shut down not because it would be targeted, but because it lost network 
connection to the rest of the world. It did not lost the network connection 
because the network itself would be targeted, but because there was a much 
longer loss of power to the area that housed major networking infrastructure 
and nobody anticipated that the power will be lost for so long. Emergency 
batteries and generators took over temporarily and then they stopped. Mobile 
phone networks in New York were virtually shut down not because there 
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would be attack on them, they simply were overloaded first and then the 
system could not handle it any more. 
Key Proposal: Systems and procedures must be designed with maximum 
optimisation, with necessary redundancy and no slack in the system. Otherwise 
they cannot cope with an emergency. 
In this context, forensic computing emerges as an approach that does not 
advocate for stronger laws, stricter technical systems and/or organisational 
protocols per se, but rather for the beginning of dialogue amongst these 
different requirements. In responding to the complex inter-relationships 
identified in this research, it is clear that solutions developed need to be aware 
of their specific aims and objectives as well as the broader context if we are to 
avoid the on-going 'band-aid' approaches. 
Key Proposal: The need for rigorous testing and evaluation of software used 
in forensic computing. 
It is clear that without rigorous testing and evaluation, software used in 
forensic computing will always face problems. There is a clear need for 
development of unified methodology for this testing and evaluation, perhaps 
activity similar to that of EICAR (see http://www.eicar.or twenty years ago 
is needed. Indeed, it has been mentioned during interview with Johan ten 
Houten, (2007b) after presentation of his paper (ten Houten, 2007a) at Digital 
Forensic Forum, Prague 2007, that something similar to EICAR's sample/test 
virus would be useful for forensic computing. 
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